Logic, Computation and Set Theory

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Preface

This book is based on my lecture notes and supervision (tutorial) notes for the course entitled "Logic, Computation and Set theory" which is lectured in part II (third year) of the Cambridge Mathematics Tripos. The choice of material is not mine, but is laid down by the Mathematics Faculty Board having regard to what the students have learned in their first two years. Third-year mathematics students at Cambridge have learned a great deal of mathematics—Cambridge is one of the few schools where it is possible for an undergraduate to do nothing but mathematics for three years—but they have done no logic to speak of. Readers who know more logic and less mathematics than did the original audience for this material—and they may well be a majority outside these islands—may find the emphasis rather odd. The part IIb course (of which this is a component) is designed for strong mathematics students who wish to go further and who need some exposure to logic: it was never designed to produce logicians. This book was written to meet a specific need, and to those who suffer that need I offer it in the hope that it can be of help. I offer it also in the hope that it will convey to mathematicians something of the flavour of the distinctive way logicians do mathematics. However, the feature of this book that is perhaps most distinctive—the freewheeling approach to induction—goes back to Conway's beautiful book (*op. cit.*).

Like all teachers I owe a debt to my students. Any researcher needs students for the stimulating questions they ask but in addition those attempting to write textbooks will be grateful to their students for the way they push us to give clearer explanations than our unreflecting familiarity with elementary material normally generates. I particularly want to thank Jonathon Kirby, Rosi Sexton, Tom Jones and David Chan.

Things in **boldface** are usually being **defined**. Things in *italic* are being *emphasised*. Some exercises will be collected at the end of each chapter, but a lot of exercises are to be found in the body of the text. The intention is that they will all have been inserted at the precise stage in the exposition when they become doable.

Contents

Introduction

> In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was also in the beginning with God.
>
> *John's Gospel, ch 1 v 1*

Despite having this text by heart I still have no idea what it means. What I do know is that the word which is translated from the Greek into English as 'word' is $\lambda o\gamma o\sigma$ which also gave us the word 'Logic'. It's entirely appropriate that we use a Greek word since it was the Greeks who invented Logic. They also invented the axiomatic method, in which one makes basic assumptions about a topic from which one then derives conclusions.

Logic exploded into life in the twentieth century with the Hilbert Programme and the famous Incompleteness theorem of Gödel. It is probably a gross simplification to connect the explosive growth in Logic in the twentieth century with the Hilbert programme, but that is the way the story is always told. In his famous 1900 address Hilbert posed various challenges whose solution would perforce mean formalising more mathematics. One particularly pertinent example concerns Diophantine equations, which are equations like $x^3 + y^5 = z^2 + w^3$ where the variable range over integers. Is there a general method for finding out when such equations have solutions in the integers? If there is, of course, one exhibits it and the matter is settled. If there isn't (and as it happens, there isn't) then in order to prove this fact one would have to be able to say something like: "Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an arbitrary algorithm ... " and then establish that $\mathcal{A}$ did not perform as intended. However, to do *that* one would need to have a concept of an algorithm as an arbitrary mathematical object, and this was not available in 1900. Here we treat this topic in chapter 6.

There will be two recurring themes in this book: inductively defined sets, and completeness theorems. The first is well-demarcated and has a technical core which merits a chapter to itself, but the second is more amorphous and deserves to be treated earlier in this introduction.

One of the great insights of twentieth-century logic was that in order to understand how formulæ can bear the meanings they bear we must first strip them of all those meanings so we can see the symbols as themselves. Stripping symbols of all the meanings we have so lovingly bestowed on them over the centuries in various unsystematic ways[1] seems an extremely perverse thing to

[1] The reader is encourged to dip into Cajori's *History of mathematical notations* to see how

do—after all it was only so that they could bear meaning that we invented the things in the first place. But we have to do it so that we can think about formulæ as (perhaps mathematical) objects in their own right, for then can we start to think about how it is possible to ascribe meanings to them in a systematic way that takes account of their internal structure. That makes it possible to prove theorems about what sort of meanings can be borne by languages built out of those symbols. These theorems tend to be called *Completeness theorems*, and it is only a slight exaggeration to say that Logic in the middle of the twentieth century was dominated by the production of them. It's hard to say what it's dominated by now because no age understands itself (A very twentieth century insight!) but it doesn't much matter here because all the material of this book is fairly old and long-established. All the theorems in this will be older than the undergraduate reader; most of them are older than the author.

unsystematic these ways can be, and how many dead ends there have been.

Chapter 1

Definitions and Notations

This chapter is designed to be read in sequence, not merely referred back to. There are even exercises in it to encourage the reader.

I shall use lambda notation for functions. $\lambda x.F(x)$ is the function which, when given x, returns $F(x)$. Thus $\lambda x.x^2$ applied to 2 evaluates to 4. A word is in order at this point on the kind of horror inspired in logicians by passages like this one, picked almost at random from the literature (Ahlfors, Complex Analysis p 69)

> *Suppose that an arc with equation* $z = z(t), \alpha \leq t \leq \beta$ *is contained in a region* Ω*, and let* f *be defined and continuous in* Ω*. Then* $w = w(t) = f(z(t))$ *defines an arc* ...

The linguistic conventions being exploited here can be easily followed by people brought up in them, but they defy explanation in any terms that would make this syntax machine-readable. Lambda notation is more logical. Writing "$w = \lambda t.f(z(t))$" would have been much better practice. I shall also adhere to the universal practice of writing '$\lambda xy.(\dots)$' for '$\lambda x.(\lambda y.(\dots))$'.

I write ordered pairs, triples, etc. with angle brackets: $\langle x, y\rangle$. If x is an ordered pair then $\mathtt{fst}(x)$ and $\mathtt{snd}(x)$ are the first and second components of x. We will also write '$\vec{x}$' for '$x_1 \dots x_n$'.

Structures

A set with a relation (or bundle of relations) associated with it is called a **structure** and we use angle brackets for this too. $\langle X, R\rangle$ is the set X associated with the relation R, and $\langle X, R_1, R_2 \dots R_n\rangle$ is X associated with the bundle of relations—$R_1 \dots R_n$. For example $\langle \mathbb{N}, \leq\rangle$ is the naturals as an ordered set.

The elements are "in" the structure in the sense that they are members of the underlying set—which the predicates are not. Often we will use the same letter in different fonts to denote the structure and the **domain** of the structure, thus: in "$\mathfrak{M} = \langle M, \dots\rangle$" M is the domain of $\mathfrak{M}$. Some writers prefer the longer but more evocative locution that M is the **carrier set** of $\mathfrak{M}$. We may as well

note here the notation '$dom(R)$' (the **domain** of an n-ary relation R) which is the set of things that appear as elements of n-tuples in R.

Notice that it is common and natural to have distinct structures with the same carrier set. The rationals-as-an-ordered-set, the rationals-as-a-field and the rationals-as-an-ordered-field are three distinct structures with the same carrier set. Even if you are happy with the idea of this distinction between carrier-set and structure and will not need for the moment the model-theoretic jargon I am about to introduce in the rest of this paragraph, you may find that it helps to settle your thoughts. The rationals-as-an-ordered-set and the rationals-as-an-ordered-field have the same carrier set, but different signatures (see page 41). We say that the rationals-as-an-ordered-field are an **expansion** of the rationals-as-an-ordered-set, which in turn is a **reduction** of the rationals-as-an-ordered-field. The reals-as-an-ordered-set are an **extension** of the rationals-as-an-ordered-set, and conversely the rationals-as-an-ordered-set are a **substructure** of the reals. Thus:

> Beef up the signature to get an *expansion*
> Beef up the carrier set to get an *extension*
> Throw away some structure to get a *reduction*
> Throw away some of the carrier set to get a *substructure*

We will need the notion of an **isomorphism** between two structures. If $\langle X, R\rangle$ and $\langle Y, S\rangle$ are two structures they are **isomorphic** iff there is a bijection f between X and Y such that for all $x, y \in X$, $R(x, y)$ iff $S(f(x)), (f(y))$.

(This dual use of angle brackets for tupling and for notating structures has just provided us with our first example of **overloading**. "Overloading"!? It's computer science-speak for "using one piece of syntax for two distinct purposes"—commonly and gleefully called "abuse of notation" by mathematicians.)

Intension and extension

Sadly the word 'extension', too, will be overloaded. We will not only have extensions of models—as just now—but extensions of theories (of which more later), and there is even **extensionality**, a property of relations. A binary relation R is extensional if $(\forall x)(\forall y)(x = y \longleftrightarrow (\forall z)(R(x, z) \longleftrightarrow R(y, z))$. Notice that a relation can be extensional without its converse (see below) being extensional: think "square roots". Extensional relations correspond to an injection from a set $X \hookrightarrow \mathcal{P}(X)$.

Finally there is the intension-extension distinction, an informal device, but a standard one we will need at several places. We speak of **functions in intension** and **functions in extension** and similarly 'intensions' and 'extensions' as nouns in their own right. We speak of **relations in intension** and **relations in extension**.

The standard illustration in the literature concerns the two properties of being *human* and being a *featherless biped*—a creature with two legs and no feathers. There is a perfectly good sense in which these concepts are the same

(one can tell that this illustration dates from before the time when the West had encountered Australia with its kangaroos!) but there is also a perfectly good sense in which they are different. We name these two senses by saying that 'human' and 'featherless biped' are the same property in extension, but different properties in intension.

A more modern and more topical illustration is as follows. A piece of code that needs to call another function can do it in either of two ways. If the function being called is going to be called often, on a restricted range of arguments, and is hard to compute, then the obvious thing to do is compute the set of values in advance, and store them in a look-up table in line in the code. On the other hand if the function to be called isn't going to be called very often, and the set of arguments on which it is to be called cannot be constrained in advance, and if there is an easy algorithm available to compute it then the obvious strategy is to write code for that algorithm, and call it when needed. In the first case the embedded subordinate function is represented as a function in extension, and in the second case as a function in intension.

Functions-in-extension are sometimes called the **graph**s of the corresponding functions-in-intension: the graph of a function f is $\{\langle x, y\rangle : x = f(y)\}$.

For years the first question on the example sheet I have been giving my first-year discrete mathematics students has been "How many binary relations are there on a set with n elements?" One cannot begin to answer this unless one realises the question must be "How many binary relations-*in-extension* on a set with n elements?" (There is no answer to "how many binary relations-in-extension ...)

I remember being disquieted—when I was a A-level student—by being shown a proof that if one integrates $\lambda x. \int \frac{1}{x}.dx$ one gets $\lambda x.log(x)$. The proof procedes by showing that the two functions are the same function-in-extension—or at least that they are both roots of the one functional equation, and that didn't satisfy me.

The intension/extension distinction is not a formal technical device, and it does not need to be conceived or used rigorously, but as a piece of mathematical slang it is very useful.

In recent times there has been increasingly the idea that intensions are the sort of things one *evaluates* and that they evaluate to extensions.

Notation for sets and relations

Relations in extension can be thought of as sets of ordered tuples, so we'd better ensure we have properly defined elementary set-theoretic gadgetry to hand.

'$\{x : F(x)\}$' for the set of things that are F and '$\subseteq$' for subset-of are presumably familiar, '$x \supseteq y$' (read 'x is a superset of y') perhaps less so: it means the same as $y \subseteq x$'. Set difference: $x \setminus y$ is the set of things that are in x but not in y. The symmetric difference: $x \Delta y$, of x and y is the set of things in one or other but not both: $(x \setminus y) \cup (y \setminus x)$. (This is sometimes written '`XOR`', but we will reserve `XOR` for the corresponding propositional connective). Sumset: $\bigcup x := \{y : (\exists z)(y \in z \wedge z \in x)\}$; and intersection

$\bigcap x := \{y : (\forall z)(z \in x \to y \in z)\}$. These will also be written in indexed form at times: $\bigcap_{i \in I} A_i$. The **composition** of two relations R and S which is $\{\langle x, z\rangle : (\exists y)(\langle x, y\rangle \in R \wedge \langle y, z\rangle \in S)\}$ is notated '$R \circ S$'. $R \circ R$ is written R^2. R^n similarly. The **inverse** or **converse** of R—written 'R^{-1}' is $\{\langle x, y\rangle : \langle y, x\rangle \in R\}$. However, do not be misled by this exponential notation into thinking that $R \circ R^{-1}$ is the identity. What is it?

It is sometimes convenient to think of a binary relation as a matrix whose entries are `true` and `false`. In principle this is not a good habit, because it forces one to decide on an ordering of the underlying set (rows and columns have to be put down in an order after all) and so is less general than the picture of binary relations-in-extension as sets of ordered pairs. It also assumes thereby that every set can be totally ordered, and this is a non-trivial consequence of the axiom of choice, a contentious assumption of which more later. However it does give a nice picture of converses: the inverse/converse of R corresponds to the transpose of the matrix corresponding to R, and the matrix corresponding to $R \circ S$ is the product of the two matrices in the obvious way.

A relation R is **transitive** if $\forall x \forall y \forall z\, xRy \wedge yRz \to xRz$ (or, in brief, $R^2 \subseteq R$). A relation R is **symmetrical** if $\forall x \forall y (xRy \longleftrightarrow yRx)$ or $R = R^{-1}$.

An **equivalence relation** is symmetrical, transitive and reflexive. An equivalence relation $\sim$ is a **congruence relation for** an n-ary operation f if whenever $x_i \sim y_i$ for $i < n$ then $f(\vec{x}) \sim f(\vec{y})$. (The notation "$\vec{x}$" abbreviates a list of variables, all of the shape 'x' with different subscripts.) A cuddly familiar example is integers mod k: congruence mod k is a congruence relation for addition and multiplication of natural numbers. We will need this again in the sections 3.4 (on Boolean algebra) 5.7 (on ultraproducts) and in chapter 7, the chapter on ordinal and cardinal arithmetic.

I've used the adjective 'reflexive' without defining it. A binary relation on a set X is **reflexive** if it relates every member of X to itself. (A relation is **irreflexive** if it is disjoint from the identity relation: note that irreflexive $\neq$ not-reflexive!) That is to say R is reflexive iff $(\forall x \in X)(\langle x, x\rangle \in R)$. Notice that this means that reflexivity is not a property of a relation, but of the structure $\langle X, R\rangle$ of which the relation is a component.

This annoying feature of reflexivity (notice that irreflexivity does not have it) is exhibited also by **surjectivity** which is a property not of a function but a function-with-a-range. **Totality** likewise is a property of a function-and-an-intended-domain. A function f on a set X is total if it is defined for every argument in X.

Some mathematical cultures make this explicit, saying that a function is an ordered triple of domain, range, and a set of ordered pairs. This notation has the advantage of clarity, but it has not yet won the day.

In contrast injectivity of a function-in-extension is a property solely of the function-in-extension and not of the intended domain or range. A function is injective iff it never sends distinct arguments to the same value.

While on the subject of functions, a last notational point. In most mathematical usage the terminology '$f(x)$' is overloaded: It can denote either the value that the function f allocates to the argument x or the *set* of values that

f gives to the arguments in the set x. Normally this overloading does not cause any confusion, because typically it is clear from context which is meant. $f(\pi)$ is clearly a number and $f(\Re)$ a set of numbers. The give-away here is in the style of letter used for the argument. The human brain is very good at exploiting cues like this for useful information (as witness the convenience of the notation $\mathcal{M} = \langle M, R\rangle$, and the readability of the Ahlfors example on p. 9 above) but there are circumstances in which contextual decoding doesn't work. If everything is a set (and in set theory—which we meet in chapter 8—everything is, indeed, a set!) there is no way of telling which of the two $f(x)$ is: it could be either!

Accordingly we will use the following notation, which is nowadays standard: f"x for the set of values f allocates to the arguments in the set x, and $f(x)$ will continue to be the value that f assigns to the argument x. Older books on set theory sometimes use for this the notation f'x ("One apostrophe, one value"; f"x is "*plural* apostrophe, *set* of values") for our $f(x)$ but this notation (due originally to Russell and Whitehead) is now obsolescent.

Order

Now for a number of ideas that emerge from the concept of *order*. Order relations obviously have to be transitive, and they can't be symmetrical because then they wouldn't distinguish things would they? Indeed transitive relations that are symmetrical are called *equivalence* relations (as long as they're reflexive). So how do we capture this failure of symmetry? We start by noticing that although an order relation must of course be transitive and can't be symmetrical, it's not obvious whether we want it to be reflexive or irreflexive. Since order relations represent our ways of arranging *distinct* things, they don't have anything to say about whether things are related to themselves or not: they aren't naturally invoked with two identical aruments. Is x less than itself? Or not? Does it matter which way we jump? Reflection on your experience with $<$ and $\leq$ on the various kinds of numbers you've dealt with (Naturals, integers, reals and rationals) will make you feel that it doesn't much matter. After all, in some sense $<$ and $\leq$ contain the same information about numbers. (See exercise 1 part 13) This intuition is sound, and we can indeed go either way. These two ways give rise to two definitions.

A **strict partial order** is irreflexive, transitive and asymmetrical. (A relation is **asymmetrical** if it cannot simultaneously relate x to y and y to x. This of course implies irreflexivity)

A **partial order** is reflexive, transitive and ... well it can't be asymmetrical because $x \leq x$. We need to weaken asymmetry to a condition that says that if $x \neq y$ then not both $x \leq y$ and $y \leq x$. This condition, usually expressed as its contrapositive (see page 1) $(\forall xy)(x \leq y \wedge y \leq x \rightarrow x = y)$ is **antisymmetry**, and is the third clause in the definition of partial order.

Notice that when we describe a given binary relation as a 'partial order' we are not precluding the possibility of the order in question being total. The word 'partial' is there (in the common name) because we wish to be able to call

relations 'orders' even if for some x and y they fail to prefer x to y or y to x, Total orders are special kinds of orders that never fail in this way. Again, they come in two flavours.

A **strict total** order is a strict partial order that satisfies the extra condition $(\forall xy)(x < y \vee y < x \vee x = y)$. Because this condition says there are no more than three possibilities it is called 'trichotomy' (from a Greek word meaning to *cut* as in a-*tom*, lobo-*tomy*.)

A **total order** is a partial order with the extra condition $(\forall xy)(x \leq y \vee y \leq x)$. This property is called **connexity**, and relations bearing it are said to be **connected**. Overloading of this last word is a frequent source of confusion, so beware.

A **poset** $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ is a set with a partial ordering. The expression "strict poset" which one might expect to see being used to denote a set-with-strict-partial-order seems not to be used.

EXERCISE 1 *1. How many binary relations are there on a set of size n?*

2. *How many of them are reflexive?*

3. *How many are fuzzies? (A fuzzy is a binary relation that is symmetric and reflexive)*

4. *How many of them are symmetrical?*

5. *How many of them are antisymmetrical?*

6. *How many are total ordersg?*

7. *How many are trichotomous?*

8. *How many are antisymmetrical and trichotomous?*

9. *There are the same number of antisymmetrical relations as trichotomous. Prove this to be true without working out the precise number.*

10. *(for the thoughtful student) If you have done parts 8 and 4 correctly the answers will be the same. Is there a reason why they should be the same? (Revisit this later in connection with* natural bijections.*)*

11. *Do not answer this question. How many partial orders are there on a set of size n?*

12. *Do not answer this question. How many strict partial orders are there on a set of size n?*

13. *Should the answers to the two previous questions be the same or different? Give reasons. (Compare this with your answer to question 10 above.)*

14. *Show that the proportion of relations on a set with n members that are extensional tends to 1 as $n \to \infty$.*

A **monotone** function from a poset $\langle A, \leq_A \rangle$ to a poset $\langle B, \leq_B \rangle$ is a function $f : A \to B$ such that $\forall xy(x \leq_A y \to f(x) \leq_B f(y))$.

The **arity** of a function or a relation is the number of arguments it is supposed to have.

The **restriction** of a relation R to a domain X (which is $R \cap X^n$ where n is the arity of R) is denoted by '$R \mid X$'. A **chain** in a poset $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ is a total ordering $\langle X', \leq_X | \ X' \rangle$ where $X' \subseteq X$. In words: a chain in a poset is a subset totally ordered by the restriction of the order relation.

The confident reader ought to be willing to have a stab at guessing what 'antichain' means. An antichain in a poset is a subset of the carrier set such that the restriction of the order relation to it is the identity relation.

An **upper semilattice** is a poset $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ such that $(\forall x_1, x_2)(\exists y \geq_X x_1, x_2)(\forall z)(x_1 \leq_X z \wedge x_2 \leq_X z \to y \leq_X z)$. By antisymmetry, if there is such a y it is unique, and we write it $x_1 \vee x_2$ and refer to it as the **supremum** (**sup** for short) or **least upper bound** (**lub** for short, also known as **join**) of x_1 and x_2. A **lower semilattice** is a also a poset, $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ such that $(\forall x_1, x_2)(\exists y \leq_X x_1, x_2)(\forall z)(x_1 \geq_X z \wedge x_2 \geq_X z \to y \geq_X z)$. By antisymmetry, if there is such a y it is unique, and we write it $x_1 \wedge x_2$ and refer to it as the **infimum** (or **inf** for short) or the **greatest lower bound** (or **glb** for short also known as **meet**) of x_1 and x_2. A **lattice** is something that is both an upper- and a lower-semilattice. Some people apply the word 'lattice' only to things with a top and a bottom element, and we will adhere to this custom here. The thinking behind this decision is that if one thinks of a lattice as a poset in which every finite set of elements has both a sup and an inf (which appears to follow by an easy induction from the definition given) then one expects the empty set to have a sup and an inf—it's finite after all. And manifestly the sup and inf of the empty set must be the bottom and the top element of the lattice (and yes, it is that way round not the other: check it!) A **complete** upper (resp. lower) semilattice is an upper (resp. lower) semilattice $\langle X, \leq \rangle$ where *every* subset X' of X (not just finite ones) has a sup (resp. inf.). We write these sups and inf (or lubs and glbs) in the style $\bigvee X'$ (sup or lub) and $\bigwedge X'$ (inf or glb). Everyone agrees that a complete lattice must have a top element and a bottom element.

An easy induction shows that in a lattice every finite set of elements has a sup and an inf. Notice also that in any lattice the set of things above a given element is also a lattice. These things are sometimes called "upper sets"[1]

If $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ is a poset, a subset $X' \subseteq X$ of X is a **directed** subset if $(\forall x_1 x_2 \in X')(\exists x_3 \in X')(x_1 \leq_X x_3 \wedge x_2 \leq_X x_3)$. (So for example if $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ is a total order every subset is directed). A **directed union** is the sumset of a directed set. Similarly directed sups.

$\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ is a **Complete Partial Order** if every subset has a sup. It follows immediately that every subset also has an inf, so a complete poset is simply a complete lattice. $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ is a **chain-complete poset** if every chain has a sup.

A lattice is **distributive** if $\forall xyz(x \wedge (y \vee z) = ((x \wedge y) \vee (x \wedge z)))$. It is

[1] "In Spain, all the best upper sets do it, Lithuanians and Letts do it, let's do it, let's fall in love! ... "

dually distributive if $\forall xyz(x \vee (y \wedge z) = ((x \vee y) \wedge (x \vee z)))$.

EXERCISE 2 *A* **partition** Π *of a set* x *is a family of pairwise disjoint nonempty subsets of* x *which collectively exhaust* x*. The nonempty subsets which comprise the partition are called* **pieces**. *If* Π_1 *and* Π_2 *are partitions of* x *we say that* Π_1 **refines** Π_2 *if every piece of* Π_1 *is a subset of a piece of* Π_2.

Show that for any set X *the collection of partitions of* X *is a complete lattice under refinement. Is it distributive?*

If sups and infs always exist, we can introduce a notation for them, and '$x \vee y$' for the sup and '$x \wedge y$' for the inf are both standard. '0' and '1' for the bottom and top element are standard, but not universal: in some cultures the bottom element is written '$\perp$'. Using these notations we can write down the following axioms for lattices.
$(\forall xy)(x \vee (x \wedge y) = x)$;
$(\forall xy)(x \wedge (x \vee y) = x)$;
$(\forall xyz)(x \vee (y \vee z) = (x \vee y) \vee z)$;
$(\forall xyz)(x \wedge (y \wedge z) = (x \wedge y) \wedge z)$;
$(\forall xy)(x \vee y = y \vee x)$;
$(\forall xy)(x \wedge y = y \wedge x)$.

Axioms for 0 and 1:
$(\forall x)(x \vee 1 = 1)$;
$(\forall x)(x \wedge 1 = x)$;
$(\forall x)(x \wedge 0 = 0)$;
$(\forall x)(x \vee 0 = x)$.

For distributive lattices one adds:
$\forall xyz(x \wedge (y \vee z) = (x \wedge y) \vee (x \wedge z))$.

None of these axioms mention the partial order! In fact we can define $\leq$ in terms of $\wedge$ or $\vee$ by $x \leq y$ iff $(x \vee y) = y$ (or by $(x \wedge y) = x$). Readers should check this for themselves.

A lattice is **complemented** if it has elements 1 ("top") and 0 (or $\perp$ "bottom") and a function (written in various ways) $\neg$ s.t. $\forall x((x \wedge \neg x = 0) \wedge (x \vee \neg x = 1))$. (Note overloading of '$\wedge$'!) A **Boolean algebra** is a distributed complemented lattice.

Products

The product of two structures $\langle X, R\rangle$ and $\langle Y, S\rangle$ is the structure whose carrier set is $X \times Y$, with the binary relation defined "pointwise":

$\langle X \times Y, \{\langle\langle t, u\rangle, \langle v, w\rangle\rangle : \langle t, v\rangle \in R \wedge \langle u, w\rangle \in S\}\rangle$

You have encountered this in products of groups, for example. Make a note here (though we shall not make use of this until section 5.7) that we can form products of more than two things at a time, and we will write things like '$\prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{A}_i$' to mean a product of $\mathcal{A}$s indexed by a set I.

If $\langle A, \leq_A \rangle$ and $\langle B, \leq_B \rangle$ are two posets we can define a partial order on functions from A to B by setting $f \leq g$ iff $(\forall a \in A)(f(a) \leq g(a))$. We write '$A \to B$' for the set of all functions from A to B. Overloading of '$\to$' in this way in no mere overloading: it is a divine ambiguity, known as the *Curry-Howard correspondence*, on which a wealth of ink has been spent. Try, for example, Girard Lafont and Taylor, *op. cit.*

Now if $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ and $\langle Y, \leq_Y \rangle$ are two partial orders then we can define partial orders on $X \times Y$ in several ways. The product defined above is called the **pointwise** product. In the **lexicographic** order of the product we set $\langle x, y \rangle \leq_{lex} \langle x', y' \rangle$ if $x <_X x'$ or $x = x'$ and $y \leq_Y y'$. Although straightforward examples of lexicographic products are scarce, there are a number of combinatorial devices whioch have the flavour of lexicographic product. One example is the Olympic league table: one grades nations in the first instance by the number of gold medals their gladiators (oops, *athletes*) have won, then by the number of silvers and only if these fail to discriminate them does one count the number of bronzes. Strictly one is defining a lexicographic order not on the nations themselves, but on their *medal hauls*. This induces a preorder on the set of nations which may or may not be antisymmetrical: two nations can have the same medal haul.

Other examples include the devices used to determine which team goes forward from a qualifying group in world cup football. *Prima facie* this should be the team withe the largest number of point, but if two teams have the same number of points one looks at the numbner of goals the two teams have scored, and so on, examining the values the two teams take under a sequence of parameters of dwindling importance. In cricket the analysis of a bowler who takes x wickets while conceding y runs is preferred to that of a bowler who takes x' wickets while conceding y' runs as long as $x > x'$ or $x = x' \wedge y < y'$. However in none of these naturally occurring cases is one ordering *tuples* of things: rather one is trying to order things by combining in various ways various preorders of the things. The underlying intuition is the same.

Notice that the lexicographic product is a superset of the pointwise product. If we have two partial orders with the same domain and (the graph of, or extension of) one is a superset of (the graph of, or extension of) the other, we say the first **extends** the second. The **colex** ordering of $X \times Y$ orders pairs according to *last* difference. The colex ordering too is a superset of the pointwise product ordering. In fact the pointwise product ordering is the intersection of the lexicographic ordering and the colex ordering.

One naturally tends to think of partial orders as preference orders. They aren't all of them of course, but it enables us to motivate the distinction between the pointwise product of $\mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{Q}$ (which corresponds to impartiality between parameters $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$) and the lexicographic product (according to which any increase in $\mathcal{P}$ is more important than any increase in $\mathcal{Q}$). In real life preference orderings on products of posets are usually complicated. Lexicographic products are extremely unlikely to represent your views on baskets of apples and oranges because even if you prefer apples to oranges, you would be unlikely to prefer any increase (however small) in the number of apples you are offered to any

increase (however large) in the number of oranges—unless, that is, you have no time for oranges anyway. And in that case you wouldn't prefer an apple and two oranges to an apple and one orange.

On the other hand your preference ordering is likely nevertheless to be finer than the pointwise product ordering: according to the pointwise product ordering you would be unable to decide between a single orange-with-a-pound-of-apples, and two-oranges-with-one-apple. You'd have to be very blasé not to prefer the first. After all, to a certain extent apples and oranges are interchangeable: realistic product (preference) orders refine the product order but are typically not as refined as a lexicographic order. We must not get too deeply into utility theory! Note merely that it is a sensible motivation for the study of orderings and products of orderings.

But before leaving preference orderings altogether the reader should notice at least that preference orders have another odd feature not shared by partial orders in general. $A \not\leq B \not\leq A$ and $B > C$ doesn't imply $A > C$, though one expects it to if the ordering is a preference ordering. This makes a nice exercise ...

EXERCISE 3 *Are the two following conditions on partial orders equivalent?*

1. $(\forall xyz)(z < x \not\leq y \not\leq x \rightarrow z < y)$
2. $(\forall xyz)(z > x \not\leq y \not\leq x \rightarrow z > y)$.

(This exercise uses two common conventions that it takes a logician to spell out. (i) when '$\leq$' and '$<$' appear in the same formula they denote a partial ordering and its strict part respectively; (ii) that the relations $\leq$ and $\geq$ are converses of each other.)

Given a subset $X \subseteq (P \times Q)$, the points in X that are maximal in the pointwise product $\mathcal{P} \times_{pw} \mathcal{Q}$ are called "**Pareto-efficient** points" by economists. Sometimes called "Pareto-optimal" because if X is the set of points that are in some sense accessible, or possible, or something, then a Pareto-efficient point in X is one that, once one has reached it, one cannot find another point in X that makes one of the coordinates better without simultaneously making another one worse. Pareto was an italian economist. Natural illustrations are defective in the way that we have seen that natural illustrations of lexicographic products are defective, but they might still help. CO_2 is the compound most easily put into a supercritical state. The critical point of a substance is that temperature and pressure at which the difference between liquid and gas disappears. All compounds other than CO_2 require either a more extreme temperature or a more extreme pressure or both. CO_2 is a Pareto-efficient point. Ammonia (NH_3) might be Pareto-efficient too, I'm not sure. The mathematician Green (after whom Green Street in Cambridge is named, and who invented Green functions) is the most famous most recent person of whom no picture survives.

1. Show that a totally ordered poset is a lattice if and only if it has a top and bottom element. Show that such a poset is always distributive.

2. Which of the following are lattices?
   (i) The set of subspaces of a vector space under inclusion.
   (ii) The set of positive integers under division.
   (iii) The set of non-negative integers under division.
   (iv) The set of square-free numbers under division.
   Where you find a lattice say whether or not it is distributive.

3. Let X be an arbitrary infinite set. Discuss the following sets and explain whether or not they are lattices, complete lattices, chain-complete partial orders.
   (i) The set of all transitive relations on X, partially ordered by set inclusion.
   (ii) The set of all total orderings of subsets of X, partially ordered by set inclusion.
   (iii) The set of all antisymmetrical relations on X, partially ordered by set inclusion.

4. Show that distributivity and dual distributivity are the same. (see definition page 16)

5. Let $\mathcal{P} = \langle P, \leq_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle$ and $\mathcal{Q} = \langle Q, \leq_{\mathcal{Q}} \rangle$ be two posets. Are $\mathcal{P} \times_{lex} \mathcal{Q}$ and $\mathcal{Q} \times_{lex} \mathcal{P}$ isomorphic? Are $\mathcal{P} \times_{pw} \mathcal{Q}$ and $\mathcal{Q} \times_{pw} \mathcal{P}$ isomorphic? (The subscripts mean lexicographic and pointwise products).

6. Show that a complete upper semilattice is a lattice. Must a complete lattice be complemented?

   Give some examples to show that chain-complete posets are not always complete lattices.

7. Consider the set $I^2 = \{\langle x, y \rangle \in \Re^2 : 0 \leq x, y \leq 1\}$, the unit square in the first quadrant in the plane.
   Equip I^2 with the pointwise order. Identify the maximal elements (if any) and the sup of the following sets:
   (i) The points on the circle radius $1/2$ and centre $\langle 1/2, 1/2 \rangle$.
   (ii) The points in the open disc radius $1/2$ and centre $\langle 1/2, 1/2 \rangle$.
   (iii) The points with irrational coordinates in I^2.

   Now do the same for the lexicographic order.

Logical connectives

We will use standard notation for the connectives of propositional logic: '$\vee$', '$\wedge$' for 'or' and 'and'. We will also write $\bigwedge_{i \in I} p_i$ and suchlike for indexed conjunctions (and disjunctions). We write '$p \to q$' for the connective that will be equivalent to '$\neg(p \wedge \neg q)$' or to '$\neg p \vee q$'. $\to$ is the **material conditional**. A

conditional[2] is a connective that is an attempt to formalise a relation of implication. The material conditional is the simplest one: $p \to q$ evaluates to `true` unless p evaluates to `true` and q evaluates to `false`.

Lots of students don't like the material conditional as an account of implication. The usual cause of this unease is that in some cases a material conditional evaluates to `true` for what seem to them to be spurious and thoroughly unsatisfactory reasons: namely that p is false or that q is true. How can q follow from p merely because q happens to be true? The meaning of p might have no bearing on q whatever! This unease shows that we think we are attempting to formalise a relation between *intensions* not *extensions*. $\wedge$ and $\vee$ are also relations between intensions but they also make sense applied to extensions. Now if p implies q, what does this tell us about what p and q evaluate to? Well, at the very least, it tells us that p can't evaluate to `true` when q evaluates to `false`. This rule "from p and $p \to q$ infer q" is called *modus ponens*. q is the **conclusion**, p is the **minor premiss** and $p \to q$ is the **major premiss**. Thus we can expect the *extension* corresponding to a conditional to satisfy *modus ponens* at the very least.

(Reasonable people might expect that what one has to do next is solve the problem of what the correct notion of conditional is for intensions. This is a very hard problem, since it involves thinking about the internal structure of intensions and nobody really has a clue about that. It has spawned a vast and inconclusive literature. Fortunately it turns out that we can skirt it, and resolve just to use the material conditional all the time.)

How many extensions are there that satisfy *modus ponens*? It is easy to check that the following list is exhaustive. $\lambda pq.q$, $\lambda pq.(p \longleftrightarrow q)$, $\lambda pq.\neg p$, $\lambda pq.(\neg p \vee q)$, $\lambda pq.$`false`. Evidently the material conditional is the *weakest* of these: the one that holds in the largest number of cases. To be precise: among those functions from $\{$`true`, `false`$\} \times \{$`true`, `false`$\} \to \{$`true`, `false`$\}$ that satisfy *modus ponens* it is the greatest in the sense of the ordering on maps from posets to posets that we defined on page 1.

In cases where the conditional is evaluated to `true` *merely* for spurious reasons then no harm can be done by accepting that evaluation. For consider: if it is evaluated to `true` *merely* because p evaluates to `false` then we are never going to be able to invoke it (as a major premiss at least) and if it is evaluated to `true` *merely* because q evaluates to `true` then if we invoke it as a major premiss the only thing we can conclude—namely q—is something we knew anyway.

So we have a conditional that is defined on extensions. We can copy this back to intensions by saying that P implies Q if what P evaluates to materially implies what Q evaluates to. This doesn't solve the problem of identifying the intensional condition, but it gets us a surprisingly long way: although we will touch on other connectives the material conditional is the only formalisation of implication that we will need here.

Before we leave conditionals altogether: the conditional $\neg A \to \neg A$ is the

[2] This word 'conditional' is overloaded as well. Often a formula whose principal ('top level') connective is a conditional will be said to be a conditional.

contrapositive of the conditional $A \to B$, and the **converse** is $B \to A$. A formula like $A \longleftrightarrow B$ is **biconditional**.

The quantifier '$(\exists! x)\ \ldots$ ' is to be read: "there is a unique x such that $\ldots$ ". If a is a thing that is ϕ then it is a **witness** to the formula '$(\exists x)\phi(x)$'

Chapter 2

Recursive Datatypes

2.1 Recursive Datatypes

2.1.1 Definition

'recursive datatype' is the sexy, postmodern, techno-friendly way to talk about things that mathematicians used to call 'inductively defined sets'. I shall abbreviate these two words to the neologism 'rectype'.

The standard definition of the naturals is as the least set containing zero and closed under successor, or, using some notation we have just acquired:

$$\mathbb{N} = \bigcap \{Y : 0 \in Y \wedge S``Y \subseteq Y\}$$

Of course $\mathbb{N}$ is merely the simplest example, but it exhibits the central features of a declaration of a rectype. In general a rectype is a set defined as the smallest ($\subseteq$-least) set containing some **founders**[1] and closed under certain operations, commonly called **constructors**. (This *is* standard terminology). $\mathbb{N}$ has only one founder, namely 0, and only one constructor, namely successor (often written 'S' or '`succ`': $S(x)$ is $x+1$).

2.1.2 Structural induction

This definition of $\mathbb{N}$ justifies induction over it. If $F(0)$ and $F(n) \to F(n+1)$ then $\{n : F(n)\}$ is one of these Y that contains 0 and is closed under S, and therefore is a superset of $\mathbb{N}$, so every natural number is F. It's a bit like original sin: if F is a property that holds of 0, and holds of $n+1$ whenever it holds of n, then each natural number is innoculated with it as it is born. Hence induction.

It also justifies definition by recursion. You might like to try proving by mathematical induction that—for example—all functions satisfying the recursion

$$0! := 1;\ (n+1)! := (n+1) \cdot n!$$

[1] This isn't standard terminology, but I like it and will use it.

agree on all arguments. That is to say we can use induction to prove the uniqueness of the function being defined.

2.1.3 Generalise from $\mathbb{N}$

$\mathbb{N}$
is of course the simplest example of a rectype: it has only one founder and only one constructor, and that constructor is unary.

My first encounter with rectypes was when I was exposed to compound past tenses in latin, when I was about eight. I pointed out to my latin teacher that the construction that gives rise to the pluperfect tense from the perfect (in "By the time I reached the station the train had left" the first verb is in the perfect and the second is in the pluperfect) could be applied again, and what was the resulting tense called, please? Maybe the reader has had similar experiences. In UK law if it is a crime to do X, it is also a crime to attempt to do X or to conspire to do X. So presumably it's a crime to attempt to conspire to do X? Crimes and tenses form recursive datatypes.

There are less bizarre examples than these which will concern us later. An X-**list** is either the empty object or the result of `cons`ing a member of X onto the front of an X-list. Thus a list can be thought of as a function from an initial segment of $\mathbb{N}$ to X. Thought of as a rectype the family of X-lists has a founder (the empty list) and a single binary constructor: `cons`. Later in this text there will be illustrations using `ML` pseudocode, and in `ML` the notation `h::t` denotes the list obtained by `cons`ing the object `h` onto the front of the list `t`. `t` is the **tail** of `h::t`. `h` is its **head**.

Rectypes are ubiquitous, and different tribes will find different examples obvious. Computer scientists might think of lists; mathematicians might think of the subgroup of a group generated by a set of elements of the group; a more advanced example is the family of Borel sets—one can prove things about all Borel sets by showing that every open set has a property F, the complement of a thing with F has F and the union of countably many things with F has F. (Like being measurable!). Logicians will think of the rectype of formulæ, or the rectype of primitive recursive functions which we will see later. Words in an algebra form a rectype. A bundle of important examples which we will discuss later features the transitive closure ${}^*R$ of a (binary) relation R, which is the intersection of all transitive supersets of R, and the symmetric closure of R (the intersection of all symmetric supersets of R) and the reflexive closure similarly.

The sexiest rectype of all is Conway Games. (see Conway *Op cit*). Donald Knuth has popularised the material in this book with the catchphrase "surreal numbers" but mathematics students should be equal to reading Conway's original)

We can develop analogues of mathematical induction for any recursive datatype, and I shall not spell out the details here, as we shall develop them in each case as we need them. This kind of induction over a rectype is nowadays called

structural induction.[2]

2.1.4 Wellfounded Induction

Wellfounded relations and induction

Suppose we have a domain with a binary relation R on it, and we want to be able to infer

$$\forall x\ \psi(x)$$

from

$$(\forall x)((\forall y)(yRx\ \rightarrow \psi(y)) \rightarrow \psi(x))$$

We will be using frequently the expression "R-predecessor of x" so we had better explain it. y **is an R-predecessor of** x if $R(y,x)$. Notice that there is no "case $n = 0$" clause in this more general form of induction: the premiss we are going to use implies immediately that a thing with no R-predecessors must have ψ. The expression "$(\forall y)(R(y,x) \rightarrow \psi(y))$" is called the **induction hypothesis**. The first line says that if the induction hypothesis is satisfied, then x is ψ too. Finally the inference we are trying to draw is this: **if** x has ψ whenever the induction hypothesis is satisfied **then** everything has ψ. When can we do this? We must try to identify some condition on R that is equivalent to the assertion that this is a legitimate inference to draw in general (i.e., for any predicate ψ).

Why should anyone want to draw such an inference? The antecedent says "x is ψ as long as all the immediate R-predecessors of x are ψ", and there are plenty of situations where we wish to be able to argue in this way. Take $R(x,y)$ to be "x is a parent of y" and then the inference from "Children of blue-eyed parents have blue eyes" to "Everyone has blue eyes" is an instance of the rule schematised above. As it happens this is a case where the relation R in question does *not* satisfy the necessary condition, for it is in fact the case that children of blue-eyed parents have blue eyes and yet not everyone is blue-eyed.

To find what the magic ingredient is, let us fix the relation R that we are interested in, and suppose that the inference

$$\frac{(\forall y)(R(y,x) \rightarrow \psi(y)) \rightarrow \psi(x)}{(\forall x)(\psi(x))}$$

has failed for some choice ψ of predicate. [3] Then we will see what this tells us about R. To say that R is wellfounded all we have to do is legislate that this failure (whatever it is) cannot happen for any choice of ψ.

[2]Historical Note: Russell and Whitehead called it **ancestral induction** because they called the transitive closure of a relation the **ancestral** of the relation. I used their terminology for years—and I still think it is superior—and but the battle for it has been lost; readers should not expect the word 'ancestral' to be widely understood any longer, though they may see it in the older literature.

However in Set Theory 'transitive closure' is used to mean something different and I shall continue to use 'ancestral' instead of 'transitive closure' where this is needed to preclude ambiguity.

[3]tangential remark about premisses above and conclusions below the line

Let ψ be some predicate for which the inference fails. Consider the set of all things which are *not* ψ. Let x be something with no R-predecessors. Then all R-predecessors of x are ψ (vacuously!) and therefore x is ψ too. This tells us that if y is something that is not ψ *then there must be some* y' *such that* $R(y', y)$ *and* y' *is not* ψ *either.* If there weren't, y would be ψ. This tells us that the collection of things which are not ψ "has no R-least member" in the sense that everything in that collection has an R-predecessor in that collection.

Thus we can see that if induction fails over R then there is a subset X of the domain (to wit, the extension of the predicate for which induction fails) such that every member of X has an R-predecessor in X.

Notice that 'ψ' has disappeared from our calculations: what we are left with is a condition on R. All we have to do is exclude the possibility of the domain of R having any such pathological subsets, and we will have justified induction over R. Accordingly we will attach great importance to the following condition on R:

DEFINITION 1 *R is* **wellfounded** *iff every nonempty subset X of the domain of R has an element x such that all the R-predecessors of x lie outside X. (x is an "R-minimal" element of X.)*

This definition comes with a health warning: it is easy to misremember. The only reliable way to remember it correctly is to rerun in your mind the discussion we have gone through: wellfoundedness is precisely what one needs a realtion R to have if one is to be able to do induction over R. No more and no less. The definition is not memorable, but it is reconstructible.

Notice that for a finite binary structure to be wellfounded it is neccessary and sufficient for it to have no loops: a loop is manifestly a subset with no least element!

A **wellordering** is a wellfounded strict total order. (No wellfounded relation can be reflexive so wellfounded orders have to be of the strict flavour). Perhaps we should have some examples of wellorderings. Obviously any finite total order will be a wellorder! What about infinite wellorderings? The only natural example of an infinite wellordering is one we have already seen—$\mathbb{N}$. Notice that the real line is not a wellordering, for it is a simple matter to find sets of real numbers with no least element, for example the set of all real numbers strictly greater than 0. This set has a lower bound all right—namely 0—but this lower bound is not a member of the set and so cannot be the least member of it.[4]

We note here two facts which we will come in useful later (see remark 38 and chapter 7):

EXERCISE 4 *A pointwise product of two wellfounded (strict) partial orders is a wellfounded (strict) partial order.*

A lexicographic product of two wellfounded (strict) partial orders is a wellfounded (strict) partial order.

[4] It is important not to get confused (as many people do) by the fact that every set of reals has a *greatest lower bound*. For example, $\{x \in \Re : x > 0\}$ has no least member, but it does have a greatest lower bound, which is of course 0. Notice that $0 \notin \{x \in \Re : x > 0\}$!!

The **Axiom of Dependent Choices**, usually known as DC, says that if R is a relation such that $(\forall x \in Dom(R))(\exists y)(R(x,y))$ then there is an infinite R-chain.

The full **Axiom of Choice** is:

If X is a set of nonempty sets, there is a function $f : X \to \bigcup X$ s.t. $(\forall x \in X)(f(x) \in x)$. Such a function is a **selection function**.

A definition of wellfoundedness which is equivalent to the above if we have DC is the following. R is wellfounded if there is no $f : \mathbb{N} \to dom(R)$ s.t. $(\forall n)(R(f(n+1), f(n))$.

Beware! One might think that the easiest and most natural definition of wellfoundedness is this last one in terms of descending chains. (It's certainly a lot easier to understand!) However, defining wellfoundedness in terms of descending chains doesn't make for an easy justification of induction: one then finds that one needs DC to deduce induction. Its use is to be avoided.

The official definition of wellfoundedness is a lot more unwieldy than the definition in terms of descending sequences. In consequence it is very easy to misremember it. A common mistake is to think that a relation is wellfounded if its domain has a minimal element, and to forget that *every* nonempty subset must have a minimal element. The only context in which this definition makes any sense at all is induction, and the only way to understand the definition or to reconstruct it is to remember that it is cooked up precisely to justify induction. This last fact is the content of the next theorem.

Theorem 2 *R is a wellfounded relation iff we can do wellfounded induction over the domain of R.*

Proof:

The left-to-right inference is immediate: The right-to-left inference is rather more interesting.

What we have to do is use R-induction to prove that every subset of the domain of R has an R-minimal element. But how can we do this by R-induction? The trick is to prove by R-induction ("on x") that every subset of the domain of R to which x belongs contains an R-minimal element. Let us abbreviate this to "x is R-**regular**".

Now let x_0 be such that every R-predecessor of it is R-regular, but such that it itself is not R-regular. We will derive a contradiction. Then there is some $X \subseteq dom(R)$ such that $x_0 \in X$ and X has no R-minimal element. In particular x_0 is not an R-minimal element of X. So there must be x_1 s.t. $x_1 R x_0$ and $x_1 \in X$. But then x_1 is likewise not R-regular. But by hypothesis everything R-related to x_0 was R-regular. Contradiction.

Therefore everything in $dom(R)$ is R-regular. Now to show that any subset X of $dom(R)$ is either empty or has an R-minimal element. If X is empty we're ok. If it isn't, it has a member x. Now we have just shown by R-induction that x is R-regular, so X has an R-minimal element as desired. ■

Wellfoundedness is a very important concept throughout mathematics, but it's usually spelled out only by logicians. (That's why you read it here first).

Although the rhetoric of mathematics usually presents mathematics as a static edifice, mathematicians do in fact think dynamically, and this becomes apparent in mathematical slang. Mathematicians often speak of *constructions* underlying proofs, and typically for a proof to succeed it is necessary for the construction in question to terminate. This need is most obvious in computer science, where one routinely has the task of showing that a program is well-behaved in the sense that every run of it halts. Typically a program has a main loop that it goes through a number (which one hopes will be finite!) of times. The way to prove that it eventually halts is to find a parameter changed by passage through the loop. A common and trivial example is the `count` variable found in many programs that not affected by the passage through the loop but only by the decrement command at the start of each pass. Sometimes the rôle is played by a program variable that is decremented at each pass —not explicitly decremented at the start of each pass like a `count` variable, but as a side-effect of what happens on each pass. In general we look for a parameter which may not be a program variable at all, but some construct put together from them that takes values in a domain X with a binary relation R on it such that (i) at each pass through the loop the value of the parameter changes from its old value v to a new value v' such that $\langle v, v' \rangle \in R$ and (ii) any sequence v_0, v_1 ... where for all n, $\langle v_n, v_{n+1} \rangle$ is finite.

If we can do this then we know that we can only make finitely many passes through the loop, so the program will halt. Condition (ii) is the descending-sequence version of wellfoundedness.

EXERCISE 5 *The game of Sylver Coinage was invented by Conway, Berlekamp and Guy (op cit) It is played by two players,* `I` *and* `II`*, who move alternately, with* `I` *starting. They choose natural numbers greater than 1 and at each stage the player whose turn it is to play must play a number that is not a sum of multiples of any of the numbers chosen so far. The last player loses.*

Notice that by 'sum of multiples' we mean 'sum of positive *multiples'. The give-away is in the name: 'Sylver Coinage'. What the players are doing is trying at each stage to invent a new denomination of coin, one that is of a value that cannot be represented by assembling coins of the denominations invented so far. (There is a significance to the spelling of 'silver' but I don't think we need to concern ourselves with that.)*

Prove that no play of this game can go on for ever.

The way to do this is to identify a parameter which is altered somehow by each move. The set of values this parameter can take is to have a wellfounded relation defined on it, and each move changes the value of the parameter to a new value related to the old by the wellfounded relation. The question for you is: what is this parameter? and what is the wellfounded relation?

(You should give a much more rigorous proof of this than of your answer to exercise 8 below: it is quite easy to persuade oneself that all plays are indeed finite as claimed, but rather harder to present this intuition as reasoning about a wellfounded relation)

As we noted earlier, we can think of binary relations as matrices, (pictures)

but can also think of them as digraphs, where there is a vertex for each element of the domain, and an edge from a to b if a is related to b. This is a very natural thing to do in the present context, since we can also think of the arrows as representing a possible step taken by the program in question. It also gives us a convenient way of thinking about composition and transitive closures. a is related to b by R^n if there is a path of length n from a to b in the digraph picture of R, and a is related to b by the transitive closure of R if there is a path from a to b at all. It also makes it very easy to see that the transitive closure of a symmetric relation is symmetric, and makes it obvious that every subset of a wellfounded relation is wellfounded. This makes it easy to explain why pointwise products of wfs are wf. By the same token, a lexicographic product of two wellfounded relations (being a subset of the pointwise product) will also be wellfounded.

[*HOLE picture here of the four-element boolean algebra withand without heads on the arrows*]

The digraph picture gives rise to **Hasse diagrams**. When drawing a digraph of a transitive relation R one can safely leave out a lot of arrows and still display the same information: all one has to draw is the arrows for a relation whose transitive closure is R.

EXERCISE 6 *Find an example to illustrate the fact that for an arbitrary transitive relation there is no minimal relation relation of which it is the transitive closure.*

In fact we can leave out the heads on the arrows (so we draw in edges not arrows) by adopting the convention that the end of the edge on which the arrowhead belongs is the end that is further up the page. (Of course this only works if the relation is transitive!) The result of doing this is the Hasse diagram of that transitive relation. The appeal of Hasse diagrams relies on—and to some extent reinforces—an unspoken (and false!) assumption that every partial order can be embedded somehow in the plane: every ascending chain is a countable linear order (in which the rationals cannot be embedded) and every antichain is isomorphic to a nowhere dense subset of $\Re$. Related to this is the weaker (but nevertheless still nontrivial) assumption that all total orders can be embedded in the real line, as instance the image of Justice, blindfolded with a pair of weighing scales. Although this is clearly a false assumption that might perhaps push our intuitions in wrong directions—we in fact need a weak version of the axiom of choice (see exercise 3.3.1.1) to show that every partial order has a superset that is a total order—it is not such a crazy idea in computer science, where linearity of time and of machine addresses compel us to think about extensions of partial orders of precisely this kind.

Recursion on a wellfounded relation

Theorem 3 *Let $\langle X, R\rangle$ be a wellfounded structure, and $g : X \times V \to V$ be an arbitrary (total) function. Then there is a unique total function $f : X \to V$ satisfying $(\forall x \in X)(f(x) = g(x, f\text{“}\{y : yRx\}))$*

Here V is the universe, so that when we say "$g : X \times V \to V$" we mean only that we are not putting any constraints on what the values of g (or its second inputs) are to be.

Proof: The idea is very simple. We prove by R-induction that for every $x \in X$ there is a unique function f_x satisfying $(\forall y)(^*R(y,x) \to f_x(y) = g(y, f_x\text{“}\{z : R(z,y)\}))$. We then argue that if we take the union of the f_x the result will be a function, and this function is the function we want. ■

The following commutative diagram might help.



$f\dagger$ is $\lambda a.\langle \texttt{fst}\ a, f\text{“}(\texttt{snd}\ a)\rangle$. ("leave the first component alone and translate the second under f"). The map R isn't just the map from X into $\mathcal{P}(X)$ corresponding to R (remember that every subset of $X \times X$ corresponds to a map $X \to \mathcal{P}(X)$) but the map that sends a pair $\langle x, y\rangle$ to $\langle x, \{z : R(z,y)\}\rangle$. ($V$ contains everything: not just junk but sets of junk as well, so you don't have to worry about whether values of g are sets or junk).

The reason this crops up here is that all rectypes—since they are generated by operations—will have a sort of **engendering relation**[5] which is related to the operations that generate the recursive datatype rather in the way that $<_{\mathbb{N}}$ is related to the successor operation. The engendering relation is that binary relation which holds between an object x in the rectype and those objects "earlier" in the rectype out of which x was built. Thus it holds between a formula and its subformulæ, between a natural number and its predecessors and so on. Put formally, the (graph of the) engendering relation is the transitive closure of the union of the (graphs of the) constructors.

The (graph of, extension of) the engendering relation is itself a rectype. For example, $<_{\mathbb{N}}$ is the smallest set of ordered pairs containing all pairs $\langle 0, n\rangle$ with $n > 0$ and closed under the operation that applies S to both elements of a pair. (i.e., $\lambda p.\langle S(\texttt{fst}\ p), S(\texttt{snd}\ p)\rangle$).

The following triviality is important.

Theorem 4 *The engendering relation of a rectype is wellfounded*

Proof:

Let X be a subset of the rectype that has no minimal element in the sense of $<$, the engendering relation. We then prove by structural induction ("on x") that $(\forall y)(y < x \to y \notin X)$. ■

[5] This is not standard terminology.

We have not assumed that the constructors have finite arity: it is not necessary for the constructors of a rectype to have finite arity for the engendering relation to be wellfounded. An important example we shall see later is the rectype of wellfounded sets in set theory; a standard example from analysis is the rectype of Borel sets of reals, but by far the most attractive is the rectype of Conway games in ONAG. A rectype whose constructors are all of finite arity will be said to have **finite character**. If in addition it has only finitely many of them, and only finitely many founders, it will be said to be **finitely presented**; if it has finitely many constructors of finite arity, and only countably many founders, it will be said to be **countably presented**.

Engendering relations on rectypes give us nice concepts of **bounded quantifier**. The commonest, most natural and most important example is that of bounded quantifiers in arithmetic: $(\forall n < m)(\dots)$ and $(\exists n < m)(\dots)$ which we will see a lot more of in chapter 6. The idea is that expressions with bounded quantifiers only—and no unbounded quantifiers—should be thought of as being quantifier-free. This is because an injunction to search for something $< x$ is only an injunction to search among things that you are given if you are given x, not to scour the entire universe.

(If this is puzzling to you because you do not feel comfortable with predicate languages, fear not. Put it on the back burner and return to it later, in chapter 5.)

Theorem 4 means that we can always do wellfounded induction over the engendering relation. In this simplest case, $\mathbb{N}$, this wellfounded induction is often called *strong* induction or sometimes *course of values* induction. Quite often arguments by wellfounded induction are presented in contrapositive form. We first establish that if there is a counterexample to what we are trying to prove then there is an earlier counterexample. However this contradicts wellfoundedness. The standard example of this style of proof is due to Fermat, who proved that $x^4 + y^4 = z^2$ has no nontrivial solutions in $\mathbb{N}$. It uses the fact that all pythagorean triples are of the form $a^2 - b^2$, $2ab$, $a^2 + b^2$ to show that for any solution to $x^4 + y^4 = z^2$ there is one with smaller z. This gives us a proof by wellfounded induction on $<_{\mathbb{N}}$ that there are no solutions at all. The details are fiddly, which is why it's not an exercise. The following are more straightforward.

EXERCISE 7 *Dress up the traditional proof that $\sqrt{2}$ is irrational into a proof by wellfounded induction on $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$.*

The following example is the most natural use of this technique known to me.

EXERCISE 8 *A square can be dissected into finitely many squares all of different sizes. (See Martin Gardner: op. cit. ch. 17). Prove that a cube cannot be dissected into finitely many cubes all of different sizes.*

(Do not attempt to give too rigorous a proof.)

EXERCISE 9 .

Computer Science tripos 1993:9:10, available at:
`http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/tripos/y1993.html`

Try also `http://wwwis.cs.utwente.nl:8080/~faase/Ha/DE_Knuth.html` for more of the same

EXERCISE 10 *You presumably know the proof that the arithmetic mean of two reals is at least as big as the geometric mean. In fact this works for the arithmetic and geometric mean of any finite number of reals. The standard proof proceeds by showing that it works for two reals, and that if it works for n reals it works for $2n$ reals, and that if it works for n reals it works for $n-1$ reals. (See Aigner-Ziegler, op. cit. pp 99-100). This is a wellfounded induction over a kinky relation on $\mathbb{N}$. What is this relation, precisely?*

Structural Induction again

We know that structural induction holds for rectypes but we could deduce it from the wellfoundedness of the engendering relation if we wished. Take the example of $\mathbb{N}$. Suppose we know that 0 has property F, and that whenever n has property F so does $S(n)$. Then the set of integers that are *not* F, (assuming there are any) will have no least member, and therefore, by wellfoundedness of $<$, will be empty.

This holds in general: we can deduce structural induction from the wellfoundedness of the engendering relation. For example, if we can prove $(\forall n)(\Phi(n))$ by a wellfounded induction over $<_{\mathbb{N}}$, then we can prove $(\forall n)(\forall m <_{\mathbb{N}} n)(\Phi(m))$ by structural induction.



Other uses of wellfoundedness

Intuitions of wellfoundedness and failure of wellfoundedness are deeply rooted in common understandings of impossibilities. For example: it is probably not unduly fanciful to claim that the song "There's a hole in my bucket, dear Liza" captures the important triviality that a process that eventually calls itself with its original parameters will never terminate. The attraction of tricks like the ship-in-a-bottle seems to depend on the illusion that two processes, each of which (apparently) cannot run until it has successfully called the other, have nevertheless been successfully run. A similar intuition is at work in the argument sometimes used by radical feminists to argue that they can have no (nonsexist) surnames, because if they try to take their *mother's* surname instead of their fathers, then they are merely taking their *grandfather's* surname, and so on. Similarly one hears it argued that since one cannot blame the person from whom one catches a cold for being the agent of infection (for if one could, they in turn

would be able to pass the blame on to whoever infected them, and the process would be illfounded[6]) so one cannot blame anyone at all. This argument is used by staff in STD clinics to help their patients overcome guilt feelings about their afflictions.

The reader is invited to consider and discuss the following examples from the philosophical literature.

1. " ... most of those who believe in probability logic uphold the view that the appraisal is arrived at by means of a principle of induction [7] which ascribes probabilities to the induced hypothesis. But if they ascribe a probability to this "principle of induction" in turn, the infinite regress continues".

   Popper, *op. cit.* p 264

2. In every judgement, which we can form concerning probability, as well as concerning knowledge, we ought always to correct the first judgement, deriv'd from the nature of the object, by another judgement, deriv'd from the nature of the understanding. 'Tis certain a man of solid sense and long eperience ought to have, and usually has, a greater assurance in his opinions, than one who is foolish and ignorant, and that our sentiments have different degrees of authority, ebven with ourselves, in proprtion to the degrees of our reason and experience. In the man of the best sense and longest experience, this authority is never entire; since even such-a-one must be conscious of many errors in the past, and must still dread the like for the future. Here then arises a new species of probability to correct and regulate the first, and fix its just standard and proportion. As demonstration is subject to the control of probability, so is probability liable to a new correction by a reflex act of the mind, wherein the nature of our understanding, and our reasoning from the first probability become our subjects.

   Having thus found in every probability, beside the original uncertainty inherent in the subject, a new uncertainty deriv'd from the weakness of that faculty, which judges, and having adjusted these two together, we are oblig'd by our reason to add a new doubt deriv'd from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties. This is a doubt, which immediately occurs to us, and of which, if we wou'd closely pursue our reason, we cannot avoid giving a decision. But this decision, tho' it shou'd be favourable to our preceding judgement, being founded only on probability, must weaken still further our first evidence, and must itself be weaken'd by a fourth doubt of the same kind and so *ad infinitum*; till at last there remain nothing of the original probability, however great we may suppose it to have been, and however small the diminution by every new uncertainty. No finite object can subsist under a

[6] Unless one can blame Eve!

[7] This is of course philosophical not mathematical induction!

decrease repeated *in infinitum*; and even the vastest quantity, which can enter into human imagination, must in this manner be reduc'd to nothing.

Hume: A treatise of human nature. book I part IV, sec 1, 5-6.

3. " ... Volitions we postulated to be that which makes actions voluntary, resolute [etc.] But ... a thinker may ratiocinate resolutely, or imagine wickedly .... Some mental processes then can, according to the theory, issue from volitions. So what of the volitions themselves? Are they voluntary or involuntary acts of mind? Clearly either answer leads to absurdities. If I cannot help willing to pull the trigger, it would be absurd to describe my pulling it as voluntary. But if my volition to pull the trigger is voluntary, in the sense assumed by the theory, then it must issue from a prior volition and from that another ad infinitum.

(Ryle *The Concept of Mind* pp 65-6.)

2.1.5 Sensitivity to set existence

We now return to structural induction and consider how the set formulæ for which one can perform structural induction over a rectype depends on what other assumptions one makes. We deduce an instance of structural induction over a rectype by appealing to the fact that the rectype (of widgets, as it might be) is the intersection of all things containing the founders and closed under the constructors. So if the class of things that are F contains the founders and is closed under the constructors, then all widgets are F. For this to work we need to know that the extension (page 10) of F really exists. In this way we see that the extent of what we can prove by induction is determined at least in part by our set existence axioms. This will matter later on when we start doing set theory.

2.1.6 Countably presented rectypes are countable

Mathematicians should be warned that logicians often use the word 'countable' to mean 'countably infinite'. The symbol used for the cardinal number of countably infinite sets is '$\aleph_0$'.

The Prime powers trick

"Countably presented" is slang, but it this case we mean that the rectype has countably many founders and countably many operations all of finite arity.

Theorem 5 *Countably presented rectypes are countable.*

Sketch of proof.

The key observation is that the set of finite sets of naturals and the set of finite sequences of naturals are both countable. The function $\lambda x.\Sigma_{n\in x}2^n$ maps finite sets of natural numbers 1-1 to natural numbers. (Make a note of this for

later use in finding models of ZF without the axiom of infinity). We map finite sequences of naturals to naturals by sending—for example—the tuple $\langle 1, 8, 7, 3\rangle$ to $2^{1+1} \cdot 3^{8+1} \cdot 5^{7+1} \cdot 7^{3+1}$.). This is the **prime powers trick**.

The elements of a finitely presented (indeed countably presented) rectype can obviously be represented by finite sequences of symbols, and so the prime powers trick is enough to show that every finitely presented rectype is countable. ■

A meal is often made of the fact that (the syntax of) every human language is a rectype—unlike the syntax of any animal language—and that therefore the repertory of possible expressions is infinite in a way that the repertory of meaningful calls available to animals of other species is not. Quite how useful this recursive structure is to those who wish to drive a wedge between human language and animal language is not entirely clear, but it is immensely useful when dealing with artificial languages, since it enables us to exploit structural induction in proving facts about them.

We can enumerate the wffs[8] of a language, then *sequences* of wffs of a language (which is to say, Gödel-proofs which we will meet on page 66). This enables us to arithmetise proof theory and eventually to prove the incompleteness theorem. Since this was first done by Gödel with precisely this end in view, any enumeration of formulæ (or register machines or Turing machines as in chapter 6 or anything else for that matter) tends to be called **Gödel numbering** or **gnumbering** for short: the 'g' is silent).

I shall say nothing at all at this stage about how big a rectype can be if it is not countably presented.

The way to crystallise the information contained in theorem 5 is to develop a nose for the difference between what one might call *finite precision objects* and *infinite precision objects*. Members of finitely presented rectypes are finite precision objects: one can specify them uniformly with only finitely many symbols. In contrast the reals, for example, are infinite precision objects: there is no way of uniformly notating reals using only finitely many symbols for each real. There is a sort of converse to theorem 5: if a set is countable then there will be a way of thinking of it (or at least there will be a notation for its members) as a finitely presented rectype. This gives us a rule of thumb: if X is a set which admits a uniform notation for its members where each member has a finite label then X is countable, and conversely. This isn't the *definition* of countable but it is the most useful way to tell countable sets from uncountable.

EXERCISE 11 *Which of the following sets are countable and which uncountable, using the above test? The set of*
(i) permutations of $\mathbb{N}$ *that move only finitely many things;*
(ii) permutations of $\mathbb{N}$ *of finite order;*
(iii) algebraic numbers;
(iv) partitions of $\mathbb{N}$ *into finitely many pieces;*

[8] Logicians' slang, which I shall frequently lapse into. It's an acronym: Well-Formed Formula

(v) partitions of $\mathbb{N}$ *all of whose pieces are finite;*
(vi) partitions of $\mathbb{N}$ *containing a cofinite piece.*

It is often quite hard to provide explicit bijections between two things that are the same size: a good example is the naturals and the rationals. For this reason we often have recourse to the Schröder-Bernstein theorem (theorem 3.1.1) which says that for there to be a bijection between X and Y it is sufficient for there to be an injection $X \to Y$ and an injection $Y \to X$. And it is easy to inject the rationals into $\mathbb{N}$ and *vice versa*.

Cantor's theorem

Although we won't need this until later we may as well note at this stage that there are precisely as many countable sequences of reals as there are reals. To show there are as many countable *sets* of reals as reals one needs countable choice (page 53).

EXERCISE 12 *Find a bijection between* $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ *and* $\mathbb{N}$. *Use it to show that there are precisely as many* ω *sequences of reals (sequences indexed by* $\mathbb{N}$*) as there are reals.*

The set of finite subsets of $\mathbb{N}$ is countable. In contrast the set of *all* subsets is not. $\mathcal{P}(x)$ is the **power set** of x: $\{y : y \subseteq x\}$.

The following theorem is easy and of central importance.

Theorem 6 *(Cantor's theorem) There is no surjection from any set onto its power set.*

Proof: Let f be a map from X to $\mathcal{P}(X)$. We shall show that f is not onto. Let $C = \{x \in X : x \notin f(x)\}$. If f were onto, we would have $C = f(a)$ for some $a \in X$. But then we can reason as follows. $a \in f(a)$ iff $a \in C$ (since $C = f(a)$) iff $a \notin f(a)$ (by membership condition on C) whence $a \in C \longleftrightarrow a \notin C$. ■

Notice the constructive nature of this proof. Not only does it show that no $f : X \to \mathcal{P}(X)$ can be onto, it embodies an algorithm that for each f exhibits a subset of X not in the range of f.

We noticed earlier that any binary relation E on a set X corresponds to a function $X \to \mathcal{P}(X)$ and that R is extensional iff this function is injective. An Italian logician called di Giorgi made the observation that any model of set theory at all can be thought of as an injection i from a collection X into $\mathcal{P}(X)$: simply associate with X the relation $\{\langle x, y\rangle : x \in i(y)\}$ to get a structure that looks like a toy set-theoretic universe. So such maps are sometimes called 'di Giorgi maps'.

Suppose f were a bijection between X and $\mathcal{P}(X)$, and run the construction of the "diagonal" set: $\{x \in X : x \notin f(x)\}$. What is this object doing in the di Giorgi model? It is $\{x : x \notin x\}$. This object is the star in Russell's paradox, and this is how Russell discovered the paradox.

If we rerun the above proof of Cantor's theorem with 'i' for 'f' we discover Russell's paradox: try it. (Russell tried it, and that's how he found the paradox)

2.1.7 Proofs

One last general point about rectypes that we should note is the idea of a *proof* (that something is in a rectype). For the moment let us restrict attention to rectypes of finite character

The idea is that if something turns out to be in a particular rectype then there is a good finite reason for it, such as a construction of the object by means of the operations the rectype is built with. Thus $6 \in \mathbb{N}$ because of $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$. More generally, if R is the engendering relation of the rectype, then $R\text{“}\{x\}$ is a proof that x is in the rectype: $R\text{“}\{x\}$ contains everything that needs to be checked to confirm x's membership.

Perhaps a better way of putting this would be to say that $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$ is a *manifestation* of the natural-numberhood of 6, but these constructions are increasingly coming to be called **proofs**. (Some communities use the word *'certificate'* in contexts like this: a pair of factors is a *certificate* for the compositeness of a number.) This might look rather like a loose usage of an old word, but the circle will close when we show that formal concepts of proofs (at least since Gödel, as we shall see on page 66) have in fact been constructions of this kind.

2.2 Languages

Important examples of rectypes for us in logic are *languages* and it is to these that we now turn. An **alphabet** is a (usually but not invariably finite) set of atomic symbols, like the alphabet a, b, c .... Typically written in the style: {a,b,c}. A **string** or a **word** (or **formula** in most of the languages of interest to us) is a (for these purposes) finite list (or sequence) of letters from an alphabet. If Σ is an alphabet, this set of all finite sequences from Σ is often called 'Σ^*'. A **Language** is a set of words (or strings or formulæ). Notice that this is an entirely syntactic definition. The semantics will come later.

There is one family of languages we will not be concerned greatly with, but which make a useful way in to languages we do need. These are the so-called *regular languages.*

If this machine is started in the designated start state, and moved by inputs from one state to another according to the labels on the arrows, we can see that it will be in a state labelled by a smiley iff it has received an even number of 0's and an even number of 1's. We say that this machine **accepts** strings having an even number of 0s and an even number of 1's and that it **recognises** the set of strings having an even number of 0s and and even number of 1's. (This is a common cause of confusion: the machine *accepts* strings, but it *recognises* sets of strings.



Figure 2.1: A finite-state machine

Machines that can be drawn in this style are **finite state** machines. All that such a machine knows is which state it is in. It doesn't know which state it was in last, and it doesn't know how often it has been in any given state. We say of a set of strings that is recognised by one of these machines that it is a **regular language**.

At this stage the only useful example of a regular language is the positional notation for natural numbers to base n, for fixed n. Here is a finite state machine that accepts strings of 0s and 1s that start with a 1, and thereby recognises the set of binary representations of member of $\mathbb{N}^+$.

This machine accepts any string of 0s and 1s beginning with a 1. This set of strings is the set of base-2 notations for natural numbers, and is thus a set of **numeral**. (Remember to distinguish between a natural number and a notation for it.)

The scowlie is not standard but I use it. The smilie isn't standard either: the official symbol is a pair of concentric circles.

It is now possible to see why regular languages are not going to be of much use to us, for consider the set of strings of left-and-right brackets where every left bracket is closed by a right bracket and there are no extra right brackets. (The "matching brackets" language). Any machine that accepts strings of matching brackets and accepts no other strings must be able to keep track of how many left brackets have been opened, and this can get arbitrarily large, and therefore larger than the number of states of any given machine.

In a way this is unfortunate, since any language that is going to admit nontrivial semantics is certainly going to have at least the complexity of the



Figure 2.2: A finite-state machine recognising numerals to base 2

matching-bracket language. (Those that might appear not to, like polish notation, have the same complexity in a less obvious manner).

Regular languages will have little further application in this text, but here they have served to introduce us to machines, and ideas of *accepting* and *recognising* which we will need in connection with Turing machines in chapter 6. They do occur naturally though: it seems that for every natural language the sound-strings that form permissible words of that language constitute a regular language. It has to be admitted that the use of the word 'language' in this connection is a bit question-begging: not all regular languages have any semantics. The set of strings of 0s and 1s starting with a 1 is an example of a regular language with a natural semantics, but there are not many. The older terminology, now obsolescent, speaks of regular *events* not regular languages.

Ambiguous parsing

Not surprisingly we are going to be interested only in languages which can be used to say things. In practice this means languages that are rectypes—and not even all of them. Unless the recursive datatype that is the language is in some sense free (so that each object in it can be generated in only one way—like $\mathbb{N}$) some strings will turn up in more than one way. This means that one regards

the formula not just as a string but as a string with extra structure that tells us where the string comes from, such as a *proof* or *certificate* in the sense of section 2.1.7.

To the recursions that generate the strings of which the language is composed will correspond rules telling us how the meaning of an expression is built up from the meaning of its parts.

Given that the meaning assigned to a string depends on the meaning assigned to the things it is built up from, any string that can be generated in two ways can be given two meanings:

The thing that terrified him was climbing up the drainpipe

This kind of ambiguity is a real pain for language users, and artificial languages are carefully designed not to exhibit it. This frees us from the need to associate to each formula a proof or certificate, and thereby allows us to think of a formula simply as a formula.

In chapters 4 and 5 we will use recursion on the engendering relations to assign meaning to formulæ of two families of languages called **propositional** and **predicate** languages. For the moment we will merely set up the syntax of these languages, and leave the recursive definition of semantics until later.

2.2.1 Propositional languages

An alphabet of propositional logic contains infinitely many **variables** also known as **propositional letters** also known as **literals**; and **connectives** such as $\wedge$, $\vee$, $\rightarrow$, $\longleftrightarrow$, `NAND` and `NOR`; and finally bits of punctuation like '(' and ')'.

To be specific let's say that a propositional letter is one of the letters 'p', 'q' or 'r' with primes attached (so that we have infinitely many of them). Notice that this makes the set of propositional letters into a regular language over the alphabet { 'p', 'q', 'r' '$'$' }!)

A propositional language is a set of formulæ over this alphabet recursively generated as follows:

1. a propositional letter is a formula;

2. If p and q are formulæ so are $(p \vee q)$, $(p \rightarrow q)$ etc etc.

If P is a propositional alphabet, the propositional language over P will be written $\mathcal{L}(P)$.

2.2.2 Predicate languages

A predicate language is the richer kind of thing that contains formulæ like $(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)(R(x,y) \wedge R(y,z) \rightarrow R(x,z))$. To be rigorous about it we would have to say something like the following:

1. A quantifier is $\forall$ or $\exists$;

2. A variable is one of the letters 'x', 'y' or 'z' with a number of primes appended to it;

3. A predicate letter is an uppercase letter of the Roman alphabet. Recall from page 15 the function called **arity** which takes a predicate letter to the number of arguments it is supposed to have;[9]

4. A function letter is a lowercase letter of the Roman alphabet other than 'x', 'y' or 'z'. Function letters have arities the way predicate letters do;

5. An atomic formula is a predicate letter followed by the appropriate number (the **arity** of that predicate letter) of terms all enclosed within a pair of parentheses and demarcated by commas—*e.g.* $F(f(x), y, g(z))$;

6. A term is either (i) a variable or (ii) a function letter followed by the appropriate number of terms enclosed in a set of parentheses and demarcated by commas, as it might be '$f(g(x), y)$';

7. A molecular formula is either (i) an atomic formula, or (ii) a boolean combination of molecular formulæ or (iii) the result of hanging a quantifier-with-a-variable in front of a molecular formula;

A function letter might have arity 0, in which case it is a constant symbol. A predicate letter might have arity 0 in which case it is a propositional letter;

A **negatomic** formula is the negation of an atomic formula.

A quantifier $\forall x$ or $\exists x$ always comes equipped with brackets, thus: '$(\forall x)(\dots)$' The material between the second left and the second right bracket is said to be **within the scope** of the quantifier. If (as in this case) the variable after the quantifier is 'x', then every occurrence of 'x' within the scope is **bound**. An occurrence that is not bound is **free**. Naturally we have the same idea of free and bound variables in lambda calculus too.

There are various things I could have done differently here, while doing the same kind of thing. One could alter the number of functions or their arity, or have different predicates. Another example we will need later is the language of set theory. We characterise it formally by saying that it is a language we would say *in* or *of* predicate calculus with equality and one primitive binary predicate letter '$\in$'. This information is laid down in the **signature**. For example the signature of set theory is: equality plus one binary predicate; the signature of the language of first-order Peano arithmetic has slots for one unary function symbol, one nullary function symbol (or constant), and equality. A signature is something even more abstract than a set of predicate letters and function letters. It's what remains after we throw away the symbols but remember how many of each variety you have. Cricket and baseball have the same signature. Well, more or less! They can be described by giving different values to the same set of parameters. Rings and Integral domains have the same signature.

[9] On page 15 arity was a quantity associated with an operation rather than with a piece of syntax potentially denoting that operation. This is an example of use-mention confusion. See the White Knight's song in *Through the Looking glass and what Alice found there.*

When your mail-order kitset arrives, with the pieces and instructions for a build-your-own-algebraicly closed field, somewhere buried in the sawdust or the polystyrene chips you have a piece of paper (the "manifest") which in this context is the signature. It tells you how many objects you have of each kind, but it doesn't tell you what to do with them. Instructions on what you do with the objects come with the axioms (instructions for assembly)

2.2.3 Intersection-closed properties and Horn formulæ

A rectype is the intersection of all sets containing certain founders and closed under certain constructors.

The property of containing certain founders and being closed under certain constructors—call it **closed** for the moment—has the feature that the intersection of a family of closed sets is also closed. So the intersection of all of them is also closed.

A property which is preserved under intersection in this way is said to be **intersection-closed**: a property of sets is intersection-closed iff the intersection of any number of sets having that property also has that property. Intersection-closed properties give rise to a notion of closure: If X is a set that lacks some intersection-closed property F, then the intersection of all supersets of X that do have F is itself F, and is the least superset of X that is F, and is commonly called the F-closure of X.

Standard examples are: convex hull of a set of points in a vector space, transitive closure of relations.

At first blush you might think that this is slightly more general than declaring a rectype. Interestingly this is not so. It turns out that any intersection-closed property $F(X)$ can be twisted into a form where it says that X is closed under certain operations.

Let's illustrate this by recalling the intersection-closed properties of transitivity and symmetry from page 12.

$$(\forall xyz)(R(x,y) \wedge R(y,z) \rightarrow R(x,z))$$

$$(\forall xy)(R(x,y) \rightarrow R(y,x))$$

We can see that a relation is transitive iff it is closed under the operation that accepts $\langle x, y\rangle$ and $\langle y, z\rangle$ and returns $\langle x, z\rangle$. It is symmetric iff it is closed under the operation that flips ordered pairs around.

Notice now that these two definitions have a syntactic peculiarity: the stuff inside the quantifiers is of the form

$$(\bigwedge_{i\in I} p_i) \rightarrow q$$

where the p_i and q are atomic (not even negatomic—just atomic). I may be empty, and q may be $\bot$. '$\bot$' is the constant symbol constrained to evaluate always to `false`: this matches its other use as the symbol denoting the bottom

element of a poset. Formulæ like this are called **Horn clauses**. We will say that a property F of relations is **captured by horn clauses** if the assertion that R has property F is expressed by a formula which is a list of universal quantifiers enclosing a body which is a horn clause whose atomic parts are fragments like '$R(x, y)$' which just glue together with R's the variables mentioned in the universal quantifiers.

To put it roughly:

REMARK 7 *the following are equivalent for a property F:*

F is intersection-closed;

F is captured by horn clauses;

The extension (graph) of F is a rectype.

Horn clauses are the syntactic manifestation of rectypes.

(Think about "X contains 0 and is closed under successor"; "R is a transitive relation", and contrast them with "R is a trichotomous relation"

[*HOLE burble nonhorn nonmonotonicity. A horn clause corresponds to "if you find this tuple in the set, and that tuple in the set, put in this tuple. Try to think of a non-horn definition as partaking of the same absurdity that we find in "if you don't get this message, please ring me back"*

The graph of a relation with a horn property can always be thought of as a set of ordered pairs closed under some operation.]

> We might note also in this connection that the projection of a convex set in a vector space is likewise a convex set. The way in to this is to think of convex figures in three dimensions. The shadow cast by a convex solid figure is a convex plane figure. The set of convex subsets of E^n is closed under directed unions. (page 15) This is not an accident.

2.2.4 All wellfounded structures arise from rectypes?

All rectypes give rise to wellfounded relations: do all wellfounded relations arise from rectypes? For most practical purposes the answer appears to be 'yes'. Counterexamples would be interesting, but no-one has ever fomulated the question precisely enough for us to know what we'd be looking for. What do we mean by 'arise', exactly?

Chapter 3

Partially ordered sets

3.1 Lattice fixed point theorems

A **fixed point** for a function f is an argument x such that $f(x) = x$. This is an important concept because many useful mathematical facts can be expressed by assertions that say that certain functions have fixed points. For example, the equation $p(x) = 0$ has a solution iff the function $\lambda x.(p(x) - x)$ has a fixed point. This gives us a motive to seek methods for showing that functions have fixed points: fixed point theorems are useful in the search for solutions to equations.

3.1.1 The Tarski-Knaster theorem

Theorem 8 The Tarski-Knaster theorem
Let $\langle X, \leq \rangle$ be a complete lattice and f an order-preserving map $\langle X, \leq \rangle \to \langle X, \leq \rangle$. Then f has a fixed point.

Proof:
Set $A = \{x : f(x) \leq x\}$ and $a = \bigwedge A$. (A is nonempty because it must contain $\bigvee X$). Since f is order-preserving, we can say that if $f(x) \leq x$ then $f^2(x) \leq f(x)$ so $f(a)$ is also a lower bound for A as follows. If $x \in A$ we have $f(x) \leq x$ whence $f^2(x) \leq f(x)$ so $f(x) \in A$ and $a \leq f(x)$. But $f(x) \leq x$ so $f(a) \leq x$ as desired. But a was the *greatest* lower bound so $f(a) \leq a$ and $a \in A$. But then $f(a) \in a$ since $f``A \subseteq A$, and $f(a) \geq a$ since a is the greatest lower bound.

■

This proof of theorem 8 shows not only that increasing functions have fixed points but that they have *least* fixed points. This gives us the existence of inductively defined sets because the operation of taking a set and adding to it the result of applying all the constructors once to all its members is increasing (with respect to $\subseteq$). The above definition of the element a echoes precisely the declaration of $\mathbb{N}$ as an intersection of a family of sets. Compare $\bigwedge\{x : f(x) \leq x\}$ with $\bigcap\{X : (S``X \cup \{0\}) \subseteq X\}$.

EXERCISE 13 *Prove that every monotone function on a complete lattice has a greatest fixed point.*

A least fixed point (think: $\mathbb{N}$) has an induction principle, and a greatest fixed point has a co-induction principle. What might this co-induction principle be? Something will belong to a coinductive dataype as long as there isn't a good finite reason for it not to.

Let's have a couple of applications.

Theorem 9 *Schröder-Bernstein*



Figure 3.1: The Schröder-Bernstein theorem

The function $\lambda X.(A \setminus g``(B \setminus f``X))$ is a monotone map from $\mathcal{P}(A)$ into itself. $\lambda X.f``X$ is monotone; complementation in $B$ is antimonotone; $\lambda Y.g``Y$ is monotone, and complementation in A is antimonotone. the composition of two antimonotone functions is antimonotone, so the function $\lambda X.(A \setminus g``(B \setminus f``X))$ is a monotone map from $\mathcal{P}(A)$ into itself as claimed.

If now X is a fixed point for $\lambda X.(A \setminus g``(B \setminus f``X))$ we find that $f|X \cup (g^{-1}|(A \setminus X)$ is a bijection between A and B. ■

Further applications include the existence of transitive closures of relations.

Consider the complete lattice $\mathcal{P}(X \times X)$ and let f be the function $\lambda R.R \cup R^2$. Any fixed point for this function is a transitive relation. If N is a binary relation on X then the least fixed point of $\lambda R.R \cup R^2$ that is above N is the transitive closure of N. Is there a fixed point above N? Yes, because the the upper set of points above any given point in a complete lattice is also a complete lattice and we can use theorem 8 again.

3.1.2 Witt's theorem

We say $f : X \to X$ is **inflationary** if $(\forall x \in X)(x \leq f(x))$.

Theorem 10 *Every inflationary function from a chain-complete poset into itself has arbitrarily late fixed points.*

Proof: Let $\langle X, \leq \rangle$ be a chain complete poset, f an inflationary function $X \to X$, and x a member of X. We will show that f has a fixed point above x.

The key device is the inductively defined set of things obtainable from x by repeatedly applying f and taking sups of chains—the smallest subset of X containing x and closed under f and sups of chains. Let us call this set $C(x)$. Our weapon will be induction.

We will show that $C(x)$ is always a chain. Since it is closed under sups of chains it must therefore have a top element and that element will be a fixed point.

Let us say $y \in C(x)$ is **normal** if $(\forall z \in C(x))(z < y \to f(z) \leq y)$. We prove by induction that if y is normal then $(\forall z \in C(x))(z \leq y \vee f(y) \leq z)$. That is to say, we show that—for all normal y—$\{z \in C(x) : z \leq y \vee f(y) \leq z\}$ contains x and is closed under f and sups of chains and is therefore a superset of $C(x)$. Let's deal with these in turn.

1. (Contains x) $x \in \{z \in C(x) : z \leq y \vee f(y) \leq z\}$ because $x \leq y$. ($x \leq y$ because x is the smallest thing in $C(x)$—by induction! The set of things $\geq x$ contains x, is closed under f and sups of chains and is therefore a superset of $C(x)$.

2. (Closed under f). If $z \in \{z \in C(x) : z \leq y \vee f(y) \leq z\}$ then either

   (a) $z < y$ in which case $f(z) \leq y$ by normality of y and $f(z) \in \{z \in C(x) : z \leq y \vee f(y) \leq z\}$. or

   (b) $z = y$ in which case $f(y) \leq f(z)$ so $f(z) \in \{z \in C(x) : z \leq y \vee f(y) \leq z\}$ or

   (c) $f(y) \leq z$ in which case $f(y) \leq f(z)$ (f is inflationary) and $f(z) \in \{z \in C(x) : z \leq y \vee f(y) \leq z\}$

3. (Closed under sups of chains). Let $S \subseteq \{z \in C(x) : z \leq y \vee f(y) \leq z\}$ be a chain. If $(\forall z \in S)(z \leq y)$ then $sup(S) \leq y$. On the other hand if there is $z \in S$ s.t. $z \not\leq y$, we have $f(y) \leq z$ (by normality of y) so $sup(S) \geq f(y)$ and $sup(S) \in \{z \in C(x) : z \leq y \vee f(y) \leq z\}$.

Next we show that everything in $C(x)$ is normal. Naturally we do this by induction: the set of normal elements of $C(x)$ will contain x and be closed under f and sups of chains.

1. (contains x). Vacuously!

2. (closed under f). Suppose $y \in \{w \in C(x) : (\forall z \in C(x))(z < w \to f(z) \leq w\}$. We will show $(\forall z \in C(x))(z < f(y) \to f(z) \leq f(y))$. So assume $z < f(y)$. This gives $z \leq y$ by normality of y. If $z = y$ we certainly have $f(z) \leq f(y)$ as desired, and if $z < y$ we have $f(z) \leq y \leq f(y)$.

3. (closed under sups of chains). Suppose $S \subseteq \{w \in C(x) : (\forall z \in C(x))(z < w \rightarrow f(z) \leq w)\}$ is a chain. If $z < sup(S)$ we can't have $(\forall w \in S)(z \geq f(w))$ for otherwise $(\forall w \in S)(z \geq w)$ (by transitivity and inflationarity of f) so for at least one $w \in S$ we have $z \leq w$. If $z < w$ we have $f(z) \leq w \leq sup(S)$ since w is normal. If $z = w$ then w is not the greatest element of S, so in S there is $w' > w$ and then $f(z) \leq w' \leq sup(S)$ by normality of w'.

If y and z are two things in $C(x)$ we have $z \leq y \vee f(y) \leq z$ by normality of y, so the second disjunct implies $y \leq z$, whence $z \leq y \vee y \leq z$. So $C(x)$ is a chain as promised, and its sup is the fixed point above x whose coming was foretold.

■

3.1.3 Exercises on Fixed Points

1. Show that the fixed point of theorem 8 is $\leq_X$-minimal.

2. Let $\langle A, \leq\rangle$ and $\langle B, \leq\rangle$ be total orderings with $\langle A, \leq\rangle$ isomorphic to an initial segment of $\langle B, \leq\rangle$ and $\langle B, \leq\rangle$ isomorphic to a terminal segment of $\langle A, \leq\rangle$. Show that $\langle A, \leq\rangle$ and $\langle B, \leq\rangle$ are isomorphic.

   You used an analogue of the function in the proof of the Schröder-Bernstein theorem. What can you say about the set of its fixed points?

3. (The Gale-Stewart theorem)

   Let X be an arbitrary set. $[X]^{<\omega}$ is the set of finite sequences of members of X. Let G be a subset of $[X]^{<\omega}$ **closed under shortening** (*i.e.*, initial segments of sequences in G are also in G.) There is a map v defined on the **endpoints** of G (sequences in G with no proper end-extensions in G) taking values in the set $\{\mathtt{I}, \mathtt{II}\}$.

   Players `I` and `II` play a game by picking elements of X alternately, with `I` playing first, with their choices constrained so that at each finite stage they have built a finite sequence in G.

   If they reach an endpoint of G the game is over, and v tells them who has won. If the game goes on for ever, `II` wins.

   Provide a formal notion of **winning strategy** for games of this sort. Use Witt's theorem to prove that one or the other player must have a winning strategy in your sense.

4. What might the *wellfounded part* of a binary relation be? Use one of the fixed point theorems to show that your definition is legitimate.

5. (Maths tripos Part II exam 2000)

   (i) State and prove the Tarski-Knaster fixed-point theorem for complete lattices.

(ii) Let X and Y be sets and $f : X \to Y$ and $g : Y \to X$ be injections. By considering $F : \mathcal{P}(X) \to \mathcal{P}(X)$ defined by

$$F(A) = X \setminus g``(Y \setminus f``X)$$

or otherwise, show that there is a bijection $h : X \to Y$.

Suppose U is a set equipped with a group Σ of permutations. We say that a map $s : X \to Y$ is *piecewise*$-\Sigma$ just when there is a finite partition $X = X_1 \cup \ldots \cup X_n$ and $\sigma_1 \ldots \sigma_n \in \Sigma$ so that $s(x) = \sigma_i(x)$ for $x \in X_i$. Let X and Y be subsets of Y, and $f : X \to Y$ and $g : Y \to X$ be piecewise$-\Sigma$ injections. Show that there is a piecewise$-\Sigma$ bijection $h : X \to Y$.

If $\langle P, \leq_P \rangle$ and $\langle Q, \leq_Q \rangle$ are two posets with order-preserving injections $f : P \to Q$ and $g : Q \to P$, must there be an isomorphism? Prove or give a counterexample.

3.2 Continuity

Notice that neither theorem 8 nor theorem 10 make any assumptions about the continuity of the functions they produce fixed points for. To appreciate the significance of this point, attempt the following exercise.

EXERCISE 14 *Let $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ be a complete partial order and f a monotone function $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle \to \langle X, \leq_X \rangle$. Show that $\{x : x = f(x)\}$ is a complete lattice.*

One naturally spots immediately that any set F of fixed points for f has a sup in X. Equally naturally one expects next to able to prove that this fixed point is itself fixed. Why should one expect this? There are two reasons, both of which bear examination.

(i) One might expect that the subposet of fixed points for f inherits not only the ordering from $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ but inherits the $\bigvee$ and $\bigwedge$ as well. This is a natural thing to expect because in most cases where one has two algebras, where the carrier set of the second is a subset of the carrier set of the first, the operations of the second are restrictions of the operations of the first: subgroups of groups have the same multiplication as the group of which they are subgroups; multiplication of rationals is a restriction of multiplication of the reals, and so on.

(ii) There are various natural concepts of continuity which one might be unconsciously invoking, and they will ensure that the sup of X in the poset of fixed points is the same as its sup in $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$. These ideas of continuity bear examination in turn.

The roots of all ideas of continuity lie in the real line. Topology arose from an endeavour to develop the notion of a continuous function from the reals to the reals for use elsewhere. It is a powerful development because it remains useful even when the domain and range of the putatively continuous functions lack order structure. In the present context we still have order structure and we can develop the same original ideas in a different direction.

Let $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ be a complete lattice. $f : X \to X$ can be made to act on $\mathcal{P}(X)$ in two ways. Given $Y \subseteq X$, one can take the sup and then apply f, or one can apply f setwise to Y, and take the sup of the values. Are the two results the same? If they are, we say f is continuous. Notice that if X is $\Re$ then this agrees with the usual definition of continuous function $\Re \to \Re$, at least for nondecreasing functions.

So $f : X \to X$ is **continuous** if $(\forall X' \subseteq X)(\bigvee(f``X') = f(\bigvee(X')))$. That is to say, if the following diagram commutes.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \mathcal{P}(X) & \xrightarrow{\lambda x.f``x} & \mathcal{P}(X) \\ \Big\downarrow{\scriptstyle sup} & & \Big\downarrow{\scriptstyle sup} \\ X & \xrightarrow{\quad f \quad} & X \end{array}$$

If we write X^α for the set of subsets of X that are ranges of increasing[1] X-valued sequences of length α. We then say that f is α-**continuous** if the next diagram commutes.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} X^\alpha & \xrightarrow{\lambda x.f``x} & X^\alpha \\ \Big\downarrow{\scriptstyle sup} & & \Big\downarrow{\scriptstyle sup} \\ X & \xrightarrow{\quad f \quad} & X \end{array}$$

Of course you haven't ever had to worry about α-continuity for any α other than ω because, as you know, whenever a is a least upper bound of a set of reals X then there is an increasing sequence x_0, x_1 ... indexed by the naturals whose limit is a. (In fact this uses dependent choices see page 27.) So the only kind of continuity of functions $\Re \to \Re$ that matters is ω-continuity, where ω is the order type of the naturals in their natural order. So you wouldn't have learned a general concept of α-continuity from the reals!

In Algebra one has operations like $\lambda A.\{ab : a, b \in A\}$ which takes a set of group elements to another set of group elements. This too is ω-continuous. It seems that it is ω-continuous because it has finite character. However even some operations whose character is less obviously finite are ω-continuous. Consider the function that sends a set to the set of all its finite subsets. Even this is ω-continuous: if $a_1 \subseteq a_2 \subseteq a_3 \subseteq \ldots$ and x is a finite subset of $a_1 \cup a_2 \cup a_3 \cup \ldots$ then it can only meet finitely many $a_{i+1} \setminus a_i$ and so it is already a subset of some a_i. So $\lambda x.$(set of finite subsets of x) is ω-continuous. In contrast $\lambda x.$(set

[1] We need this condition because without it any β-sequence with $\beta < \alpha$ could be padded out to an α-sequence, with the effect that α-continuity of a function f would imply β-continuity for all $\beta < \alpha$.

of countable subsets of x), is not! Think about how to apply this reasoning to the set of countable subsets of a set. If you know about ordinals already, you may ask yourself: what can we deduce about an ordinal α if we are told that the function $\lambda x.$(set of countable subsets of x) is α-continuous? We will return to this in chapter 8.

Finally $\mathcal{P}$ is an example of a function that is monotone but not α-continuous for any α.

Given that many natural functions are continuous in one sense or another, it is natural to wonder if one can weaken the requirement that the domain and range should be a continuous lattice if it is only continuous functions one is after fixed point for. An intuition that is very appealing in this context is the idea of iterating a continuous function and looking at the limit of the points obtained. Is the sup of $\{x, f(x), f^2(x) \ldots f^n(x) \ldots\}$ a fixed point for f, if f is continuous? It will be—as long as it exists! What condition can we put on the lattice that will ensure that this limit exists? Well, if f is monotone increasing, then the set $\{f^n(x) : x \in \mathbb{N}\}$ will be a chain, so all that is necessary is to suppose that the lattice has sups of all chains of length ω: a weaker condition than existence of sups of all subsets.

This is susceptible of refinements which we will not pursue here: arguments like this will enable us to show that if a poset has sups of all chains of length α, then if f is α-continuous, then f will have a fixed point.

In fact, not only do we not need the domain and range to be a complete lattice, we don't need it to be a lattice at all. The condition on existence of sups of chains that does the business for us doesn't imply existence of sups of two incomparable elements. Our next example illustrates this.

Let us write "$\mathrm{Z} \rightharpoondown \mathrm{Z}$" for the set of partial maps from the integers into itself. (The funny arrow isn't defective—it really is meant to have only one fletch, and its LaTeX symbol is `\rightharpoondown`. $X \rightharpoondown Y$ is the set of partial functions from X to Y.)

Identify the maps with their graphs and partially order $\mathrm{Z} \rightharpoondown \mathrm{Z}$ by set inclusion. This makes it a chain-complete poset under $\subseteq$. It inherits its structure from the complete lattice $\langle \mathcal{P}(\mathrm{Z} \times \mathrm{Z}), \subseteq \rangle$—of which it is a substructure in terms of the jargon on page 10. Now consider the map

$$\texttt{metafact}\colon \lambda f.\lambda n.\texttt{if } n = 0 \texttt{ then } 1 \texttt{ else } n * f(n-1)$$

Notice that `metafact` is ω-continuous, and that the poset of partial maps $\mathrm{Z} \rightharpoondown \mathrm{Z}$ partially ordered by inclusion has sups of ω-chains. So `metafact` will have a fixed point.

Check for yourself that any fixed point for this satisfies the recursion that characterises the factorial function. In fact there are lots of fixed points for `metafact`, but the one we are after is the least one, which we can obtain by iteration in the obvious way. The least fixed point is the only fixed point that contains no information beyond that obtainable from the recursion. The recursion only tells us about what to do to natural numbers, so the least fixed point is undefined everywhere else.

This illustrates how the extra generality (of chain-complete posets over complete lattices) matters. The set of partial maps $\mathrm{Z} \rightharpoonup \mathrm{Z}$ partially ordered by inclusion is an important object but it isn't a complete lattice (two functions which disagree on even one argument have no common upper bound) so we cannot use the Tarski-Knaster theorem to show that things like `metafact` have fixed point.

3.2.1 Exercises on lattices and posets

1. Let $\mathcal{O}(X)$ be the lattice of open sets of a topological space X. Show that it is a complete lattice under inclusion. Is it distributive? There are two *infinitary* distributive laws: $x \wedge \bigvee A = \bigvee\{x \wedge a : a \in A\}$ and $x \vee \bigwedge A = \bigwedge\{x \vee a : a \in A\}$. Which of these does it satisfy?

   Consider the map

   $$F : \mathcal{O}(X) \to \mathcal{O}(X)\,; \quad F(U) = \mathrm{int}(X \setminus \mathrm{int}(X \setminus U))$$

   where $\mathrm{int}(A)$ is the interior of $A \subseteq X$. Show that F is order-preserving. Is F continuous?

2. Consider the following functions $F : \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N}) \to \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N})$.
   (i) $F(A) = \{1\} \cup \{2n : n \in A\} \cup \{3n : n \in A\}$.
   (ii) $F(A) = A \cup \{2n : n \notin A\}$.
   (iii) $F(A) = \{2\} \cup \{ab : a, b \in A\}$.
   (iv) $F(A) = \{n : \exists m \in A.n \leq m\}$.
   (v) $F(A) = \mathbb{N} \setminus A$.
   In each case determine whether or not F is ω-continuous.
   In case F is ω-continuous identify the least fixed point of f.
   In the cases when F is not ω-continuous determine whether or not F has a fixed point.

3. The proof of theorem 3.1.1 uses the function

   $$F : \mathcal{P}(X) \to \mathcal{P}(X)\,; \quad F(A) = X \setminus g\text{“}(Y \setminus f\text{“}A),$$

   where $f : X \to Y$ and $g : Y \to X$ are injections. Is this function ω-continuous?

3.3 Zorn's lemma

Zorn's lemma is one of a collection of interdeducible assertions.

> **Zorn's lemma: Every poset in which every chain has an upper bound has a maximal element.**

Do not worry too much about whether or not it might be true.
We can use it to prove various convenient generalities, like these:

1. Every vector space has a basis.
2. Every set can be wellordered.
3. Given any two sets there is a injection from one into the other.
4. The Axiom of Choice: If X is a set of nonempty sets, there is a function $f : X \to \bigcup X$ s.t. $(\forall x \in X)(f(x) \in x)$.
5. Countable choice: like the previous item but X is required to be countable.
6. Every surjection has a right inverse.
7. Tikhonov's theorem: a product of compact spaces is compact.
8. Jordan-König. (see page 166)
9. (Nilson-Schreier) Every subgroup of a free group is free.
10. Every connected graph has a spanning tree.

EXERCISE 15 *Deduce items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 10 from Zorn's lemma.*

5 has no converse, and it is open whether or not 9 has. All the others do, but mostly they are beyond the scope of this book. Theorem 10 was proved specifically to deduce Zorn's lemma from the axiom of choice.[2]

EXERCISE 16 *Use Witt's theorem and the axiom of choice to prove that every chain-complete poset has a maximal element.*

Show that for any poset $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ the collection of chains in it, partially ordered by $\subseteq$, is a chain-complete poset.

Then deduce Zorn's lemma from this last assertion.

(You may need the hint that this generalises the construction of the reals as the completion of the rationals.)

EXERCISE 17 *Prove the following implications:*
7 → 4;
2 → 4;
10 → 4;

3.3.1 Exercises on Zorn's Lemma

1. Recall that one partial order $\leq_2$ on a set P *extends* the partial order $\leq_1$ just when $a \leq_1 b$ implies $a \leq_2 b$ for all a, b in P. Use Zorn's Lemma to show that every partial order can be extended to a total order. This is the **Order Extension Principle**.
2. Use Zorn's Lemma to prove that every subspace $U \leq V$ of a vector space has a complementary subspace (that is, there is $W \leq V$ with $V = U \oplus W$).

[2] Deducing Zorn from AC was a well-known fiddly task—and in some ways remains so. I learned the idea of using Witt's theorem for it from my colleague Peter Johnstone.

3.4 Boolean Algebras

Recall that a boolean algebra is a distributive complemented lattice.

Notice that all the axioms for boolean algebras are horn. So we can talk about the boolean algebra generated by a set of elements, and we can talk about products and substructures of boolean algebras. Indeed they are a special kind of Horn formula, being of the form $(\forall x_1 \dots x_n)$ hung on the front of a conjunction of a lot of equations. Theories axiomatised by universal closures of conjunctions of equations are said to be **algebraic**. (Look ahead to page 82 if you don't understand this and are in a hurry to find out).

The most natural examples of boolean algebras are a power set algebras: the set of all subsets of a given set, partially ordered by set inclusion, with union, intersection and complement.

Filters

A filter in a boolean algebra is a subset F of the domain which is closed under $\geq$ and $\wedge$. i.e. it satisfies the two conditions:

$$x \in F \wedge x \leq y \rightarrow y \in F$$

and

$$x, y \in F \rightarrow x \wedge y \in F$$

Notice that these conditions are horn, so an intersection of filters is a filter and a directed (page 15) limit of filters is a filter. The fact that it is horn also means we can talk about the filter generated by a set, which is of course the smallest filter that is a superset of the set given. A filter in the power set algebra $\langle \mathcal{P}(X), \subseteq \rangle$ is said to be a filter **on** X. We should think of a filter on X as a concept of largeness (of subsets of X). This seems reasonable if we reflect on the easiest examples: the cofinite subsets of $\mathbb{N}$ (these are the sets X such that $\mathbb{N} \setminus X$ is finite) are clearly large in some sense. This motivates two other clauses which we almost always assume and which it is easy to forget.

1. Proper filters. According to the definition of filter, the whole algebra is a filter. However it is not a **proper** filter. All other filters are proper. If the filter generated by a set of elements is proper, we say the set is a **filter base**.

2. Nonprincipal filters. There are pathological filters that do not accommodate the "largeness" intuition. If b is any element of a boolean algebra $\mathcal{B}$, then $\{b' \in \mathcal{B} : b' \geq b\}$ is a filter in $\mathcal{B}$. It is the *principal filter generated by* b. We will think of principal filters as pathological and will not be interested in them. The remaining filters are *nonprincipal*: like the filter of cofinite subsets on $\mathbb{N}$ we saw earlier.

Exercise 18 *Check that the filters in a fixed boolean algebra form a complete poset; the proper filters form a chain-complete poset.*

Let F be a filter in a boolean algebra $\mathcal{B}$. $\{\neg y : y \in F\}$ is an **ideal**. Indeed it is the **dual ideal** to F

Ideals in Boolean algebras are so-called because they correspond to ideals in Boolean rings. Boolean rings?

EXERCISE 19 *A Boolean ring is a ring with a 1 such that for all elements x, $x^2 = x$.*

1. *Describe operators and equations which show that the theory of Boolean rings is an algebraic theory.*

2. *Show that a Boolean ring satisfies the equations $x + x = 0$ and $xy = yx$. Deduce (by considering additive groups) that every finite Boolean ring has order a power of 2.*

3. *Show that a Boolean algebra becomes a Boolean ring with multiplication given by $\wedge$ and addition defined by $x + y = (x \wedge \neg y) \vee (y \wedge \neg x)$.*

4. *Conversely find definitions of 0, 1, $\vee$ $\wedge$ and $\neg$ in terms of $+$, 0, 1 etc so that a Boolean ring becomes a Boolean algebra.*

5. *Which Boolean rings are integral domains?*

DEFINITION 11 *A filter F satisfying any of the conditions below is said to be an* **ultrafilter**. *The dual ideal is a* **prime ideal**.

1. *F is $\subseteq$-maximal among proper filters.*

2. *$(\forall x \in \mathcal{B})(x \in F \vee \neg x \in F)$.*

3. *For all $a, b \in \mathcal{B}$, if $(a \vee b) \in F$ then either $a \in F$ or $b \in F$. (F is* **prime**.*)*

EXERCISE 20 *Prove that the definitions of definition 11 are equivalent*

There are natural examples of filters on sets: we saw earlier the filter of cofinite subsets of $\mathbb{N}$, and indeed for *any* infinite set X the collection of cofinite subsets of X is a filter on X. Unfortunately the only natural examples of ultrafilters are trivial. If x is any element of a set X, then $\{X' \subseteq X : x \in X'\}$ is a principal ultrafilter on X, and unless we assume something like the axiom of choice this is the only kind of ultrafilter whose existence can be demonstrated.

We tend to use $\mathcal{CALLIGRAPHIC}$ font capitals for variables ranging over ultrafilters.

If we do assume the axiom of choice we can prove that there are lots of ultrafilters:

Theorem 12 *(The Prime ideal theorem) Every boolean algebra has an ultrafilter.*

Proof:

Consider the set of filters in a boolean algebra $\mathcal{B}$. They are partially ordered (by $\subseteq$, as we have remarked earlier in exercise 18); also any $\subseteq$-chain of filters has an upper bound (which is simply the union of them all) so the assumptions of Zorn's lemma are satisfied. Therefore there are maximal filters. These are ultra, by exercise 20.

■

Since proving that there are ultrafilters is the same as proving that there are maximal ("prime") ideals, the name should not cause puzzlement: it's simply a question of which terms you propose to think in.

Since, as we noted on p. 15 upper sets in (complete) posets are (complete) posets, we can even prove the apparently stronger assertion that every filter in a boolean algebra $\mathcal{B}$ can be extended to an ultrafilter. It isn't in fact any stronger because if we seek an ultrafilter extending a given filter F we form the quotient algebra $\mathcal{B}/F$, use theorem 12 to find an ultrafilter, and then form the set of all elements of $\mathcal{B}$ that got sent to the ultrafilter in the quotient. This set is an ultrafilter extending F.

In fact by being careful in the choice of a chain-complete poset we can even prove:

EXERCISE 21 *If $\mathcal{B}$ is a boolean algebra with nonprincipal filters then it has a nonprincipal ultrafilter.*

Algebras have products and quotients. A homomorphism from $\mathcal{A}$ to $\mathcal{B}$ is a map h such that if a tuple $\vec{a}$ of elements of $\mathcal{A}$ stands in some (atomic) relation R in $\mathcal{A}$, then the tuple $h(\vec{a})$ stands in the same relation R in $\mathcal{B}$. In fact there is usually more one can say about homomorphisms than this. In the case of boolean algebras (which are the only algebras we are going to be interested in here) any filter gives rise to a homomorphism. As noted earlier, a filter corresponds to a notion of largeness. Thus if we have a filter F in a boolean algebra $\mathcal{B}$ it is natural to think of b and b' in $\mathcal{B}$ being similar if their symmetric difference $b\Delta b'$ is *small*, which is to say, its complement is in the filter. Thus we have $b \sim_F b'$ iff the complement of $(b\Delta b') \in F$.

EXERCISE 22 .

(i) Check that $\sim_F$ is the same as $(\exists c \in F)(c \wedge b = c \wedge b')$;
(ii) Check that $\sim_F$ is a congruence relation for the boolean operations;
(iii) Prove that the function sending elements of $\mathcal{B}$ to their equivalence classes is a boolean algebra homomorphism.

DEFINITION 13 *The algebra whose elements are equivalence classes under $\sim_F$ is the quotient algebra modulo F. The* **kernel** *of a homomorphism of boolean algebras is the set of elements sent to 0.*

This enables us to prove the *Stone Representation theorem.* A representation theorem you already know is the representation theorem for groups: every group

is (isomorphic to) a group of permutations of a set. The most obvious examples of boolean algebras all have sets as their elements and set inclusion ($x \subseteq y$) as their partial order. Not all do: quotient algebras typically don't. The Stone Representation theorem is the assertion that nevertheless

Theorem 14 *(Stone's Representation Theorem)*
Every boolean algebra is isomorphic to a boolean algebra whose elements are sets, whose partial order is $\subseteq$, and whose $\vee$ and $\wedge$ are $\cup$ and $\cap$.

Proof:
The hard part is to find the isomorphic algebra; the rest is easy. Given $\mathcal{B}$ construct $\mathcal{B}'$ as follows. Send each $b \in \mathcal{B}$ to $\{\mathcal{U} : b \in \mathcal{U}\}$ (the set of all ultrafilters in $\mathcal{B}$ containing b). $\mathcal{B}'$ will be the image of $\mathcal{B}$ in this map. Obviously if $b \leq c$ then any ultrafilter containing b will contain c but not *vice versa* unless $c \leq b$. If b is strictly below c then consider the principal filter generated by $c \wedge \neg b$. Extend this to an ultrafilter by theorem 12. This ultrafilter will contain c but not b. Thus $b \leq c \longleftrightarrow \{\mathcal{U} : b \in \mathcal{U}\} \subseteq \{\mathcal{U} : c \in \mathcal{U}\}$.

■

Theorems 12 and 14 are in fact equivalent. Although we used Zorn to prove them there is no converse. Nevertheless there is a list of natural assertions equivalent to them, though it is not as long as the list of equivalents of AC. The most interesting item is probably: a product of compact Hausdorff spaces is compact Hausdorff, but that is hard! (See Johnstone: Stone Spaces)

Atomic and Atomless boolean algebras

An **atom** in a boolean algebra is a minimal nonzero element. A boolean algebra is **atomic** if every nonzero element is above an atom. Power set algebras are of course atomic—the atoms are the singletons.

A rich source of atomless boolean algebras are things of the form $RO(\mathcal{T})$, the **algebra of regular open sets**[3] of a topological space $\mathcal{T}$. The poset of open sets is a Heyting algebra. Atomless boolean algebras will reappear in section 5.6.

3.5 Antimonotonic functions

A function f from a poset into itself is **antimonotonic** iff $(\forall x, y)(x \leq y \rightarrow f(y) \leq f(x))$

Theorem 8 tells us nothing about fixed points for antimonotonic functions, but sometimes one can get results by doing clever *ad hoc* things. A fact that is sometimes useful is that the composition of two antimonotonic functions is monotonic, and every fixed point for f is also a fixed point for f^2. Look also at question 3.1.3.2.

[3] An open set is regular open if it is the interior of its closure.

Fixed points for antimonotonic functions—or at least things with that kind of flavour—crop up inconveniently all over the place. Natural examples in mathematics include finding roots of polynomials. After all $x^2 - 2 = 0$ has a solution iff the antimonotonic function $\lambda x.(2/x)$ has a fixed point. But in this case there are other techniques we can use, since the poset of reals has extra structure. Complementation in Boolean algebras, $\bigcap$ in the poset of all sets are both antimonotonic. Further interesting examples are to be found in linguistics and biology. Two creatures of the same species are supposed to be able to mate and produce viable offspring. This gives rise to a possible definition of a(n extension of a) species as a fixed point for the operation

$$\lambda X.\{y : (\forall x \in X)(x \text{ and } y \text{ can be mated to produce viable offspring})\}$$

(We disregard gender for the moment!) The only trouble is: this operation is antimonotonic with respect to $\subseteq$! Let M and F be two sets and $R \subseteq M \times F$. Then the function $m = \lambda X \subseteq M.\{y \in F : (\forall x \in X)(R(x,y))\}$ is an antimonotone function from $\mathcal{P}(M) \to \mathcal{P}(F)$, and similarly $f = \lambda X \subseteq F.\{y \in M : (\forall x \in X)(R(y,x))\}$ is an antimonotone function from $\mathcal{P}(F) \to \mathcal{P}(M)$. Now $f \circ m$ is a monotone map $\mathcal{P}(F) \to \mathcal{P}(F)$ and $m \circ f$ is a monotone map from $\mathcal{P}(M) \to \mathcal{P}(M)$. $f \circ m$ and $m \circ f$ have fixed points by theorem 8. If we take M and F to be the set of (genotypes of) male and female fruit flies respectively, and $R(x,y)$ to be the binary relation "x and y will produce viable offspring when mated" we find that fixed points for the compositions (either way) of these two maps give rise to things like *species* of fruit flies. Is there any reason to suppose that every member of $M \cup F$ belongs to a fixed point? You may enjoy working out the details. [4]

There are equally important examples from other areas too. In phonetics there is the concept of *allophone*. Two sounds are allophones for a language if the language makes no use of the difference between them. The voiced and unvoiced *th* sounds as in *pith* and *wither* are distinct for native speakers of English in that they can hear that these two sounds are distinct. However they are equivalent in the sense that there is no pair of English words which differ only in that one has a voiced *th* where the other has an unvoiced *th*.[5] (They are not equivalent in this sense in Arabic, for example). There are other pairs of sounds in English that are indistinguishable in this sense, but they are less striking: front and back 'l's, front and back 'k's for example. I'm not sure about the sounds *sh* and *zh* (as in 'pleasure') for example: I know of no pair of English words that differ only in that one has 'sh' where the other has 'zh'. Let's suppose for the sake of argument that there is no such pair and that these two sounds are indistinguishable in the same sense as the voiced and unvoiced 'th'.

But even if both these pairs are indistinguishable in that sense, it doesn't imply that they are as it were *jointly* indistinguishable: there might be two

[4] A probably rather important point that it is hard to see how to make allowances for is the fact that realistically R^3 is very nearly a subset of R. ...

[5] Well, very nearly anyway: the only counterexamples to this claim are contrived or obscure: loathe/loth, thy/thigh and thou (as in 'you')/'thou' (as in 'Morrie thou').

words that differ in that where one has a voiced 'th' and a voiced 'sh' the other has the two unvoiced sounds. What we want is a notion of equivalence of tuples of sounds. That equivalence relation will be a fixed point for an antimonotonic operation.

Biology provides us with an important example with the same logical structure: the notion of phenotypic equivalence of two alleles at a locus: if when we swap one for the other it makes no difference to the resulting genotype, we say they are phenotypically equivalent. But if A and a are phenotypically equivalent[6] at one locus and B and b are phenotypically equivalent at another, can we *simultaneously* swap a for A and b for B and *still* not make any difference to the phenotype?

We will revisit these themes briefly in section 4.2.

3.6 Exercises

Exercise 23 *Why do we need ultrafilters? Why can't we send b to the set of filters containing b?*

Exercise 24 *Let X be an infinite set. Observe that the filter of cofinite subsets of X is a subset of every nonprincipal ultrafilter on X. Show that it is in fact the intersection of all nonprincipal ultrafilters on X*

Exercise 25 .

1. *If a filter is ultra the corresponding quotient is the canonical two-valued boolean algebra $\{0,1\}$.*
2. *If $\mathcal{U}$ is a nonprincipal ultrafilter in $\mathcal{P}(I)$ then it contains all cofinite subsets of I. Deduce that if X is finite all filters in $\mathcal{P}(X)$ are principal.*

[6] There is a convention in the biology literature of using an upper case letter and the corresponding lower case letter to denote alleles at a locus, when we are considering only two alleles.

Chapter 4

Propositional Calculus

So far I have been extremely careful not to say anything about languages that depends in any way on semantics. We are now going to introduce ourselves to two notions in Logic that cannot, without perversity, be approached without semantics. They are **theory**—which is a kind of language, and a **logic**—which is a kind of theory.

If P is a propositional alphabet then $\mathcal{L}(P)$ is to be the **language over** P: the set of all formulæ like $p_1 \vee p_2$, $p_3 \wedge \neg p_4$ etc. all of whose literals come from P—as in section 2.2.1.

A **theory** is a set of formulæ closed under deduction, and members of this set are said to be **theorems** of the theory. What is deduction? This is where semantics enters. Rules of deduction are functions from tuples-of-formulæ to formulæ that preserve something, usually (and in the course of this book *exclusively*) truth.

But what is truth of a formula? A formula is a piece of syntax. It may be long or short, or illformed or wellformed. it can be true or false only w.r.t. an *interpretation*. Interpretations in the propositional calculus are simply rows from the things you may know and love as *truth-tables*: they are functions from literals to truth-values, to {`true`, `false`}. Each row in a truth-table is an interpretation of the formula.

While we are about it, a **tautology** is a formula that is truth-table valid: true under *all* interpretations.[1]

So a theory is a set of formulæ true in an interpretation or in a number of interpretations. If deductions are to be things that preserve truth, and truth is always truth-in-one-or-more-interpretations, then a theory will be a set of formulaæ closed under deduction, as we wanted at the outset.

Here is an example of a propositional theory. We might call it the theory of adding two eight-bit words (with overflow). It has 24 propositional letters, p_0

[1] This word is routinely misused. The other day my wife threatened to buy me a new pair of trousers so I said "I'd rather have the money instead" "That's a tautology" she said, thinking about the use of both 'rather' and 'instead'. She was wrong: it's not a tautology, it's a *pleonasm*.

to p_7, p_8 to p_{15} and p_{16} to p_{23} and axioms to say that p_{16} to p_{23} represents the output of an addition if p_0 to p_7 and p_8 to p_{15} represent two words of input. `true` is 1 and `false` is 0, so it contains things like $((p_0 \wedge p_8) \rightarrow \neg p_{16})$ (co's an odd plus an odd is an even!)

	p_7	p_6	p_5	p_4	p_3	p_2	p_1	p_0
$+$	p_{15}	p_{14}	p_{13}	p_{12}	p_{11}	p_{10}	p_9	p_8
$=$	p_{23}	p_{22}	p_{21}	p_{20}	p_{19}	p_{18}	p_{17}	p_{16}

A **Logic** is a theory closed under **substitution**.

Before I tell you what substitution is, let's motivate it. The theory of adding two eight-bit words contains $((p_0 \wedge p_8) \rightarrow \neg p_{16})$ but not $((p_1 \wedge p_8) \rightarrow \neg p_{16})$ for example. It doesn't treat all propositional letters the same. This is because it is a description of a particular state of affairs rather than a general constraint on what sort of states of affairs are possible A set of formulæ that encapsulates a general constraint must make the same assertions about all propositional letters, must be impervious to differences between them and must be invariant under permutations that act on them. (Rather like the way in which—say—moral truths are invariant under permutations of moral agents: if it's wrong for me it's wrong for you. This is the *categorical imperative*[2]). You should make a mental note here to understand that this is why logics are closed under substitution. It's an invariance property.[3]

Now let's be formal about it. A **substitution** is a (finite)[4] map from variables to formulæ (in the propositional case) or (in the predicate case) from variables to terms or from predicate letters to formulæ with the appropriate number of free variables. If L is a logic and σ is a substitution then the result of applying σ to any formula in L must also be in L. I am going to assume that you know what I mean by applying a substitution (which is a function defined on variables) to a formula. We will use the specific notation '$A[\phi/\psi]$' for the result of replacing in A all occurences of ψ by ϕ.

Now just as we weren't interested in just any old language (= set of strings of letters) but only languages which look as if they are going to have some semantics, so we are not going to become interested in just any old set of propositional (or predicate) formulæ closed under substitution and something that looks like deduction but only in logics that are the set of formulæ whose burden is that it is legitimate to reason in a certain way (for example $p \wedge q \rightarrow q$ tells us it's ok to infer q from $p \wedge q$) or the set of all formulae true in some (very large and natural) set of interpretations. For example we will be very interested in that propositional logic which is the set of tautologies.

[2] I am indebted to Nick Denyer for showing me the Greek puzzle in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* Book 6, Chapter 97. "If Theodorus could not be said to be committing an injustice in doing something, then neither could Hipparchia be said to be committing an injustice in doing that thing. But Theodorus commits no injustice in hitting himself. So neither does Hipparchia commit an injustice in hitting Theodorus".

[3] See the posthumous article of Tarski's *op. cit*:

[4] We can probably drop this condition, since all the formulæ the substitution will act on are finite.

Formally a **valuation** (or interpretation) is a function from propositional letters to truth-values. A valuation can be thought of as a conjunction of literals and negations of literals (i.e., as the conjunction of those literals that it believes to be true, and the negations of those literals that it believes to be false).

Next we define `eval`: valuations $\times$ formulæ $\to$ truth-values by recursion on formulæ.

DEFINITION 15 *Let 'v' range over valuations.*[5]

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\texttt{eval}(A, v) := & v(A), \textit{ if } A \textit{ is a literal;} \\
\texttt{eval}(A \wedge B, v) := & \texttt{eval}(A, v) \wedge \texttt{eval}(B, v); \\
\texttt{eval}(A \vee B, v) := & \texttt{eval}(A, v) \vee \texttt{eval}(B, v); \\
\texttt{eval}(A \to B, v) := & \texttt{eval}(A, v) \to \texttt{eval}(B, v); \\
\texttt{eval}(\neg A, v) := & \neg\ \texttt{eval}(A, v).
\end{array}
$$

This enables us to think of **satisfaction** as being a relation between formulæ and interpretations. v **satisfies** A if $\texttt{eval}(A, v) =$ **true**. (In the propositional case where we are at the moment this sounds a bit obsessional but thinking of it in this rather abstract way will help later when we come to semantics for predicate logic)

The fact that `eval` is defined on all formulæ means that we can think of a valuation as a complete description of a way the world (or at least the world as described by propositional logic) can be: *via* `eval`, a valuation determines the truth value of every formula.

To each formula ϕ we can associate a function from valuations to truth-values, namely the function that sends a valuation to `true` if the valuation satisfies ϕ and to `false` otherwise. That way we can think of any formula as the set of those valuations that make it true, and this pairing of formulæ with sets-of-valuations is 1-1 up to semantic equivalence. (Two formulæ are **semantically equivalent** if they are satisfied by the same valuations.)

This enables us to think of a formula as the disjunction of all the valuations that think it is true, so that any formula can be thought of as a disjunction of lots of conjunctions of literals-and-negations-of-literals.

This is the **Normal Form Theorem**:

Theorem 16 *Every propositional formula is semantically equivalent to one in disjunctive normal form.*

There is a dual theorem that says that any formula can be thought of as a *con*junction of lots of ... *dis*junctions of literals-and-negations-of-literals, but it can't be given the same slick proof and it is simplest to derive it from the disjunctive normal form theorem by the de Morgan laws.

[5] To be strictly correct, one should add that the letter A is a variable ranging over formulæ. If you are unhappy about putting sysmbols like '$\wedge$' between names of formulæ instead of between formulæ you may wish to look ahead to page 91. Alternatively you might prefer to regard '$A \vee B$' as a special compound variable constrained to vary only over disjunction, '$\neg A$' as a special compound variable constrained only to range over negations, and so on.

EXERCISE 26 *Theorem 16 tells us that—up to logical equivalence—there are 2^{2^n} distinct propositional formulæ with n propositional letters. Put another way, this says that the free boolean algebra with n generators has 2^{2^n} elements. How many bases are there for the free boolean algebra with 2^{2^n} elements?*

This goes back to Boole, who "derived" it by using the Taylor-MacLaurin theorem over a boolean ring.

We can also prove by structural induction on formulæ that such a normal form can always be found.

Truth-tables enable us to discriminate between those formulæ that always come out true and those that might not. We call the first *valid*.

DEFINITION 17 *A valid formula is one true under all interpretations*

I have carefully phrased this definition so it covers both propositional and predicate calculi. (I haven't said anything yet about what an interpretation is in predicate calculus) A lot of tautologies have proper names that we use: $A \vee \neg A$ is **excluded middle**; $\neg\neg A \to A$ is **double negation**; $\neg(A \wedge B) \longleftrightarrow (\neg A \vee \neg B)$ and $\neg(A \vee B) \longleftrightarrow (\neg A \wedge \neg B)$ are the **de Morgan laws**; $((A \to B) \to A) \to A$ is **Peirce's Law**.

The most important logic for us is classical logic: this logic contains all formulæ that are true under all interpretations.

4.1 Semantic and Syntactic Entailment

I said earlier that deduction was an operation on formulæ that preserved truth-in-an-interpretation, and we saw the two ways of thinking of theories. A theory will typically be the set of things true in some fixed interpretation or bundle of interpretations.

However, although that is the usual reason for interest in any specific theory, the theory itself might happen to be—and be conveniently studied *as*—a rectype. The idea that a body of truths (which is what a theory is supposed to be, after all) can be represented as an inductively generated set in this way goes back to Euclid. The rectype has axioms (like $\mathbb{N}$ has 0) and rules of inference (like $\mathbb{N}$ has the successor function).

Now we must think about the connection between theories as *semantically* characterised (set of things true in an interpretation) and theories *syntactically* characterised (things deducible from axioms). These two characterisations give rise to two relations between formulæ and sets of formulae.

We write "$\psi \models \phi$" to mean that any interpretation that satisfies ψ also satisfies ϕ. We overload '$\models$' by writing "$\Gamma \models \phi$" where Γ is a set of formulæ to mean that any interpretation satisfying all formulæ in Γ also satisfies ϕ. This is called **semantic entailment**.

We write "$\psi \vdash \phi$" to mean that ϕ follows from ψ by means of whatever the rules of inference are that we are using. These will typically be clear from context. Again there is a version of this notation for sets of formulæ: "$\Gamma \vdash \phi$"

means that ϕ can be deduced from assumptions in Γ. This is called **syntactic entailment**. By abuse of notation we will write '$L, A \vdash \ldots$' where A is a single formula, to be the same as '$L \cup \{A\} \vdash \ldots$'.

The aim is to prove that these two notions are the same. Of course, the astute reader will say, this is trivial. Just cook up the axioms and rules of inference so that they are. Not so: there are funny theories which cannot be expressed as rectypes in this way. (see exercise 6.1 later)

DEFINITION 18 *A theory that is also a finitely presented rectype is said to be* **axiomatisable**.

If all one wanted to do was show that the set of propositional tautologies was a rectype (was an axiomatisable theory) the simplest thing to do would be to exhibit an axiomatisation and show that the set of things deducible from it is precisely the set of tautologies. However I shall complicate matters by introducing not one but *two* rectypes of formulæ and showing that all three sets are the same.

We defined natural numbers as things one can obtain from 0 by adding 1 repeatedly. Any rectype is built up from founders by means of **operations** also known as **constructors**. With many rectypes there are alternative ways of generating its members.[6] Perhaps lots of founders and very few operations, or lots of operations and very few founders. This is certainly the case with the rectypes that constitute the logics we are interested in. We can either have lots of founders (axioms) and very few operations (rules of inference) (typically only *modus ponens*) or lots of rules of inference and few—if any—founders.

4.1.1 Lots of founders, few rules: the Hilbert approach

Only two connectives, $\rightarrow$ and $\bot$. All others defined in terms of them.

$\neg A$ is $A \rightarrow \bot$

$A \wedge B$ is $\neg(A \rightarrow \neg B)$

$A \vee B$ is $\neg A \rightarrow B$

(Exercise: justify the introduction and elimination rules for the other connectives as derived rules, and verify that these connectives are symmetrical. Do this on the board)

Connect the occurrences of formulæ at intro and elim by superscripts. Square brackets round eliminated formulæ

Two bits of $\wedge$-elimination for $\wedge$ defined in terms of $\rightarrow$ and $\bot$.

[6] Be careful not to confuse this with the situation where an element of a rectype can be generated in two ways **from the one set of rules** ("The thing that terrified him was climbing up the drainpipe"). I am alluding here to the situation where there are two different sets of rules for generating the same set. This situation may be familiar to you: a given group may have several different presentations.

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{[A]^1 \quad [\neg B]^2}{\neg B} \quad \neg(A \to \neg B)}{A \to \neg B^1}}{\dfrac{\bot}{B^2}}$$

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{[A]^1 [\neg A]^2}{\bot} \quad \neg(A \to \neg B)}{A \to \neg B^1}}{\dfrac{\bot}{A^2}}$$

Given derivations $\overset{A}{\vdots}\, C$ and $\overset{B}{\vdots}\, C$,

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\overset{[A]^2}{\vdots}\, C \quad [\neg C]^1}{\bot} \quad \neg A \to B}{\overset{B}{\neg A^2}}}{\vdots\, C}}{\dfrac{\bot}{C}} [\neg C]^1$$

Here is one set of axioms.
K: $A \to (B \to A)$
S: $(A \to (B \to C)) \to ((A \to B) \to (A \to C))$
T: $(\neg B \to \neg A) \to ((\neg B \to A) \to B)$

The third axiom does not have a generally accepted proper name. The names of the first two axioms are motivated by the Curry-Howard correspondence, a beautiful mathematical phenomenon beyond the scope of this book. See, for example, Girard Lafont and Taylor.

But we also need rules which enable us to infer things from our axioms. These are (i) a rule of substitution (every subsitution-instance of a theorem is a theorem) and **modus ponens**: from A and $A \to B$ infer B. Recall in this connection the habit first shown on page 2.1.4 of presenting an inference with premisses above and conclusion below the line. It's customary to display the modus ponens rule as:

$$\dfrac{A \quad A \to B}{B}$$

Recall the idea of a proof from section 2.1.7. Naturally the corresponding notion here is a lot more complicated, though it is quite easy to reconstruct what it must be. A **Gödel-style** proof that $\Gamma \vdash \psi$ is a finite list of formulæ

wherein every formula is either a member of Γ or is obtained from an earlier member of the list by substitution or from two earlier items in the list by means of modus ponens.[7]

This definition of Gödel-style proof makes proofs into things that are just as much mathematical objects as are numbers or groups or anything else. This is a distinctive development of 20th century mathematics. (Specifically—in the spirit of the small print on page 73—proofs are members of an inductively defined set: any list of substitution instances of axioms is a proof; any list obtained by appending on the end of a list l a formula obtained by doing *modus ponens* to two formulæ in l is a proof. A theorem is the last member of a proof.)

EXERCISE 27 *Construct Gödel-proofs of the following:*

(a) $B \to \neg\neg B$
(b) $\neg A \to (A \to B)$
(c) $A \to (\neg B \to \neg(A \to B))$
(d) $(A \to B) \to ((\neg A \to B) \to B)$
(e) $\bot \to A$

The Deduction Theorem

The *deduction theorem* for a logic L is the assertion

if $L, A \vdash B$ then $L \vdash A \to B$.

(The converse is easy)

Theorem 19 *The deduction theorem holds for L iff L contains (all substitution instances of) K and S.*

Proof:

$L \to R$ The left-to-right direction is easy, for we can use the deduction theorem to construct proofs of K and S. This we do as follows:

$$L \vdash (A \to (B \to C)) \to ((A \to B) \to (A \to C))$$

(which is what we want) holds iff (by the deduction theorem)

$$L \cup \{(A \to (B \to C))\} \vdash ((A \to B) \to (A \to C))$$

iff (by the deduction theorem)

$$L \cup \{(A \to (B \to C)), (A \to B)\} \vdash (A \to C)$$

iff (by the deduction theorem)

$$L \cup \{(A \to (B \to C)), (A \to B), A\} \vdash C.$$

But this last we can certainly do, since

[7] "An argument isn't just contradiction, it is a reasoned series of steps tending to establish a conclusion." "No it *isn't*!"—the Blessed Python.

$$[(A \to (B \to C)); (A \to B); A; (B \to C); B; C]$$

is a Gödel-proof of C from $L \cup \{(A \to (B \to C)), (A \to B), A\}$.

(and we've already seen how to do this by natural deduction). We also want $L \vdash A \to (B \to A)$. This holds (by the deduction theorem) iff $L \cup \{A\} \vdash (B \to A)$ iff (by the deduction theorem again) $L \cup \{A, B\} \vdash A$.

$R \to L$ Suppose $L, A \vdash B$. That is to say, there is a (Gödel) proof of B in which A is allowed as an extra axiom. Let the ith member of this list be B_i. We prove by induction on i that $L \vdash A \to B_i$. $B_i \to (A \to B_i)$ is always a (substitution instance of) an axiom (because of K), so if B_i is an axiom we have $L \vdash A \to B_i$ by *modus ponens*. If B_i is A we will need to know $L \vdash A \to A$ and we know this from exercise 27 part (??). If B_i is obtained by *modus ponens* from two earlier things in the list, say B_j and $B_j \to B_i$ then by induction hypothesis we have $L \vdash A \to B_j$ and $L \vdash A \to (B_j \to B_i)$. But by S this second formula gives us $L \vdash (A \to B_j) \to (A \to B_i)$ and then $L \vdash A \to B_i$ by *modus ponens*.

■

What the deduction theorem says is that a particular relation between formulæ (namely deducibility) is actually representable by a connective within the language to which the formulæ belong.

Put like this it sounds a bit less trivial. After all, it's quite plausible that we could set up a formal language with a funny kind of symbol and axioms to say that the symbol means a kind of conditional, but where the conditional describes something other than deducibility within the system. In fact there are lots of systems like this.

[*HOLE could say more about this*]

All readers should at least attempt exercise 27. It will bring home to them how difficult it is to construct proofs of tautologies from these axioms with substitution and modus ponens as sole rules of inference. If one is trying to prove B then one has to find A such that both A and $A \to B$ can be proved. The problem is that there are infinitely many As that are candidates for this rôle, with the result that there is no sensible feasible search strategy for proofs. Suppose we had a finite collection of formulæ all arising somehow from B, such that if there is an A such that both $\vdash A \to B$ and $\vdash A$ then there was such an A in this finite set, then we would have a procedure for reliably finding proofs.

The solution is to have few founders and lots of rules, but let us not leap into it without a bit of motivation. Anyone who has tried proving theorems from these axioms will not only have noticed how difficult it is, but will have spotted how useful the deduction theorem is. One is tempted to describe the deduction theorem as a *derived rule of inference* but of course it is nothing of the kind. It doesn't provide proofs in the system, but provides (meta)proofs that such proofs can be found. And it does so *constructively*: a (meta)proof that there is a proof of B can be teased apart to furnish a proof of B. If we are to procede from lots-of-founders-and-few-rules to lots-of-rules-but-few-founders,

the usefulness of the deduction theorem gives us strong hints about what those rules should be.

EXERCISE 28 *Let T be an axiomatisable theory, and ψ an arbitrary theorem of T (which is not a truth-table tautology). Show that T has an axiomatisation $A \cup \{\psi\}$ where ψ does not follow from A. (Hint: use Peirce's Law).*

4.1.2 No founders, lots of rules

A number of these rules have been around for so long that they have latin names. We have already seen *modus ponens*. In *modus ponens* one *affirms* the antecedent and *infers* the consequent. *Modus tollens* is the rule: $\dfrac{A \to B \quad \neg B}{\neg A}$. Affirming the consequent and inferring the antecedent—$\dfrac{A \to B \quad B}{A}$ is a **fallacy** (= defective inference).

Natural deduction:

$\vee$-int: $\dfrac{A}{A \vee B}$; $\dfrac{B}{A \vee B}$; $\vee$-elim: $\dfrac{A \vee B \qquad \begin{matrix}[A] & [B] \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ C & C\end{matrix}}{C}$

$\wedge$-int: $\dfrac{A \quad B}{A \wedge B}$; $\wedge$-elim: $\dfrac{A \wedge B}{A}$; $\dfrac{A \wedge B}{B}$

$\to$-int $\dfrac{\begin{matrix}[A] \\ \vdots \\ B\end{matrix}}{A \to B}\,^{8}$; $\to$-elim: $\dfrac{A \quad A \to B}{B}$

Ex falso sequitur quodlibet[9]; $\dfrac{\bot}{A}$ contradiction $\dfrac{\begin{matrix}[\neg A] \\ \vdots \\ \bot\end{matrix}}{A}$

These last two are the only rules that specifically mention negation. $\neg B$ is $B \to \bot$.

[*HOLE Do proofs of K and S to show what fun it is*]

EXERCISE 29 *Find Natural Deduction proofs of the following formulæ:*

$(A \to (B \to C)) \to (B \to (A \to C))$;
$A \to (B \wedge C) \to (A \to B) \wedge (A \to C)$;
$((A \wedge B) \to C) \to A \to (B \to C)$;
$A \to (B \to A)$;
$A \to ((A \to B) \to B)$;
$(A \to (B \to C)) \to ((A \to B) \to (A \to C))$;
$(A \to B) \to (((A \to B) \to B) \to B)$;
$(((A \to B) \to B) \to B) \to A \to B$;
$((A \to B) \to A) \to ((A \to B) \to B)$;
$(A \wedge (B \vee C)) \to ((A \wedge B) \vee (A \wedge C))$.

These rules involve *action at a distance* in the following sense. Let us attempt to prove $(A \to (B \to C)) \to ((A \to B) \to (A \to C))$. The obvious thing to try—indeed the *only* thing to try—is the $\to$-introduction rule. We must have deduced $(A \to B) \to (A \to C)$ from $A \to (B \to C)$. So we know so far that our proof looks like

$$\begin{array}{c} [A \to (B \to C)] \\ \vdots \\ \dfrac{(A \to B) \to (A \to C)}{(A \to (B \to C)) \to ((A \to B) \to (A \to C))} \end{array}$$

The presence of the dots means not only that we don't at this stage know what the rest of the proof will be, it also means that we don't know how much space to leave for the bits that are to come! It is true that backward proof search is easier with natural deduction systems than with Hilbert-style systems, in that we have solved the problem of the unbounded search, but evidently not all the problems have disappeared.

4.1.3 Sequent Calculus

For the moment a **sequent** is a formula $\Gamma \vdash \psi$ where Γ is a set of formulæ and ψ is a formula. We know what this means: it means that there is a deduction of ψ from Γ. In sequent calculus one reasons about sequents rather than about the formulæ that compose them, as one did with natural deduction.

Although the invention of sequent calculus antedates the invention of computing machinery by a decade, and antedates the development of theorem-proving by machine by several decades, there is merit in the anachronistic view that sequent calculus is the programming solution to the problem of backward search for proofs. To take the example above, one could represent the information in the picture more economically by some picture like the following:

$$\frac{A \to (B \to C) \vdash (A \to B) \to (A \to C))}{\vdash (A \to (B \to C)) \to ((A \to B) \to (A \to C))}$$

saying that if the upper assertion about the existence of a proof is correct, then so is the lower one. The rules that this picture gives rise to are as follows:

$$\vee L: \quad \frac{\Gamma, \psi \vdash \Delta \quad \Gamma, \phi \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, \psi \vee \phi \vdash \Delta} \qquad \vee R: \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, \psi, \phi}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, \psi \vee \phi}$$

$$\wedge L: \quad \frac{\Gamma, \psi, \phi \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, \psi \wedge \phi \vdash \Delta} \qquad \wedge R: \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, \psi \quad \Gamma \vdash \Delta, \phi}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, \psi \wedge \phi}$$

$$\neg L: \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, \psi}{\Gamma, \neg\psi \vdash \Delta} \qquad \neg R: \quad \frac{\Gamma, \psi \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, \neg\psi}$$

$$\to L: \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, \phi \quad \Gamma, \psi \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, \phi \to \psi \vdash \Delta} \qquad \to R: \quad \frac{\Gamma, \psi \vdash \Delta, \phi}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, \psi \to \phi}$$

and weakening: $\dfrac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, A \vdash \Delta, B}$

contraction-L $\dfrac{\Gamma, A, A \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, A \vdash \Delta}$; contraction-R $\dfrac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, A, A}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, A}$

and Cut: $\dfrac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, A \quad \Gamma', A \vdash \Delta'}{\Gamma \cup \Gamma' \vdash \Delta, \Delta'}$.

There is no rule for the biconditional: we think of it as a conjunction of two conditionals.

We accept any sequent that has a formula appearing on both sides. Such sequents are called **initial sequents**.

Try thinking of a sequent as saying that there is a proof of something on the right using only premisses found on the left. To illustrate, think about the rule $\wedge$-L. It tells us we can infer "$A \wedge B \vdash C$" from "$A, B \vdash C$". Now "$A, B \vdash C$" says that there is a deduction of C from A and B. But if there is a deduction of C from A and B, then there is certainly a deduction of C from $A \wedge B$, because one can get A and B from $A \wedge B$ by two uses of $\wedge$-elim.

$A \vdash A$ is an initial sequent. Use $\neg$-R to infer $\vdash A, \neg A$. Now it just isn't true that there is always a proof of A or a proof of $\neg A$, so this example shows that it similarly just isn't true that a sequent can be taken to assert that there is a proof of something on the right using only premisses found on the left—unless we restrict matters so that there is only one formula on the right of which more later. However it does help inculcate the good habit of thinking of sequents as meta-formulæ, as things that formalise facts about formulæ rather than facts of the kind formalised by the formulæ.

No-one is suggesting that sequent calculus is the right way to do the theory of proofs. There are obvious infelicities in its development. One rather glaring one is the fact that there is one obvious natural-deduction proof of $(A \vee (B \wedge C)) \to ((A \vee B) \wedge (A \wedge C))$ but there are two sequent-versions of this rather than one. Sequent calculus is now more than seventy years old, and modern proof theorists have more subtle and complicated constructs that repressent attempts to capture the underlying mathematics better. This is an active area of research.

It is natural to think that the rules we use might have been chosen because there is a salient feature that they all preserve in the sense that, for each rule, if its inputs have that feature, so do its outputs. This is true: the rules preserve truth. (They also preserve validity). But there are other properties that the rules might preserve, and consideration of them leads to weaker logics that are of some concern to logicians interested in computation.

Let us now drop down a level and return from sequents (assertions about inferences in the logic) to the logic itself. The logic we have just seen is called

classical logic and its inferences preserve truth. Preserving truth is **extensional** in that what is preserved is a property of what the thing-proved evaluates to, evaluations being functions that take intensions to extensions. Some other logics preserve intensional properties. One interesting case is constructive logic, where what is preserved is not a property of the thing proved but rather a property of the set-of-available-proofs of the thing proved. Rules of inference are thought of as operations on proofs, giving rise to new proofs. Constructive Logic allows only those operations which preserve the property (of proofs) of *corresponding to a construction*. There is something particularly appealing about an existence proof that can be easily transformed into a construction of the thing whose existence has been proved. Constructivists say that such proofs have the **existence property**. For example, consider the following (admittedly rather artificial) challenge.

Find x and y, both irrationals but both real, such that x^y is rational.

Well, we all know that $\sqrt{2}$ is irrational, so if $\sqrt{2}^{\sqrt{2}}$ is rational we can take both x and y to be $\sqrt{2}$. On the other hand, if $\sqrt{2}^{\sqrt{2}}$ is *not* rational we take x to be $\sqrt{2}^{\sqrt{2}}$ and y to be $\sqrt{2}$ and we then find that $x^y = 2$. So either way we succeed.

Except that we don't. The challenge was to *find* such a pair x and y, not merely to prove that such a pair exists. Our short existence proof doesn't have the existence property. Contrast this with the proof of Cantor's theorem (theorem 6): where one has an algorithm that acepts a candidate injection, and explicitly provides something not in its range.

A moment's reflection will make it clear why our proof of the existence of a pair doesn't have the existence property. The existence property will fail if at any stage in the proof we are in one of two cases, but don't know which, *but we nevertheless exploit the knowledge that we are in one of the two cases.* We must never exploit our knowledge that $A \vee B$ unless we also know A, or know B. To preserve the existence property, we must ensure that whenever $\vdash A \vee B$ then $\vdash A$ or $\vdash B$. (We will see proofs with the same features in exercises 6.6.1 and 6.6.3.) This means that we may make no use of the law of the excluded middle.

A logic designed to respect these constraints is therefore developed not to capture the set of those inferences that preserve a nice property of formulæ, but to ensure that proofs in it have a nice property. This means perhaps that we should really think of constructive logic not as a *Logic* at all. It's best seen not as a rectype of formulæ but as a rectype of proofs-with-the-existence-property. We recover a *Logic* (= set of formulæ closed under deduction and substitution) from this by throwing away the proofs and keeping the conclusions.

I'm not going to tell you what set of formulæ constructive logic regards as valid. As it happens, most of the pruning that needs to be done can be achieved by the simple device of requiring all our sequents to have only one formula on the right. It's not entirely clear why this is the case, but this restriction does

at least ensure that the view of sequents as metaformulæ that say "there is a proof of something on the right using only premisses that appear on the left" is correct.

We can generalise the concept of valuation to include all functions from literals to—well, anything with the same signature as boolean algebras. (There must be operations to interpret '$\wedge$', '$\vee$' etc). The obvious candidate for such a structure would be a boolean algebra. However, enlarging the set of valuations in this way has no effect on the class of sentences certified as valid as long as the set of values of the valuations forms a boolean algebra. This gives us a way of characterising boolean algebras.

EXERCISE 30 *Show that a structure for the language of boolean algebras (ie, with 0, 1, $\wedge$, $\vee$ and $\neg$) is a boolean algebra iff it validates all truth-table tautologies.*

So boolean algebras characterise classical logic. Is there a different kind of algebra that characterises constructive logic? Yes, there is, and these algebras are called **Heyting algebras**. A Heyting algebra is a complete distributive lattice, typically presented with a defined operator $\rightarrow$ where $p \rightarrow q$ is $\bigvee\{r : p \wedge r \leq q\}$. This is another example of overloading, for the arrow has already been used for the material conditional. Naturally this is deliberate. Since everything that is constructively correct is classically valid, but not *vice versa* there must be algebras that are Heyting algebras but are not boolean algebras. In fact there are plenty and, fortunately for people attempting this next exercise, some of them are very small.

EXERCISE 31 *Show that $((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A) \rightarrow A$ (Peirce's Law) cannot be deduced from K and S.*

It might be an idea to be more explicit about how these two ways of generating a theory (no founders, lots of rules, *versus* lots of founders, few rules) really look when one is more formal about it. To do this rigorously we need to return to the device used a few paragraphs ago in the discussion of constructive logic. We first set out a rectype of proof trees built up by the natural deduction constructors. Proof trees are a special kind of decorated tree of formulæ. A theorem will be the formula at the bottom of a tree all of whose leaves are labelled by formulæ enclosed by '[ ]'.

Clearly one of the things that gives us trouble with $\sqrt{2}^{\sqrt{2}}$ is excluded middle (me *must* have the disjunction property if we are to have the existence property!). However it does not mean that constructive logic thinks there are more than two truth-values. Quite the reverse!

EXERCISE 32 *Find a sequent calculus proof of*

$$\neg(A \longleftrightarrow B), \neg(A \longleftrightarrow C), \neg(C \longleftrightarrow B) \vdash$$

satisfying the single-conclusion constraint. (This is hard, and the proof is long!)

4.2 The Completeness theorem

The axiomatic and the natural deduction approach both give rise to a notion of syntactic entailment. I shall show that both of these are the same as semantic entailment. This is the **Completeness theorem**. First a toy Completeness theorem. (Lesniewski: op cit)

This is going to be sketched, to give you a taste of how these things work.

Pure biconditional logic has one connective, "$\longleftrightarrow$" and one propositional constant symbol $\bot$. There are three axioms:

$$p \longleftrightarrow p$$
$$(p \longleftrightarrow q) \longleftrightarrow (q \longleftrightarrow p)$$
$$((p \longleftrightarrow q) \longleftrightarrow r) \longleftrightarrow (p \longleftrightarrow (q \longleftrightarrow r))$$

We do not have a negation sign, but if we want $\neg p$ we can introduce it as $p \longleftrightarrow \bot$.

We also have a rule of modus ponens and a rule of substitutivity of the biconditional: if A and $\phi \longleftrightarrow \psi$ then $A[\phi/\psi]$. (Recall that $A[\phi/\psi]$ is the result of replacing in A all occurences of ψ by ϕ.)

We are going to show that something is a (truth-table) valid expression of this logic iff it is derivable from these axioms. In fact we can show

EXERCISE 33 *The following are equivalent:*
ϕ is valid;
ϕ is a consequence of the three above axioms;
Every propositional letter appearing in ϕ appears an even number of times.

First we prove that for any two formulæ ϕ and ψ with the same multiset of literals we have $\psi \vdash \phi$ and $\phi \vdash \psi$ (We say ϕ and ψ are **interdeducible**.) Then if Φ has two occurrences of p it will be interdeducible with something of the form $(p \longleftrightarrow p) \longleftrightarrow \Phi'$.

■

Now we return to the main plot: the completeness theorem for Propositional Logic.

Theorem 20 : The Completeness Theorem For Propositional Logic
The following are equivalent:
(1) ϕ is provable by natural deduction;
(2) ϕ is provable from the three axioms K, S and T;
(3) ϕ is truth-table valid.

Proof:
We will prove that $3 \to 2 \to 1 \to 3$.
(2) $\to$ (1)

First we show that all Kalmár's axioms follow by natural deduction—by inspection. Then we use induction: if there are natural deduction proofs of A and $A \to B$ there is a natural deduction proof of B!

(1) $\to$ (3)

To show that everything proved by natural deduction is truth-table valid we need only note that, for each rule, if the hypotheses are true (under a given valuation) then the conclusion is too. By induction on composition of rules this is true for molecular proofs as well. If we have a molecular proof with *no* hypotheses, then vacuously they are all true (under a given valuation), so the conclusion likewise is true (under a given valuation). But the given valuation was arbitrary, so the conclusion is true under all valuations.

(3) $\to$ (2) (This proof is due to Kalmár.)

Now to show that all tautologies follow from Kalmár's axioms.

At this point we must invoke exercise 27, since we need the answers to complete the proof of this theorem. It enjoins us to prove the following:

(a) $B \to \neg\neg B$
(b) $\neg A \to (A \to B)$
(c) $A \to (\neg B \to \neg(A \to B))$
(d) $(A \to B) \to ((\neg A \to B) \to B)$

If we think of a propositional formula in connection with a truth-table for it, it is natural to say things like: $p \longleftrightarrow q$ is true as long as p and q are both true or both false, and false otherwise. Thus truth-tables for formulæ should suggest to us deduction relations like

$$A, B \vdash A \longleftrightarrow B$$

$$\neg A, \neg B \vdash A \longleftrightarrow B$$

and similarly

$$A, \neg B \vdash \neg(A \longleftrightarrow B)$$

To be precise, we can show:

Let A be a molecular wff containing propositional letters $p_1 \ldots p_n$, and let f be a map from $\{k \in \mathbb{N} : 1 \leq k \leq n\}$ to $\{\texttt{true}, \texttt{false}\}$. If A is satisfied in the row of the truth-table where p_i is assigned truth-value $f(i)$, then

$$P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash A$$

where P_i is p_i if $f(i) = \texttt{true}$ and $\neg p_i$ if $f(i) = \texttt{false}$. If A is not satisfied in that row then

$$P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash \neg A$$

... and we prove this by a straightforward induction on the rectype of formulæ.

We have only two primitive connectives, $\neg$ and $\to$, so two cases.

$\neg$

Let A be $\neg B$. If B takes the value `true` in the row $P_1 \ldots P_n$ then, by induction hypothesis $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash B$. Then, since $\vdash p \to \neg\neg p$ (this is exercise 27 (a)), we have $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash \neg\neg B$, which is to say, $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash \neg A$ as desired. If B takes the value `false` in the row $P_1 \ldots P_n$ then by induction hypothesis $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash \neg B$. But $\neg B$ is A, so $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash A$.

$\to$

Let A be $B \to C$. Case (1): B takes the value `false` in row $P_1 \ldots P_n$.

If B takes the value `false` in row $P_1 \ldots P_n$, then A takes value `true` and we want $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash A$. By induction hypothesis we have $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash \neg B$. Since $\vdash \neg p \to (p \to q)$ (this is exercise 27 (b)) we have $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash B \to C$, which is $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash A$.

Case (2): C takes the value `true` in row $P_1 \ldots P_n$.

Since C takes the value T in row $P_1 \ldots P_n$, A takes value `true`, and we want $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash A$. By induction hypothesis we have $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash C$, and so, by K, $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash B \to C$, which is to say, $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash A$.

Case (3): B takes value `true` and C takes value `false` in row $P_1 \ldots P_n$.

A therefore takes value `false` in this row, and we want $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash \neg A$. By induction hypothesis we have $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash B$ and $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash \neg C$. But $p \to (\neg q \to \neg(p \to q))$ is a theorem (this is exercise 27 (c)) so we have $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash \neg(B \to C)$, which is $P_1 \ldots P_n \vdash \neg A$.

Suppose now that A is a formula that is truth-table valid, and that it has propositional letter $p_1 \ldots p_n$. Then, for example, both $P_1 \ldots P_{n-1}, p_n \vdash A$ and $P_1 \ldots P_{n-1}, \neg p_n \vdash A$, where the capital letters indicate an arbitrary choice of $\neg$ or null prefix as before. So, by the deduction theorem, both p_n and $\neg p_n \vdash (P_1 \wedge P_2 \ldots \wedge P_{n-1}) \to A$ and we can certainly show that $(p \to q) \to (\neg p \to q) \to q$ is a theorem (this is exercise 27 (d)), so we have $P_1 \ldots P_{n-1} \vdash A$, and we have peeled off one hypothesis. Clearly this process can be repeated as often as desired to obtain $\vdash A$.

■

The following equivalent assertion—and its analogue for predicate logic—is known as the completeness theorem as well, and is sometimes a more useful formulation.

COROLLARY 21 *ϕ is consistent (not refutable from the axioms) iff there is a valuation satisfying it.*

Proof: $\nvdash \neg\phi$ (i.e. ϕ is consistent) iff $\neg\phi$ is not tautologous. This is turn is the same as ϕ being satisfiable. ■

If $T_1 \subseteq T_2$ are theories we say that T_2 is an **extension** of T_1. If $T_1 \neq T_2$ then T_2 is a **proper** extension. (I warned you the word 'extension' would be overloaded!) A theory with no consistent proper extension is—reasonably enough—said to be complete. Beware: the completeness theorem is not so-called because it says that the set of all tautologies is a complete theory: it isn't!

Lindenbaum algebras

The Lindenbaum algebra of a theory T is the set of T-interdeducibility classes of formulæ partially ordered by deducibility. (We now know that semantic and syntactic entailment are the same, so it doesn't matter which we mean) That is to say, if $[\phi]$ and $[\psi]$ are the equivalence classes of ϕ and ψ respectively, then $[\phi] \leq [\psi]$ if ϕ (or anything T-interdeducible with it) $\rightarrow$ ψ (or anything interdeducible with it). The complement of $[\psi]$ is naturally $[\neg\psi]$. The Lindenbaum algebra is a boolean algebra as long as T contains all (propositional) tautologies.

The Lindenbaum algebra of the empty theory over an alphabet is of course the free boolean algebra generated by the literals of that alphabet. Any theory T over that alphabet corresponds to a filter in this algebra, and T is consistent iff this filter is proper.

The filter generated by a set of points in the Lindenbaum algebra of a theory T is just the theory axiomatised by T plus those axioms.

1. If T' is a theory extending T, then the set of equivalence classes of theorems of T' form a filter in the Lindenbaum algebra of T

2. If T' is a theory extending T then the Lindenbaum algebra of T' is isomorphic to the quotient algebra modulo the filter of the previous remark.

3. If T' is a *complete* extension of T then the corresponding filter is ultra.

The Compactness theorem

The compactness theorem strictly is an assertion to the effect that a certain topology on the space of all interpretations is compact. That is how it got its name. In fact most logic texts make nothing of this fact. One that does is Peter Johnstone's book [1987]. Look at exercise 2.6 on page 17.

There are two rather different-sounding facts which are both known as the compactness theorem.

Theorem 22 .

(i) If T is a theory such that every finite subset of T has an interpretation making it true then T has such an interpretation.

(ii) Every consistent theory has a complete consistent extension.

Proof:

(i) If every finite subset of T has an interpretation then every finite subset of T is consistent, and does not imply a contradiction. So there can be no proof of a contradiction in T either, because any proof of a contradiction would be finite and would appear in one of the finite subsets of T—which all have interpretations and so are consistent. But corollary 21 tells us that if T is consistent it has an interpretation.

We can prove (ii) by means of Zorn's lemma.

It can also be proved by reasoning about Lindenbaum algebras and using the Prime Ideal Theorem (theorem 12).

On page 77 we saw how how filters in the Lindenbaum algebra of a theory T correspond to extensions of T. The Prime Ideal Theorem tells us that there is an ultrafilter in the Lindenbaum algebra of T. This ultrafilter corresponds to a complete extension of T.

■

There are various applications of the prime ideal theorem/completeness theorem. What follows next is a typical example of the way one can use the Prime ideal theorem to "glue" together partial solutions to a problem.

REMARK 23 *If every finite subgraph of a graph is n-colourable, then the graph itself is n-colourable.*

(These are vertex colourings not edge colourings). I am going to take the case $n = 4$, for ease of illustration. We have an infinite graph $\langle G, E\rangle$, all of whose finite subgraphs are 4-colourable.

The language:

For each vertex x we have four propositional letters p_x, q_x, r_x, s_x. Each of these corresponds to an assertion that x has been painted some given colour. For each pair x, y of vertices we have a propositional letter $c_{x,y}$ which will be used to say whether or not x and y are connected.

(Notice that the 'x' is not a variable and that strictly speaking these propositional letters—'p_x', 'q_y', '$c_{x,y}$' etc.—have *no internal structure* and the only reason why we write them out like this is to be make it more obvious what is going on. The subscripts are not even part of the *syntax* but merely part of the *typesetting*! The information coded by the subscripts is not preserved by relettering of variables, which is a fairly mild process that ought to preserve anything of interest.)

The theory:

We adopt the following axiom schemes:

1. $(p_x \wedge \neg q_x \wedge \neg r_x \wedge \neg s_x) \vee (\neg p_x \wedge q_x \wedge \neg r_x \wedge \neg s_x) \vee (\neg p_x \wedge \neg q_x \wedge r_x \wedge \neg s_x) \vee (\neg p_x \wedge \neg q_x \wedge \neg r_x \wedge s_x)$ for each x;

2. $c_{x,y} \to \neg(p_x \wedge p_y) \wedge \neg(q_x \wedge q_y) \wedge \neg(r_x \wedge r_y) \wedge \neg(s_x \wedge s_y)$ for each x and y;

3. $c_{x,y}$ if G has an edge joining x and y, and $\neg c_{x,y}$ if not.

The first scheme says that every vertex has precisely one colour. The second says that adjacent vertices have different colours.

This theory is consistent since all its finite subtheories are consistent. (The only thing they can say is that some finite subgraph is 4-colourable, and we are told that this is true).

So there is a valuation v making all these axioms true. Any such valuation gives rise to a four-colouring of G: if $v(p_x) = \texttt{true}$ we colour vertex x with colour p, and so on.

Now try to prove the order extension principle (page 53) by the same trick: i.e., using the compactness theorem for propositional logic not Zorn's lemma.

Interpolation

(Recall that $\mathcal{L}(P)$ is the propositional formulæ that can be built up from the literals in P.)

[*HOLE Picture with intersecting circles*]

Suppose $P \to Q$ is a tautology, but $\mathcal{L}(P) \cap \mathcal{L}(Q) = \emptyset$. What can we say? Well, there is no valuation making P true and Q false. But, since valuations of P and Q can be done independently, it means that either there is no valuation making P true, or no valuation making Q false. With a view to prompt generalisation, we can tell ourselves that even if $\mathcal{L}(P) \cap \mathcal{L}(Q) = \emptyset$, the intersection *really* contains `true` and `false`, and that what we have proved is that either $P \to \texttt{false}$ is a tautology or $\texttt{true} \to Q$ is a tautology. But since $P \to \texttt{true}$ and $\texttt{false} \to Q$ are always tautologies, we can tell ourselves that what we have established is there there is some formula ϕ in the common vocabulary (which must be either `true` or `false`) such that both $P \to \phi$ and $\phi \to Q$ are tautologies. If we now think about how to do this "with parameters" we get a rather more substantial result.

Theorem 24 *The interpolation lemma.*

Let P, Q, and R be three disjoint propositional alphabets; let s be a formula in $\mathcal{L}(P \cup Q)$ and t a formula in $\mathcal{L}(Q \cup R)$. If $s \vdash t$ then there is $u \in \mathcal{L}(Q)$ such that $s \vdash u$ and $u \vdash t$.

Proof:

We do this by induction on the number of variables common to s and t. We have already established the base case, where $\mathcal{L}(s \cap t)$ is empty. Suppose now that s and t have $n+1$ variables in common. Let the $n+1$th be 'p'. Then there are s' and s'', both p-free, such that s is equivalent to $(s' \wedge p) \vee (s'' \wedge \neg p)$. Similarly there are t' and t'' such that t is equivalent to $(t' \wedge p) \vee (t'' \wedge \neg p)$. We know that any valuation making s true must make t true. But also any valuation making s true must either make $s' \wedge p$ true (in which case it makes $t' \wedge p$ true) or make $s'' \wedge \neg p$ true (in which case it makes $t'' \wedge \neg p$ true). So $s' \vdash t'$ and $s'' \vdash t''$. By induction there are interpolants u' and u'' such that $s \vdash u'$, $u' \vdash t'$, $s'' \vdash u''$ and $u'' \vdash t''$. The interpolant we need for s and t is $(u' \wedge p) \vee (u'' \wedge \neg p)$.

■

Nonmonotonic reasoning

In artifical intelligence there are people who are interested in what they call **Nonmonotonic reasoning**, which is an attempt to formalise inferences like the following:

> Tweety is a bird; we haven't yet been told that Tweety can't fly.
> Accordingly deduce: Tweety can fly.

(I think in their slang they say things like: "it's a default assumption that all birds can fly")

Contrast this with deductions in a more ordinary style: $\frac{P, P \to Q}{Q}$. Consider the operation that takes a set Γ of formulæ and returns $\Gamma \cup$ the set of all formulæ Q such that $P \to Q$ and Q are in Γ. This is clearly a monotone function on the power set of the set of all formulæ and there is no problem in showing that it will have a fixed point which will be the deductive closure of Γ. If you have rules of inference that say "if you believe this but don't believe that, then resolve to believe the other"[10] then you cannot rely on theorem 8 to tell you there are fixed points/deductive closures. In this connection look at Question 3.1.3.2 part (ii)

I hope I don't have to emphasise that nonmonotonic reasoning is a mess!

4.3 Exercises on propositional Logic

1. Prove the order extension principle using the compactness theorem fro propositional logic.

[10] remember that withholding belief from p isn't the same as according belief to $\neg p$!!

Chapter 5

Predicate calculus

5.1 The Birth of model theory

An important spur to the development of Logic was the problem of the axiom of parallels and the discovery of non-euclidean geometry. If we are trying to determine whether or not the axiom of parallels follows from Euclid's other axioms, what do we do? If it does, life is easy, for it will be sufficient to exhibit a proof. If it doesn't, we need to demonstrate that there is no proof.

One way to do this would be to show that every proof fails to be a proof of the parallel axiom from the other axioms. We have already made a start on proofs-as-mathematical-objects, which is what is needed for this approach. We could also show that there is a model universe in which the parallel axiom is false but all the other axioms of Euclid are true. That way we do not have to make proofs into mathematical objects, but we do have to develop a robust concept of a *formula being true in a structure*. That is to say, we need **semantics**. This step—of thinking of a symbolism separately from the subject matter it was devised to describe, and as having a life of its own—creates a division between syntax and semantics without which no independence proofs (of this second kind) can be had. Key idea: *the autonomy of syntax*. The most characteristic products of twentieth-century logic, the completeness theorems, arise like the Greek conception of sexuality from the need to rejoin the two halves of this beast.

A completeness theorem is something that identifies a syntactic property of a formula (like having an even number of occurrences of every variable) with a semantic property (like being true under all interpretations). The major result of this chapter will be the completeness theorem for predicate calculus.

5.2 The language of predicate logic

Exercise 34 *Fix a language $\mathcal{L}$ with constants and function letters. (see section 2.2.2). A substitution is a map from the variables of $\mathcal{L}$ to the terms of*

$\mathcal{L}$. It extends by recursion on $\mathcal{L}$ to a map from $\mathcal{L}$-terms to $\mathcal{L}$-terms.

Say $R(t_1, t_2)$ iff t_2 is a substitution instance of t_1. (That is to say, iff there is a substitution sending t_1 to t_2.)

The intersection of this preorder with its converse is an equivalence relation. Consider the quotient structure $\langle \mathcal{T}, \leq \rangle$. It has an obvious bottom element, which is the equivalence class containing all the variables of $\mathcal{L}$. Show that (i) $\langle \mathcal{T}, \leq \rangle$ is a lower semilattice, and (ii) If two elements of $\langle \mathcal{T}, \leq \rangle$ have an upper bound they have a least upper bound.

A declaration of the language of predicate calculus as a recursive datatype was given in section 2.2.2, but no further details were supplied. We will assume that our variables, rather than being x, y, z etc, are all x's with numerical subscripts. This clearly makes no difference to us, *qua* language users, since it is a trivial relettering, but it does make life a lot easier for us *qua* students of the language. The subscripts are quite important. We call them indices. The purpose of this change in notation is to make visible to the naked eye the fact that we can enumerate the variables: it is much clearer that this is the case if they are written as "x_1, x_2 ... " than if they are written as "x, y ... "

To keep things simple we will also have to assume that no variable is bound more than once in any formula, and that there are no occurrences of any variable outside the scope of any quantifier that binds some other occurrence of that variable. Thus we will outlaw $((\forall x)F(x)) \vee ((\forall x)G(x))$ and $F(x) \vee (\forall x)(Gx)$ even though they are perfectly good wffs. It will make life easier later.

The universal closure of a formula is the result of prefixing it with enough universal quantifiers to bind all the free variables in it.

Function and predicate letters are not variables and they cannot be bound with quantifiers. This distinction in the syntax between things that can be bound by quantifiers (the variables) and the things that can't (the predicate and function letters) sounds like a restriction and therefore a drawback, but it is of fundamental importance and it enables us to draw useful distinctions. In chapter 1 we were introduced to the idea of a mathematical object as a set-with-knobs-on. The language of predicate logic fitted into this picture by assuming that the variables are intended to range over members of the carrier set, and the predicate and function letters point to the knobs.

In due course we will explain in detail how this semantics is done, but we can start with some elementary illustrations. '$(\exists x)(\exists y)(x \neq y)$' is a formula which is true in those structures with at least two elements. '$(\exists x)(\exists y)(\exists z)(x \neq y \wedge y \neq z \wedge z \neq x)$' is a sentence true in those structures with at least three elements. Clearly for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$ we can supply a sentence in this style which is true in models with at least n elements. Trivial though this example is, it serves to make a useful point: we cannot do this in a way that is *uniform in* n. The temptation to write: $(\exists a_1 \ldots a_m)(\forall j, k < m)(k \neq j \rightarrow a_j \neq a_k)$ or even $(\exists a_1 \ldots a_m)(\bigwedge_{j \neq k < m} a_j \neq a_k)$ must be resisted—in this context at least. This formula is true in precisely those structures whose carrier sets have at least n elements, but it is *not* a formula in the predicate calculus as the subscripts on the variables are not themselves variables and cannot be bound. There are

plenty of things we can say in predicate logic that cannot be said uniformly, and some of them appear in the exercises in this chapter.

Less trivial illustrations will concern sets with nontrivial structure. We have already seen a set of axioms for lattices, and a set for boolean algebras. Structures that can be satisfactorily described by languages whose variables range only over their carrier set are said to have **first-order theories**. A property of structures that can be captured by a formula whose variables range only over elements of the carrier set is said to be **first-order**. For this reason predicate calculus is sometimes called *first-order logic* in contrast to *second-order logic* where the variables (or at least some of them) range not over elements of the carrier set but over subsets of the carrier set. There is also third-order and so on. More of that later.

There are important connections between logical complexity and computational complexity. Logical complexity asks how complicated a formula must be to capture a property (first-order *versus* second-order, number of quantifiers used etc.) while computational complexity concerns it time taken to establish whether or not a finite object has a property in terms of the size of the object. A first-order property can be checked in time bounded by a polynomial in the size of the object being checked for that property, and the degree of the bounding polynomial will be the number of quantifiers in the formula capturing the property. That much is fairly obvious. There are converses, but they are quite hard to find. For example, there is a polynomial time algorithm to check whether or not a finite group is simple (has no nontrivial normal subgroups) but simplicity is not a first-order property, as we shall see. To prove converses to the effect that a property checkable in polynomial time can be captured by a formula in a first-order language one needs to spice up the languages in use with various extra syntactic devices—rather in the way that may have occurred to the reader in their quest for a formula that is true in precisely those models with at least n element. In fact the devices exploited are much more complicated and there is no space to expound them here.

Polynomial-time problem = first-order. Being a free widget is not nth order for any n.

Sorts and higher-order logic. Many-sorted logic is equivalent to one-sorted. (vector spaces)

Trivial fact: completeness theorem not true for higher-order logic. Second-order arithmetic.

In tackling the following exercises the reader should bear in mind that the way to find a set of first-order axioms for a theory is to remember that first-order means quantifying over elements not subsets. Identify the property and then the language will write itself.

1. Give sets of axioms in suitable first order languages (to be specified) for the following theories. (These are very roughly in order of difficulty: the first two should be easy and the last two definitely require some thought.)

   (a) the theory of integral domains;

(b) the theory of ordered groups (i.e. groups having a given total order);

(c) the theory of groups of order 60;

(d) the theory of simple groups of order 60;

(e) the theory of algebraically closed fields of characteristic zero;

(f) the theory of partial orders in which every element belongs to a unique maximal antichain;

(g) the theory of commutative local rings (a local ring being a ring with a unique maximal ideal).

2. Which of the following have first-order theories?
(i) Groups all of whose elements are of finite order?
(ii) Groups all of whose non-identity elements are of infinite order?
(iii) Groups with trivial centre?
(iv) Groups with an element of infinite order in their centre? (v) Simple groups?
(vi) Noetherian rings (rings wherein every $\subseteq$-chain of ideals has a maximal element)?
(vii) Free groups?

3. An abelian group is *torsion-free* just if there are no non-zero elements of finite order. Describe a set of first-order axioms for the theory of torsion-free abelian groups. Does this theory have a finite set of axioms?

4. (i) Write down a theory in the predicate calculus with equality which has only finite models. Is the use of equality neccessary here?
(ii) Write down a theory in the predicate calculus with equality which has only infinite models. Is the use of equality neccessary here?
(iii) For $X \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ find a theory T_X which will have a model of size n iff $n \in X$.

5. We say that a formula is *simple existential* when it is of the form $\exists y \phi$ where ϕ is a conjunction of basic formulae (atomic formulae and negations of atomic formulae). Suppose that in a theory T every simple existential formula is equivalent to a quantifier-free formula. Show first that any existential formula $\exists y \psi$ (where ψ is quantifier-free) is equivalent to a quantifier-free formula. Deduce that any formula is equivalent to a quantifier free-formula.

6. Let $\mathcal{C}$ be the first order language having one binary predicate ϕ_r for each positive rational number r and let T be the $\mathcal{C}$-theory with axioms (i) $(\forall x)\phi_r(x,x)$ for each $r > 0$, (ii) $(\forall x, y)(\phi_r(x,y) \to \phi_s(y,x))$ for each (r,s) with $r \leq s$, (iii) $(\forall x, y, z)(\phi_r(x,y) \wedge \phi_s(y,z)) \geq \phi_{r+s}(x,z))$ for each (r,s). Show that every metric space (X,d) becomes a T-model if we interpret $\phi_r(x,y)$ as '$d(x,y) \leq r$'. Is every T-model obtained from a metric space in this way?

There is no robust concept of second-order language because of autonomy of syntax. One can set up the language with several distinct suites of variables, so that for example, lower case variables range over elements of the carrier set, upper case variables range over subsets of the carrier set. This is common practice, but there is nothing in the langauge that constrains us to consider only those interpretations where the upper case variables range over *all* subsets of the carrier set. There is nothing to stop us using interpretations where in addition to a carrier set X, one has a designated proper subset of $\mathcal{P}(X)$ as the set over which the upper case variables range. All one can do is rule that such interpretations are **nonstandard**. However there is a concept of a second-order *model*—a model is second order if the designated subset of $\mathcal{P}(X)$ that it includes does indeed contain all subsets of the carrier set, in other words, if it is not nonstandard in that sense.

The **Prenex Normal Form theorem** says that every formula of predicate calculus is equivalent to one with all its quantifiers at the beginning, so that every atomic subformula is within the scope of every quantifier.

EXERCISE 35 *Prove the Prenex Normal Form theorem from first principles.*

One of the nice things about the Prenex Normal Form theorem is that it gives us a fairly tidy classification of formulae in terms of complexity. A formula which—once its quantifiers have been pulled to the front—has only universal quantifiers is said to be *universal*, one which similarly has universal quantifiers followed by existential is said to be *universal-existential* and by forcing all formulæ into relatively simply defined classes like this it provides a framework framework which makes it natural to state things like: the class of models of a universal sentence is closed under end-extension, or the class of models of a universal-existential sentence is closed under unions of chains. These things are quite easy to prove, but we wouldn't be naturally motivated to prove them without the PNF.

Analogues of the PNF can be proved for languages intended to be used as higher-order languages, those with several distinct suites of variables intended to range over elements of the carrier set, over subsets of the carrier set, and so on.

P = NP?

An important class of properties is the class of Σ^2_1 properties: those that can be captured by a formula with one existential second-order quantifier in a suitable second-order language. See Garey and Johnson, for lots of examples. Now just as it is plausible that a first-order property of a finite structure is checkable in polynomial time, and that this can be done deterministically, it is plausible that a Σ^2_1 property can be checked nondeterministically in polynomial time. After all, if the property holds of the finite structure, one can verify it by finding a single subset with the right features—and all these features are first order and can be checked in polynomial time. For a suitably spiced-up first-order language $\mathcal{L}$ this assertion has a converse as well: a property is Σ^2_1 in $\mathcal{L}$ iff it is in NP.

It is not hard to show that there are properties that are captured by Σ_1^2 formulæ that are not captured by (first-order) formulæ of $\mathcal{L}$. What the above discussion reveals is that the famous $P = NP$ question is equivalent to the question whether or not for every Σ_1^2 formula there is a $\mathcal{L}$-formula *which has the same* finite *models*. Thus we can see that P = NP is really a question about how rich the variety of finite structures is: if it is very rich then there will be Σ_1^2 formula such that no $\mathcal{L}$-formula is complex enough to have the same finite models and P will not equal NP.

5.3 Formalising predicate logic

As we did in the propositional case in chap 4 we start with the "lots of founders one constructor" point of view, with the intention of abandoning it as promptly here as we did there.

5.3.1 Predicate calculus in the axiomatic style

Add to the three axioms for propositional logic the two new axioms:

$\forall x A(x) \to A(t)$; $A(t) \to \exists x A(x)$

and the two new rules of inference:

$$\frac{S \to A(t)}{S \to \forall t A(t)}$$

$$\frac{A(t) \to S}{\exists t A(t) \to S}$$ 't' not free in S.

The first of these two rules is often called **universal generalisation** or **UG** for short. It's a common strategy and deserves a short snappy name. To prove that all Fs are G, reason as follows: let x be an F, deduce that x is a G; remark that no assumptions were made about x beyond the fact that it was an F. Conclusion: *all* Fs must therefore be G.

5.3.2 Predicate calculus in the natural deduction style

To the natural deduction rules for propositional calculus we add rules for introducing an eliminating the quantifiers.

[*HOLE Insert piccies here*]

But we will not develop this further. We will procede immediately to a sequent treatment.

$\forall$ left.

$$\frac{F(t), \Gamma \vdash \Delta}{(\forall x)(F(x)), \Gamma \vdash \Delta}$$

where t is an arbitrary term

$\forall$ right

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, F(a)}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, (\forall x)(F(x))}$$

'a' is a variable not free in the lower sequent.

$\exists$ left

$$\frac{F(a), \Gamma \vdash \Delta}{(\exists x)(F(x)), \Gamma \vdash \Delta}$$

where 'a' is a variable not free in the lower sequent.

$\exists$ right

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, F(t)}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, (\exists x)(F(x))}$$

where t is an arbitrary term.

Reflection on the first footnote on page 62 might help to make sense of the side conditions on the variables in $\exists$ left and $\forall$- right. ("but x was arbitrary, therefore ... ")

Notice similarity between $\vee$-elimination and $\exists$-elimination.

5.3.3 Exercises on sequent calculus

In this question ϕ and ψ are formulæ in which x is not free, while $\phi(x)$ and $\psi(x)$ are formulæ in which x may be free.

Find proofs of the following sequents.

$\neg\forall x\phi(x) \vdash \exists x\neg\phi(x)$
$\neg\exists x\phi(x) \vdash \forall x\neg\phi(x)$
$\phi \wedge \exists x\psi(x) \vdash \exists x(\phi \wedge \psi(x))$
$\phi \vee \forall x\psi(x) \vdash \forall x(\phi \vee \psi(x))$
$\phi \to \exists x\psi(x) \vdash \exists x(\phi \to \psi(x))$
$\phi \to \forall x\psi(x) \vdash \forall x(\phi \to \psi(x))$
$\exists x\phi(x) \to \psi \vdash \forall x(\phi(x) \to \psi)$
$\forall x\phi(x) \to \psi \vdash \exists x(\phi(x) \to \psi)$
$\exists x\phi(x) \vee \exists x\psi(x) \vdash \exists x(\phi(x) \vee \psi(x))$
$\forall x\phi(x) \wedge \forall x\psi(x) \vdash \forall x(\phi(x) \wedge \psi(x))$

and deduce the prenex normal form theorem.

5.4 Semantics

We saw earlier (2.2.2) how the syntax of predicate calculus (the set of formulæ) can be constructed as a rectype, in a way analogous to the construction of the syntax of propositional logic as a rectype. We saw also how semantics can be given for the syntax of propositional logic by recursion over the datatype of propositional formulæ. (See definition 15.) The time has now come to do for predicate logic what we did then for propositional logic, namely provide a recursive semantics. However, predicate logic is powerful and expressive, and it is so similar to natural language in what it appears to be able to do, that a few words of warning are in order about what it will *not* achieve.

A lot of semantics for natural languages is not recursive (or "compositional" as the linguists say). There are various ways in which semantics can fail to

be compositional. For example, people can use a distinctive vocabulary to announce affiliation to a linguistically defined community—at least in cases where use of that vocabulary was avoidable, because then it represents a choice made by the speaker. People engaged in sports discourse will signal this fact by calling a good player of the game under discussion 'useful'. Elsewhere 'represents' for 'is'; 'denotes' for 'is'; 'propose' for 'suggest' mark out the speaker as engaged in scientific discourse, as in the following examples:

> "Massif-type anorthosites are large igneous complexes of Proterozoic age. They are almost monomineralic, representing [*sic*] vast accumulations of plagioclase ... the 930-Myr-old Rogaland anorthosite province in Southwest Norway represents [*sic*] one of the youngest known expressions of such magmatism." (Nature, **405** p.781.)

> To divide a number a by a number b means to find, if possible, a number x such that $bx = a$. If such a number exists it is denoted [*sic*] by a/b ... H. Davenport, *the Higher Arithmetic*)

The writers of these examples wished the texts to be read as pieces of scientific discourse and signalled this by a nonstandard use of the flagged word. This part of the author's meaning is not conveyed by building up the meaning of the compound sentence from the meaning of atomic subformulæ by recursion on the structure of the language. Nevertheless the words still have some meaning that is revealed compositionally. In contrast some words used in this way lack compositional semantics altogether: 'elitist' for example. This word is never used to convey information about the matter under discussion, but only ever to stake a claim by the speaker to be regarded as a person of progressive and egalitarian views. There are certainly other ways in which words in natural language can fail to have entirely compositional semantics and the transformational grammar of Chomsky and his school is a systematic attempt to capture some of them, but there is no need to explore them here: nonrecursive semantics is very hard to analyse mathematically, and expressions of formal mathematical languages are designed to yield up their meaning without being having to be deconstructed in the ways illustrated above.

5.4.1 Truth and Satisfaction

In this section we develop the ideas of truth and validity (which we first saw in the case of propositional logic) in the rather more complex setting of predicate logic.

We are going to say what it is for a formula to be **true** in a structure. We will achieve this by doing something rather more general. What we will give is—for each language $\mathcal{L}$—a definition of what it is for a formula of $\mathcal{L}$ to be true in a structure.

The first thing we need is the concept of a signature from page 41: for a formula ϕ to have a prayer of being true in a structure $\mathfrak{M}$, the signature of the language that ϕ belongs to must be the same as the signature of $\mathfrak{M}$. It simply

doesn't make sense to ask whether or not the transitivity axiom $(\forall xyz)(x < y \wedge y < z. \rightarrow x < z)$ is true in a structure that hasn't got a binary relation in it.

First we need to decide what our domain of discourse, our carrier set, is to be. Next we need the concept of an **interpretation**. This is a function assigning to each predicate letter, function letter and constant in the language of ϕ a subset of M^n, or a function $M^k \rightarrow M$, or element of M *mutatis mutandis*. That is to say, to each syntactic device in the language of ϕ, the interpretation assigns a component of $\mathfrak{M}$ of the appropriate arity. Let $\mathcal{L}$ be the language of ϕ.

> For example, one can interpret the language of arithmetic by determining that the domain of discourse is to be $\mathbb{N}$, the set of natural numbers, and that the interpretation of the symbol '$\leq$' will be the set of all pairs $\langle x, y\rangle$ of natural numbers where x is less than or equal to y, and so on

(If this looks mysterious, it is probably because it really is as banal as you first thought. The problem is that it is *so* banal that one tends to think that something else must have been meant: one *overinterprets*. (see page **??**.) There is also the danger of misunderstanding this enterprise because one thinks "What's the point of telling me what '$<$' means? I already know!". The point is that '$<$' *might* have meant something quite different, and the story told here will explain how it might have meant those other things. Put in another—more compsci-ish—way, one could say that in predicate logic there are no **reserved words**. Well, *almost* anyway. '$=$' is usually taken to be a reserved word, and is sometimes called a **logical** predicate letter (though the point is more usually made by referring to all other predicate letters as "nonlogical"). What is meant by this is that '$=$' must always be interpreted by equality. Models not respecting this requirement are said to be **nonstandard** (though there are other ways in which a model might be said to be nonstandard - this really belongs later) Of course the quantifiers and connectives are usually taken to be reserved words as well. (Usually but not always: one needs to reinterpret '$\rightarrow$' when showing that Peirce's law doesn't follow from K and S: exercise 31))

At this stage (the stage at which we have equipped the language with an interpretation) we know what the symbols mean, but not what the values of the variables are. In other words, settling on an interpretation has enabled us to the reach the position from which we started when doing propl logic. It's rather like the position we are in when contemplating a computer program but not yet running it. When we run it we have a concept of instantaneous state of the program: these states (snapshots) are allocations of values to the program variables. Let's formalise a concept of state.

A **finite assignment function** is a finite (partial) function from variables in $\mathcal{L}$ to M, the carrier set of $\mathfrak{M}$. These will play a rôle analogous to the rôle of valuations in propositional calculus. I have (see above) carefully arranged that all our variables are orthographically of the form x_i for some index i, so we can think of our assignment function f as being defined either on *variables* or on *indices*, since they are identical up to 1-1 correspondence. It is probably better

practice to think of the assignment functions as assigning elements of M to the *indices* and write "$f(i) = \ldots$ ", since any notation that involved the actual *variables* would invite confusion with the much more familiar "$f(x_i) = \ldots$ " where f would have to be a function defined on the things the variables range over.

Next we define what it is for a partial assignment function to satisfy a sentence p, (written "$sat(f, p)$"). We will do this by recursion on the rectype of formulæ, so naturally we define sat first of all on atomic sentences.

Notice that in

$$sat(f, x_i = x_j)$$

we have a relation between a function and an expression, not a relation between f and x_i and x_j. That is to say that we wish to **mention** the variables (talk about them) rather than **use** them (to talk about what they point to). This contrast is referred to as the **use-mention distinction**.[1] This is usually made clear by putting quotation marks of some kind round the expressions to make it clear that we are mentioning them not using them. Now precisely what kind of quotation mark is a good question. Our first clause will be something like

$$sat(f, `x_i = x_j') \text{ iff}_{\text{df}} f(i) = f(j) \tag{5.1}$$

But how like? Notice that, as it stands, it contains a name of the expression which follows the next colon: $x_i = x_j$. Once we have put quotation marks round this, the i and j have ceased to behave like variables (they were variables taking indices as values) because quotation is a referentially opaque context.

A context is **referentially opaque** if two names for the same thing cannot be permuted within it while preserving truth. Quotation is referentially opaque because when we substitute one of the two names for Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde for the other in

'Jekyll' has six letters

we obtain the falsehood

'Hyde' has six letters

even though Jekyll and Hyde are the same person. The intuition behind the terminology is that one cannot "see through" the quotation marks to the thing(s) pointed to by the words 'Jekyll' and 'Hyde', so one cannot tell that they are the same. There are other important contexts that are referentially opaque: belief for example. I might have different beliefs about a single object when it is identified by different names, and these beliefs might conflict.

But we still want the 'i' and 'j' to be variables, because we want the content of clause 5.4.1 to read, in English, something like: "for any variables i and j, we will say that f satisfies the expression whose first and fourth letters are 'x',

[1] It has been said that the difference between logicians and mathematicians is that logicians understand the use-mention distinction.

whose third and fifth are i and j respectively and whose middle letter is '=', iff $f(i) = f(j)$". Notice (and this is absolutely crucial) that in the piece of quoted English text 'x' and '=' appear with single quotation marks round them while 'i' and 'j' do not, and that formula 5.4.1 doesn't capture this feature. To correct this Quine invented a new notational device in *Mathematical Logic* [1951], which he called "corners" and which are nowadays known as "Quine quotes" (or "quasi-quotes") which operate as follows: The expression after the next colon:

$$\ulcorner x_i = x_j \urcorner$$

being an occurrence of '$x_i = x_j$' enclosed in Quine quotes is an expression which does not, as it stands, name anything. However, i and j are variables taking integers as values, so that whenever we put constants (numerals) in place of i and j it turns into an expression which will name the result of deleting the quasi-quotes. This could also be put by calling it a variable name.

A good way to think of quasi quotes is not as a funny kind of quotation mark, for quotation is referentially opaque and quasi quotation referentially transparent, but rather as a kind of diacritic, not unlike the LaTeX commands I am using to write this book. Within a body of text enclosed by a pair of quasi quotes, the symbols '$\wedge$' '$\vee$' etc. do not have their normal function of composing *expressions* but instead compose *names of expressions*. This also means that Greek letters within the scope of quasi quotes are not dummies for expressions or abbreviations of expressions but are variables that range over expressions (not sets, or integers). Otherwise, if we think of them as a kind of funny quotation mark, it is a bit disconcerting to find that, as Quine points out, $\ulcorner \mu \urcorner$ is just μ (if μ is an expression with no internal structure). The interested reader is advised to read pages 33-37 of Quine's *Mathematical Logic* where this device is introduced.

It might have been easier to have a new suite of operators which combine names of formulæ to get names of new formulæ so that, as it might be, putting '`&`' between the names of two formulæ gave us a name of the conjunction of the two formulæ. However, that uses up a whole font of characters, and it is more economical, if not actually clearer, to use corners instead.

Once we've got that straight we can declare the following recursion, where 'α' and 'β' are variables taking expressions as values.

DEFINITION 25 *First the base cases, for atomic fomulæ*

$sat(f, \ulcorner\ x_i = x_j \urcorner)$ *iff* $f(i) = f(j)$;
$sat(f, \ulcorner\ x_i \in x_j \urcorner)$ *iff* $f(i) \in f(j)$;

Then the inductive steps
if $sat(f, \alpha)$ *and* $sat(f, \beta)$ *then* $sat(f, \ulcorner \alpha \wedge \beta \urcorner)$;
if $sat(f, \alpha)$ *or* $sat(f, \beta)$ *then* $sat(f, \ulcorner \alpha \vee \beta \urcorner)$;
if for no $g \supseteq f$ *does* $sat(g, \alpha)$ *hold then* $sat(f, \ulcorner \neg \alpha \urcorner)$;
if there is some $g \supseteq f$ *such that* $sat(g, \ulcorner F(x_i) \urcorner)$ *then* $sat(f, \ulcorner (\exists x_i)(F(x_i)) \urcorner)$;

if for every $g \supseteq f$ *with* $i \in dom(g), sat(g, \ulcorner F(x_i) \urcorner)$ *then* $sat(f, \ulcorner (\forall x_i)(F(x_i)) \urcorner)$*;*

Then we say that ϕ *is* **true in** $\mathfrak{M}$*, written* $\mathfrak{M} \models \phi$ *iff* $sat(\perp, \phi)$*, where* $\perp$ *is the empty partial assignment function. Finally a formula is* **valid** *iff it is true in every interpretation.*

Remember that this definition was for the toy language of Set theory. In other cases the second clause will be replaced by a multiplicity of clauses—one for each predicate.

Beware that $\mathfrak{M} \models T$ and $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ treat plurals on the right differently. The first means that **everything** on the right is satisfied, the second means only that **something** on the right is satisfied.

DEFINITION 26 *Given a structure* $\mathfrak{M}$ *we write* $Th(\mathfrak{M})$ *for the theory of* $\mathfrak{M}$*:* $\{\phi : \mathfrak{M} \models \phi\}$.

If $Th(\mathfrak{M}) = Th(\mathfrak{N})$ *we say that* $\mathfrak{M}$ *and* $\mathfrak{N}$ *are* **elementarily equivalent**.

Examples: The reals as an ordered set and the rationals as an ordered set are elementarily equivalent. (Don't try to prove this just yet!) The reals as a field and a rationals as a field are not. Why not? (In the reals every polynomial of odd order has a root!)

If $\mathfrak{M}$ and $\mathfrak{N}$ are elementarily equivalent and $\mathfrak{M}$ is a substructure of $\mathfrak{N}$ we say $\mathfrak{N}$ is an **elementary extension** of $\mathfrak{M}$ if the following extra condition is satisfied: For all expressions ϕ, $\mathfrak{M} \models \phi(\vec{x}) \longleftrightarrow \mathfrak{N} \models \phi(\vec{x})$. (Notice that because ϕ is allowed to contain free variables this is a much stronger condition than elementary equivalence.)

Thus the reals as an ordered set are an elementary extension of the rationals as an ordered set. As noted earlier, the reals as a field are not an elementary extension of the rationals as a field.

EXERCISE 36 *The assignment functions we have used have been partial, in contrast to the valuations we used in propositional logic, which were total. How do we have to modify definition 25 if we are to usse total assignment functions?*

5.5 Completeness of the Predicate Calculus

Now that we know what it is for a formula to be true in a model, we have the notion of a valid formula (one true in all interpretations) and we can now state and prove the completeness theorem.

Theorem 27 *A formula in the language of predicate calculus is deducible by the sequent rules iff it is true in all interpretations.*

The strategy is as follows. On being given a formula ϕ, one examines all possible proofs in the hope of finding a proof of ϕ, in a systematic way that ensures that if at the end of time one has failed to find a proof then the log of one's failed attempts results in a countermodel.

The reader has by now constructed some sequent calculus proofs, and seen how one builds a proof in the form of a tree, by backward search. Each node of the tree is decorated by a sequent, and the leaves of the tree are decorated by initial sequents. How does one build the tree? How does one know what to put above a node that is decorated by a sequent that is not an initial sequent? For a start, the root of the tree will be decorated by the sequent $\vdash \phi$ where ϕ is the formula we are trying to prove or find a countermodel for. Any sequent that contains a molecular formula can be the result of applying one of the sequent rules to one or more other sequents. If it contains more than one molecular formula it can be obtained in more than one way. We guess which way will be most fruitful and put the appropriate sequent(s) above it. For example the sequent $A \vee B \vdash B \vee C$ can have been obtained by $\vee$-R from $A \vee B \vdash B, C$ and by $\vee$-L from $A \vdash B \vee C$ together with $B \vdash B \vee C$. So if, while we are building a proof-tree, we confront a bud decorated with '$A \vee B \vdash B \vee C$' we can either put a bud above it decorated with '$A \vee B \vdash B, C$', or *two* buds, one decorated with '$A \vdash B \vee C$' and the other decorated with '$B \vdash B \vee C$'. How do we choose? It turns out that it doesn't matter. What we will do is set up in advance a rule that tells us which connectives to attack depending on how far we are from the root of the proof tree under construction. ("If your distance from the root is congruent to 7 mod 13 try to attack conjunctions-on-the-left; if there are no conjunctions-on-the-left try disjunctions-on-the-right next, if there are no disjunctions-on-the-right try ... On the other hand if your distance from the root is congruent to 8 mod 13 try disjunctions-on-the-right ... ")

Not surprisingly the cases where we do have to be very careful are the four rules for the quantifiers. Let us take $\forall$-L as an illustration. It will become clear that we will have to have an enumeration of the variables of our language, so let us assume one from the outset. We are confronted by a sequent $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$, and we are resolved to attack all the formulæ in Γ that are of the form '$(\forall x_i)\phi$'. We construct a sequent from which $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ could have been derived by $\forall$-L as follows. For each formula $(\forall x_i)\phi_i(x_i)$ in Γ let 'a_i' be the first variable that we have not already used to attack this formula, but which has appeared in a sequent nearer to the root. Then we add all the formulæ $\phi_i(a_i)$ to Γ to obtain Γ^*. The desired sequent to decorate the new bud is now $\Gamma^* \vdash \Delta$.

The approach to $\exists$-R is exactly the same so let us investigate $\forall$-R. When we attack $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ we will add to Δ lots fo formulæ $\phi_i(a_i)$ corresponding to the $(\forall x_i)\phi_i(x_i)$ in Δ. This time the a_i we use are those that have *not* appeared in a sequent nearer to the root. Again, $\exists$-L will invite the same approach.

When we have built our tree according to this process, one of two things will happen. Either (i) every branch terminates with an initial sequent, in which case we have a proof, or (ii) There is an infinite path through the tree.[2] In case (ii) we will use the infinite path to construct a countermodel. For one such infinite path, set Γ to be the set of formulæ that appear on the left, and Δ to be the set of formulæ that appear on the right. We will build a model

[2]It might sound as if we need DC for this, but we can pick children of nodes uniformly because the decorations come from a countable set.

in which everything in Γ is true and everything in Δ is false. The domain of this model is the set of all the variables. For each n-ary predicate letter R we determine whether or not an n-tuple $\langle x_1 \dots x_n \rangle$ belongs to the interpretation of R by checking which of Γ or Δ contains $R(x_1 \dots x_n)$

■

5.5.1 Applications of Completeness

This has been a very cursory teatment of completeness, and several significant details have been omitted. One major topic that has not been covered is the rule of *cut*: from the two sequents $\Gamma \vdash \Delta, \phi$ and $\Gamma', \phi \vdash \Delta'$ infer the sequent $\Gamma \cup \Gamma' \vdash \Delta \cup \Delta'$. If one reads sequents not in the way I have been advocating but instead as saying "if everything on the left is true then something on the right is true" then this rule is clearly truth-preserving: if one inputs two true sequents one obtains a true sequent as output. Nobody wants to have to use a proof system which includes this rule: backward search using it gives rise to infinitely many possibilities! Thus the fact that it is truth-preserving is very inconvenient: we have to show that everything provable using it is provable without it.

Interpolation

There is a precise analogue in predicate calculus of the interpolation lemma for propositional logic, and close attention to the details of the proof of the completeness theorem will enable us to prove it and get bounds on the complexity of the interpolating formula. These bounds are not very good!

The interpolation lemma is probably the most appealing of the consequences of the completeness theorem, since we have very strong intuitions about irrelevant information. Hume's famous dictum that one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is" certainly arises from this intuition. The same intuition is at work in the hostility to the *ex falso sequitur quodlibet* that arises from time to time: if there has to be a connection in meaning between the premisses and the conclusion, how can an empty premiss imply anything?

Skolemisation

Suppose we have a consistent theory T and that it proves a theorem $(\exists x)\psi(x)$. Then, if $\mathfrak{M}$ is a model of T, we can identify in $\mathfrak{M}$ an element x in $\mathfrak{M}$ such that $\mathfrak{M} \models \psi(x)$ Suppose further that T proves a theorem $(\forall x)(\exists y)\phi(x, y)$. Then, as before, if $\mathfrak{M}$ is a model of T, we can bolt onto $\mathfrak{M}$ a function that, to every x in $\mathfrak{M}$, assigns a y such that $\mathfrak{M} \models \phi(x, y)$. The model that results from bolting this function onto $\mathfrak{M}$ is an *expansion* of $\mathfrak{M}$ (see page 10), and the language for which it is a structure is of course an expansion of $\mathcal{L}(T)$, the language of T. Of course we can do this expansion simultaneously for all ϕ such that T proves $(\forall x)(\exists y)\phi(x, y)$, and adjoin lots of new function letters to $\mathcal{L}(T)$ in so doing. We can also add, for each ψ such that $T \vdash (\exists x)\psi(x)$ constant symbols to point to something that is ψ. This process of adding function letters and constant

symbols is called **Skolemisation**. The functions denoted in a model by the new function letters are **Skolem functions**. The constants are Skolem constants.

Whenever we add Skolem functions and constants to a model we can consider the rectype whose founders are the Skolem constants and whose constructors are the Skolem functions. These substructures are natural and important objects.

EXERCISE 37 *The* **Downward Skolem-Löwenheim** *theorem.*

Let T be a theory in a countable language $\mathcal{L}$. Use Skolem functions to prove that T has a countable model.

5.6 Back and Forth

The theory of dense linear order has one primitive nonlogical symbol $\leq$ and the following axioms:

$\forall xyz(x \leq y \to (y \leq z \to (x \leq z)))$;
$\forall xz(x \leq y \to y \leq x \to x = y)$;
$\forall xy\exists z(x < y \to (x < z \wedge z < y))$;
$\forall x\exists y(y > x)$;
$\forall x\exists y(x > y)$;
$\forall xy(x \leq y \vee y \leq x)$.

Theorem 28 *All countable dense linear orders without endpoints are isomorphic.*

Proof: I shall provide a proof because it is possible to prove the theorem the wrong way.

Suppose we have two countable dense linear orders without endpoints, $\langle \mathcal{A}, \leq_{\mathcal{A}} \rangle$ and $\langle \mathcal{B}, \leq_{\mathcal{B}} \rangle$. They are both countable, so the elements of $\mathcal{A}$ can be enumerated as $\langle a_i : i \in \mathbb{N} \rangle$ and the elements of $\mathcal{B}$ can be enumerated as $\langle b_i : i \in \mathbb{N} \rangle$.

We start by pairing off a_0 with b_0. Thereafter we procede by induction. At each stage we have paired off some things in $\langle \mathcal{A}, \leq_{\mathcal{A}} \rangle$ with some things in $\langle \mathcal{B}, \leq_{\mathcal{B}} \rangle$. Let us now consider the first thing in $\langle \mathcal{A}, \leq_{\mathcal{A}} \rangle$ not already paired off. (We mean: first in the sense of $\langle a_i : i \in \mathbb{N} \rangle$.) This lies between two things we have already paired, and we must find a mate for it in $\langle \mathcal{B}, \leq_{\mathcal{B}} \rangle$ that lies in the interval between their mates. Since the ordering is dense, this interval is nonempty, and we pick for its mate the first (in the sense of the $\langle b_i : i \in \mathbb{N} \rangle$) in it.

Now we consider the first thing (in the sense of the enumeration we have chosen) in $\langle \mathcal{B}, \leq_{\mathcal{B}} \rangle$ not already paired off. This lies between two things we have already paired, and we must find a mate for it in $\langle \mathcal{A}, \leq_{\mathcal{A}} \rangle$ that lies in the interval between their mates. Since the ordering is dense, this interval is nonempty, and we pick for its mate the first (in the sense of the enumeration) in it.

That is the recursive step we use to build the bijection. It goes *back and forth*: $\langle \mathcal{A}, \leq_{\mathcal{A}} \rangle$ to $\langle \mathcal{B}, \leq_{\mathcal{B}} \rangle$ and then $\langle \mathcal{B}, \leq_{\mathcal{B}} \rangle$ to $\langle \mathcal{A}, \leq_{\mathcal{A}} \rangle$. That way we can be sure that by the time we have gone back-and-forth n times we have used up the first n things in the canonical enumeration of $\langle \mathcal{A}, \leq_{\mathcal{A}} \rangle$ *and* the first n things



Figure 5.1: There is only one countable dense total order without endpoints

in the canonical enumeration of $\langle \mathcal{A}, \leq_{\mathcal{A}} \rangle$. We will have used n other things as well on each side, but we have no control over how late or early they are in the canonical orderings.

The union of all the finite partial bijections we thus construct is an isomorphism between $\langle \mathcal{A}, \leq_{\mathcal{A}} \rangle$ and $\langle \mathcal{B}, \leq_{\mathcal{B}} \rangle$.

■

Note that this construction shows that the group of order-automorphisms of the rationals acts transitively on unordered n-tuples.

Theorem 28 tells us that the theory of dense linear orders without endpoints is complete. Suppose it were not. Then there would be a formula ϕ which is undecided by it, and by the completeness theorem there would be dense linear orders without endpoints which were ϕ and dense linear orders without endpoints which were not ϕ. But then these dense linear orders would not be elementarily equivalent, and *a fortiori* not isomorphic either.

The study of countable structures that are unique up to isomorphism is a pastime widespread among logicians, and has interesting ramifications. Such structures are said to be **countably categorical**. Although this is a misnomer, it has stuck. It is *theories* that are κ-categorical. A theory is **κ-categorical** iff it has—up to isomorphism—precisely one model of size κ. There is a remarkable and deep theorem of Morley that says that a theory that is κ-categorical for even one uncountable κ is κ-categorical for *all* uncountable κ. It is beyond the scope of this book. However there are a number of natural and important countably categorical theories, and they make good exercises.

5.6.1 Exercises on back-and-forth constructions

1. Take two countable dense linear orders without endpoints. (For example two copies of the rationals considered as a ordered set.) In both copies paint each point red or blue so that any two red points have a blue point between them and any two blue points have a red point between them.

Prove that there is an order-isomorphism between the two copies which respects the colouring.

The significance of this example is that it is the simplest example of a countably categorical structure whose categoricity has to be proved by a back-and-forth argument and not merely by a "forth" argument.[3] It seems to be an open question whether or not the countably categorical structures whose uniqueness can be proved by a "forth" construction only is a natural class in any other way.

2. Some graph theory. (You do not need any results from graph theory to do this). Let A_n be the assertion that if X and Y are disjoint sets of vertices both of cardinality at most n, then there is a vertex x not in $X \cup Y$ joined to every member of X and to no member of Y. Prove that any two countable graphs satisfying A_n for each finite n are isomorphic.

3. What is the smallest (nontrivial, i.e., at least two members) graph satisfying A_1? (easy).

4. What does this tell you about the relationship between the A_n and an arbitrary sentence in the language of graph theory? (see hint for Q1)

5. Any two countable atomless boolean algebras are isomorphic.

6. A countable atomic boolean algebra is *saturated* if every element dominating infinitely many atoms is the sup of two elements dominating two disjoint infinite sets of atoms. Prove that any two countable saturated atomic boolean algebras are isomorphic. (It's easy with the hint: show that this condition is equivalent to the requirement that the quotient modulo the ideal of finite elements is atomless.)

7. (The model companion of ZF^-). Let $\gamma(x, y_1 \dots y_n)$ be a finite conjunction of some of the following atomic formulas and their negations: $x \in x$; $x \in y_i$ $(i \leq n)$; and $y_i \in x$ $(i \leq n)$. We define the theory T as follows. If

$$\bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} y_i \neq y_j \wedge x \neq y_i \wedge \gamma(x, y_1 \dots y_n)$$

is satisfiable then

$$(\forall y_1 \dots y_n)(\exists x)[\bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} y_i \neq y_j \rightarrow \bigwedge_{1 \leq i \leq n} x \neq y_i \wedge \gamma(x, y_1 \dots y_n)]$$

is an axiom of T.

Prove that T is countably categorical.

[3] I am endebted to Peter Cameron for pointing this out to me.

5.7 Ultraproducts and Łoś's theorem

Let T be a first-order theory. Clearly if every finitely axiomatised subsystem of T has a model, then every finitely axiomatised subsystem of T is consistent. This tells us that T itself is consistent (by compactness) and thus that T itself has a model, by the completeness theorem. Thus we have successfully negotiated our way from the bottom left of the following diagram to the bottom right:



We've inferred that T has a model from the news that all its finite subsets have models, but our proof has involved something very like a *détour* through syntax. In the spirit of the interpolation lemma one might expect that there should be an operation that will accept a set of models and output a model, so that we can feed it models of finite subsets of T and obtain models of T.

There certainly are constructions that accept sets of models and output (single) models: recall that $\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i$ is the direct (sometimes called *Cartesian*) product of the A_i.

If $\{\mathcal{A}_i : i \in I\}$ is a family of structures, we define the product

$$\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i$$

to be the structure whose domain is the set of all functions f defined on the index set I such that $(\forall i \in I)(f(i) \in A_i)$ and the relations of the language are interpreted by $R(f,g)$ iff $(\forall i \in I)(R(f(i),g(i)))$. The $\{\mathcal{A}_i : i \in I\}$ are said to be the **factors** of the product $\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i$

For this operation to make sense it is of course necessary that all the A_i should have the same signature! (see page 41).

Products are nice in various ways. They preserve Horn sentences. What do we mean by "preserve"?

DEFINITION 29 *Let Γ be a class of formulæ. Products* preserve Γ *if whenever $\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i$ is a product of a family $\{\mathcal{A}_i : i \in I\}$ and $\phi \in \Gamma$ then $\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i \models \phi$ iff $(\forall i \in I)(\mathcal{A}_i \models \phi)$. In these circumstances we also say that ϕ is preserved, when $\phi \in \Gamma$.*

By definition of product, products preserve atomic formulæ. Clearly they also preserve conjunctions of anything they preserve, and similarly universal quantifications over things they preserve.

EXERCISE 38 *Verify that products preserve Horn formulæ*

(This was proved by a man named 'Horn'!) However they do not always preserve formulæ containing $\vee$ or $\neg$. How so? If ϕ is preserved, then the product will fail to satisfy it if even *one* of the factors does not satisfy it but all the rest do. In these circumstances the product $\models \neg\phi$ but it is not the case that all the factors $\models \neg\phi$. As for $\vee$, if ϕ and ψ are preserved, it can happen that $\phi \vee \psi$ is not, as follows. If half the factors satisfy ϕ and half satisfy ψ, then they all satisfy $\psi \vee \phi$. Now the product will satisfy $\psi \vee \psi$ iff it satisfies one of them. But in order to satisfy one of them, that one must be true at *all* the factors, and by hypothesis it is not. Something similar happens with the existential quantifier.

Given a filter F over the index set, we can define $f \sim_F g$ on elements of the product if $\{i \in I : f(i) = g(i)\} \in F$. This equivalence relation is a congruence relation for all the operations and relations that the product aquires from the factors. At this point it is customary to take a quotient by this congruence relation and call this structure a **reduced product**. This new structure has a different carrier set from the product, but the interpretation of '=' in it is indeed equality. It is possible to keep the same carrier set and obtain much of the effect of "reducing" by $\sim_F$ by taking the interpretation of '=' in the new structure to be $\sim_F$. Models in which the interpretation of '=' is anything other equality are often said to be **nonstandard**.

Then we *either* take this $\sim_F$ to be the interpretation of '=' in the new product we are defining, keeping the elements of the domain of the new product the same as the elements of the old *or* we take the elements of the new structure to be equivalence classes of functions under $\sim$. These we will write $[g]_{\sim_F}$ or $[g]$ if there is no ambiguity. Whichever way you prefer to look at it $\sim_F$ is a congruence relation on $\prod_{i\in I} \mathcal{A}_i$.

This new object is denoted by the following expression:

$$(\prod_{i\in I} \mathcal{A}_i)/F$$

Similarly we have to revise our interpretation of atomic formulæ so that

$$(\prod_{i\in I} \mathcal{A}_i)/F \models R(f,g) \text{ iff } \{i : R(f(i), g(i))\} \in F.$$

The reason for proceeding from products to reduced products was to complicate the structure and hope to get more things preserved. In fact nothing exciting happens (we still have the same trouble with $\vee$ and $\neg$) unless the filter we use is ultra. Then everything comes right.

Theorem 30 *(Łoś's theorem)*
Let $\mathcal{U}$ be an ultrafilter $\subseteq \mathcal{P}(I)$. For all first-order expressions ϕ,

$$(\prod_{i\in I} \mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \models \phi \text{ iff } \{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \phi\} \in \mathcal{U}$$

Proof: We do this by structural induction on the rectype of formulæ. For atomic formulæ it is immediate from the definitions.

As we would expect, the only hard work comes with $\neg$ and $\vee$, though $\exists$ merits comment as well.

Disjunction

Suppose we know that $(\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \models \phi$ iff $\{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \phi\} \in \mathcal{U}$ and $(\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \models \psi$ iff $\{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \psi\} \in \mathcal{U}$. We want to show $(\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \models (\phi \vee \psi)$ iff $\{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \phi \vee \psi\} \in \mathcal{U}$.

The steps in the following manipulation will be reversible. Suppose

$$(\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \models \phi \vee \psi$$

Then

$$(\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \models \phi \quad \text{or} \quad (\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \models \psi$$

By induction hypothesis, this is equivalent to

$$\{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \phi\} \in \mathcal{U} \quad \text{or} \quad \{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \psi\} \in \mathcal{U}$$

and either of these implies

$$\{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \phi \vee \psi\} \in \mathcal{U}$$

Now $\{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \phi \vee \psi\}$ is $\{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \phi\} \cup \{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \psi\}$. Now we make use of the ultra-ness of $\mathcal{U}$: for all A and B it contains $A \cup B$ iff it contains at least one of A and B, which enables us to reverse the last implication.

Negation

We assume $(\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \models \phi$ iff $\{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \phi\} \in \mathcal{U}$, and wish to infer $(\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \models \neg\phi$ iff $\{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \neg\phi\} \in \mathcal{U}$.

Suppose $(\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \models \neg\phi$. That is to say

$$(\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \not\models \phi$$

By induction hypothesis this is equivalent to

$$\{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \phi\} \notin \mathcal{U}$$

But, since $\mathcal{U}$ is ultra, it must contain I' or $I \setminus I'$ for any $I' \subseteq I$, so this last line is equivalent to

$$\{i : \mathcal{A}_i \models \neg\phi\} \in \mathcal{U}$$

as desired.

Existential quantifier

The step for $\exists$ is also nontrivial ...

$$(\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \models \exists x\phi$$

$$\exists f(\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \models \phi(f)$$

$$\exists f\{i \in I : \mathcal{A}_i \models \phi(f(i))\} \in \mathcal{U}$$

... and here we use the axiom of choice to pick a witness at each factor

$$\{i \in I : \mathcal{A}_i \models \exists x\phi(x)\} \in \mathcal{U}$$

■

If all the factors are the same the ultraproduct is called an **ultrapower**. We write $A^K/\mathcal{U}$ where K is a set and $\mathcal{U}$ an ultrafilter on K.

Theorem 31 *The embedding $i = \lambda m_{\mathfrak{M}}.(\lambda f_{\mathfrak{M}^\kappa/\mathcal{U}}.m)$ is elementary.*

Proof:

Of course we have to do this by structural induction on formulaæ, but the only hard case is the existential quantifier, and even that is hard in only one direction. After all, if $\mathfrak{M} \models (\exists x)(\phi(x))$ then i of any witness will satisfy ϕ in the ultraproduct. So it will be sufficient to show that, for any $m \in \mathfrak{M}$, if there is an $x \in \mathfrak{M}^\kappa/\mathcal{U}$ such that $\mathfrak{M}^\kappa/\mathcal{U} \models \phi(x, i(m))$ then there is $x \in \mathfrak{M}$ s.t. $\mathfrak{M} \models \phi(x, m)$. Consider such an $x \in \mathfrak{M}^\kappa/\mathcal{U}$.

It is the equivalence class $[f]_\mathcal{U}$ of a family of functions f such that $\{\alpha < \kappa : \phi(f(\alpha), m)\} \in \mathcal{U}$. But then this thing in $\mathfrak{M}$ that is $f(\alpha)$ will serve as the witness in $\mathfrak{M}$.

■

Ultraproducts were sold to you a few pages ago as a device that would show that if every finite subset of a theory T has a model, so does T. We'd better make this promise good.

Suppose T is a theory (with countably many axioms) such that every finite set of its axioms has a model. Let A_i be a model of the first i axioms of T, and let $\mathcal{U}$ be a nonprincipal ultrafilter on $\mathbb{N}$. Then the ultraproduct $(\prod_{i\in I}\mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U}$ is a model of T. (as long as $\mathcal{U}$ is nonprincipal of course! see exercise 24). This has the incredibly useful corollary that

COROLLARY 32 *A formula is equivalent to a first-order formula iff the class of its models is closed under taking ultraproducts.*

EXERCISE 39 *Use ultraproducts to show that wellfoundedness is not a first-order property.*

The effect of the ultraproduct construction is to add lots of things whose presence cannot be detected by finitistic first-order methods. An important effect of this is a direct proof of

Theorem 33 *(Upward Skolem-Löwenheim theorem)*
Every consistent theory with an infinite model has arbitrarily large models.

Proof: We can prove this by appealing to the completeness theorem. If T is a consistent theory with an infinite model add to the language of T as many constant symbols as you please, and add to T axioms saying that all these constants are distinct. The compactness theorem for predicate logic ensures that this new theory is consistent and the completeness theorem for predicate logic proves that it has a model.

However we can instead prove it directly using ultraproducts. Let $\mathfrak{M}$ be a model of T, K an index set of cardinality κ a cardinal as large as you please, $\mathcal{U}$ an ultrafilter on K. $\mathfrak{M}^K/\mathcal{U}$ is then elementarily equivalent to $\mathfrak{M}$ and is large. How large? Well, an element of $\mathfrak{M}^K/\mathcal{U}$ is an equivalence class of functions from K to M. To show that there are lots of equivalence classes we must show that there are large families of functions that pairwise disagree on a set in $\mathcal{U}$. But for each address in K we can pick M-many things and this gives us κ independent choices of things from M, so there are (size of $M)^\kappa$ functions which pairwise differ everywhere. This size is certainly at least as big as κ.

■

Theorem 33 can be strengthened to assert that every theory with an infinite model has models of all larger sizes.

5.7.1 Further applications of ultraproducts

Keisler's ultrapower lemma

Keisler's ultrapower lemma connects logic and algebra. It says that if two structures $\mathfrak{M}$ and $\mathfrak{N}$ are elementarily equivalent then they have ultrapowers $\mathfrak{M}'$ and $\mathfrak{N}'$ that are isomorphic.

Nonstandard models of arithmtic

In an ultrapower of the reals one finds elements like the equivalence class of the function $\lambda n.(1/n)$. This is clearly an infinitesimal: it is everywhere bigger than 0 and, for each n, eventually less than $1/n$. This enables us to do something the 18th century wanted to do but couldn't, namely do differential and integral calculus using infinitesimals, and do it rigorously. Presenting Analysis in this way hasn't yet caught on, but it well might.[4]

[4] If you want to pursue this point, seek out a copy of: Keisler op cit.

5.8 Exercises on compactness and ultraproducts

1. Write down first order axioms for the theory of fields. Show that if a first-order statement is true in all fields of characteristic zero, then it is true in all fields of sufficiently large characteristic.

2. Write down the axioms for an ordered field (essentially the axioms for the reals without the crucial completeness axiom). An ordered field is *archimedean* just when for every $x > 0$ there is $n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $x + x + x + x + x \ldots (n \text{ times}) > 1$. Show that there exist non-archimedean ordered fields.

3. Show that if $\mathcal{U} \subseteq \mathcal{P}(I)$ is the principal ultrafilter generated by j then $(\prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{A}_i)/\mathcal{U} \simeq A_j$.

An essay-sized Paper 4-style question

A *pedigree* is a set P with two unary total functions f amd m defined on it, with disjoint ranges. ($m(x)$ is x's mother and $f(x)$ is x's father).

> (i) Set up a first-order language $\mathcal{L}$ for pedigrees and provide axioms for a theory T_1 of pedigrees.

A pedigree may be *circle-free*: in a realistic pedigree no-one is their own ancestor! Realistic pedigrees are also *locally finite*: no-one is the father or mother of infinitely many things.

> (ii) One of these two new properties is first order and the other isn't. Give axioms for a theory T_2 of the one that is first-order and an explanation of why the other one isn't.

A *fitness function* is a map v from P to the reals satisfying $v(x) = (1/2) \cdot \Sigma_{f(y)=x} v(y)$ or $v(x) = (1/2) \cdot \Sigma_{m(y)=x} v(y)$ (depending on whether x is a mother or a father).

> (iii) Find a sufficient condition for a pedigree to have a nontrivial fitness function, and a sufficient condition for it to have no nontrivial fitness funtion.
>
> (iv) Extend your language $\mathcal{L}$ to include syntax for v. In your new language provide axioms for a new theory T_3 which is to be a conservative extension of T_1 and whose locally finite models are precisely the locally finite pedigrees with a nontrivial fitness function.

There is an obvious concept of *generation* for a pedigree.

(v) Expand $\mathcal{L}$ by adding new predicate(s), and give a first-order theory in this new language for pedigrees that have well-defined generations. Give first-order axioms in $\mathcal{L}$ itself for a theory of pedigrees that have well-defined generations.

(vi) When can one make sense of the idea of the fitness of an entire generation? How can fitness change from one generation to the next?

(vii) Add axioms to your theory of pedigrees admitting-a-concept-of-generation to obtain an $\aleph_0$-categorical theory.

Chapter 6

Computable Functions

Hilbert's 1900 address set a number of tasks whose successful completion would inevitably involve more formalisation. It seems fairly clear that this was deliberate: Hilbert certainly believed that if formalisation was pursued thoroughly and done properly then all the contradictions that were crawling out of the woodwork at that time could be dealt with once and for all.

One of the tasks was to find a method for solving all diophantine equations. What does this mean exactly? For example, it is easy to check that for any two naturals a and b

$$(a^2 - b^2)^2 + (2ab)^2 = (a^2 + b^2)^2$$

and so there are infinitely many integer solutions to $x^2 + y^2 = z^2$. Indeed we can even show that every solution to the pythagorean equation (at least every solution where x, y and z have no common factor) arises in this way:

Notice that if $x^2 + y^2 = z^2$ then z is odd and precisely one of x and y is even. (We are assuming no common factors!) Let us take y to be the even one and x the odd one.

Evidently $x^2 = (z - y)(z + y)$ and let d be the hcf of $z - y$ and $z + y$. Then there are coprime a and b satisfying $z + y = ad$ and $z - y = bd$. So $x^2 = abd^2$. This can happen only if a and b are perfect squares, say u^2 and v^2 respectively. So $x = uvd$.

This gives us $z = \frac{u^2+v^2}{2}.d$ and $y = \frac{u^2-v^2}{2}.d$ and in fact d turns out to be 2.

Hilbert's question—and it is a natural one—was: can we clean up all diophantine equations in the way we have just cleaned up this one?

If there is a general method for solving diophantine equations, then we have the possibility of finding it. If we find it, we exhibit it, and we're done. To be slightly more specific, we have a proof that says "Let E be a diophantine equation, then ... ", using the rule of universal generalisation (UG).

On the other hand, if there is no such general method, what are we to do? Merely gesticulating despairingly in front of hard cases will not persuade anyone that those cases cannot be solved. We would have to say something like: let

$\mathfrak{A}$ be an arbitrary algorithm, we will show that there is a diophantine equation that $\mathfrak{A}$ doesn't solve. But clearly, in order to do this, we must have a formal concept of an algorithm. Hilbert's challenge was to find one.

There are various formal versions of computation. We saw finite state machines earlier, and we saw how the set of strings recognised by a machine gives rise to a concept of computable set. However we also saw a fatal drawback to any analysis of computable set in terms of finite state machines: the matching bracket language is not recognised by any finite state machine but is obvious computable in some sense. The problem arises because each finite state machine has a number of states (or amount of memory, to put it another way) that is fixed permanently in advance. The most general kind of computation that we can imagine that we would consider to be computation is deterministic, finite in time and memory but unbounded: no predetermined limit on the amount of time or memory used. There have been various attempts to capture this idea in machinery rigorous enough for one to prove facts about it. The (historically) first of the most general versions is Turing machines. There's also representability by λ-terms. This is a rich and fascinating branch of logic which we cannot treat here: there is too much of it and there are many elegant treatments in print. Another attempt is μ-recursion which we will do in detail below.

What became clear about 60 years ago is that all attempts to formalise the maximal idea of a computable function result in the same class of functions. This gives rise to **Church's thesis**. Although not normally presented as such, Church's thesis is really just a claim that this endeavour to illuminate—by formalisation—our intuitive idea of a computable function has now been completed: we will never need another notion of computable.

How can we be so confident? Well, we have a completeness theorem. All completeness theorems have two legs: a semantic concept and a syntactic concept. The semantic concept in this case is turing-computable or register machine-computable. The syntactic concept is a bit harder. The first attempt at it is **primitive recursive**; we will discover the correct syntactical concept by examining what goes wrong with primitive recursive functions.

6.1 Primitive recursive functions

DEFINITION 34 *The rectype of* **primitive recursive functions** *is the* $\subseteq$*-least class of functions containing the* **initial** *functions which are*

> *The* **successor** *function:* $\lambda n.n+1$*, written* S*;*
> *The* **zero function** $\lambda n.0$*, and*
> *The* **projection** *functions:* $proj_n^m$ *accepts an* m*-tuple and returns its* n*th entry;*

and closed under **composition** *and* **Primitive recursion***:*

$$f(\vec{x},0) := g(\vec{x}); \qquad f(\vec{x},S(y)) := h(\vec{x},y,f(\vec{x},y)) \tag{6.1}$$

We say f is declared by **primitive recursion** *over g and h. Notice that although there is no limit on the number of variables we can compute with, we only recurse on one.*

[HOLE Explain composition: it's fiddly. Same as composition of terms page 41 clause 5. Specifically if $\lambda xy.f(x,y)$ is a primitive recursive function of two variables, then $\lambda x.f(x,x)$ is a primitive recursive function of one variable]

Strictly what we have here is a rectype of *function declarations* rather than *functions*. We will think of function declarations as a kind of function-in-intension and will consider a function(-in-extension) to be primitive recursive if it has a primitive recursive declaration (as a function-in-intension).

Note at the outset that this datatype of function declarations is countably presented (see section 2.1.6) and so has only countably many elements.

The basic functions are in some obscure but uncontroversial sense computable; clearly the composition of two computable functions is computable, and if g and h are in some sense computable then f declared over them by primitive recursion is going to be computable in the same sense. That is why this definition is *prima facie* at least a halfway-sensible stab at a definition of computable function.

We adopt the habit of bundling together all the snail variables (the one you just carry around and don't recurse on) in the style $\vec{x}$.

We need 'y' in the right hand side of the second clause of definition 6.1 because otherwise if it should ever happen that there are n and k such that $f(\vec{x},n) = f(\vec{x},k)$ we will have $f(\vec{x},n+1) = f(\vec{x},k+1)$ and $\lambda n.f(\vec{x},n)$ will be periodic.

Here are some declarations:
(i) Predecessor: $P(0) := 0$; $P(S(x)) := x$.
(ii) Bounded subtraction: $x \dot{-} 0 := x$; $x \dot{-} S(y) := P(x \dot{-} y)$
(iii) Addition: $x + 0 := x$; $x + S(y) := S(x + y)$
(iv) Multiplication: $x \cdot 0 := 0$; $x \cdot (S(y)) := (x \cdot y) + x$.

EXERCISE 40 *Show that if f is primitive recursive so are (i) the function that returns the sum of the first n values of f;*
(ii) the function that returns the product of the first n values of f.

Primitive recursive predicates and relations

A predicate $R(\vec{x})$ is a **primitive recursive predicate** (or relation) iff there is a primitive recursive function r s.t. $r(\vec{x}) = 0 \longleftrightarrow R(\vec{x})$. We can take 1 to be **true** and 0 to be **false** or *vice versa* or 0 to be **true** and all other values to be **false**—it doesn't matter as long as one is consistent. In what follows **true** is 1.

EXERCISE 41 *Show that $\leq$ is a primitive recursive relation.*

If R and S are primitive recursive predicates represented by r and s then
$\neg R$ is represented by $1 \dot{-} r$;
$R \wedge S$ is represented by $r \cdot s$;

$R \vee S$ is represented by $r + s \dot{-} (r \cdot s)$;
$(\exists x \leq z)(R(x, \vec{y}))$ is represented by

$$\prod_{0 \leq x \leq z} r(x, \vec{y}).$$

Bounded universal quantification similarly. (use duality of the quantifiers)

The set of primitive recursive functions is also closed under `if then else`, in the sense that if r is a primitive recursive predicate then `if` R `then` x `else` y is also primitive recursive. Here's why. Declare

$$\texttt{if-then-else}(x, y, 0) := x; \quad \texttt{if-then-else}(x, y, S(n)) := y.$$

`if-then-else` is evidently primitive recursive, and it is mechanical to check that

$$\texttt{if-then-else}(proj(r, x, y)^3_2, proj(r, x, y)^3_3, proj(r, x, y)^3_1)$$

evaluates to x if $r = 1$ and to y if $r = 0$.

Putting this together with the fact that bounded quantification is primitive recursive tells us that functions declared in the style

$$\texttt{if } (\exists x < y) R(x) \texttt{ then } f(x) \texttt{ else } g(x).$$

are primitive recursive, as long as R, f and g are. This is **bounded search**. Hofstader in *Gödel, Escher Bach* memorably calls this "BLOOP".

The order relation on the rectype $\mathbb{N}$ is its engendering relation, the transitive closure of the constructor S. This motivates very sweetly the restricted quantifiers that we have just considered. Before we leave this digression about bounded quantification we must make the point that bounded quantifiers give us an analogue of the Prenex Normal Form theorem.

EXERCISE 42 *Show that any expression in the language of arithmetic is equivalent to one in which all the bounded quantifiers are within the scope of all the unbounded quantifiers. (You may take pairing and unpairing operations to be primitive operations)*

hint: the only hard part is dealing with $(forall x < y)(\exists k)$

In the following questions you may assume that `pair` represents a primitive recursive bijection $\mathbb{N}^2 \to \mathbb{N}$. The following is a standard example:

$$\texttt{pair}(x, y) = ({}^1/_2) \cdot (x^2 + y^2 + 3x + y + 2xy)$$

and `fst` and `snd` the corresponding primitive recursive unpairing functions, (so that $\texttt{fst}(\texttt{pair}(m, n)) = m$, $\texttt{snd}(\texttt{pair}(m, n)) = n$ and $\texttt{pair}(\texttt{fst}(r), \texttt{snd}(r)) = r$).

EXERCISE 43 .

1. *The declaration:*

$$\texttt{Fib}(n+2) := \texttt{Fib}(n+1)+\texttt{Fib}(n);\ \texttt{Fib}(1) := 1;\ \texttt{Fib}(0) := 1.$$

isn't primitive recursive. Find a declaration of this function that is primitive recursive.

2. *The iterate* $\mathrm{It}(f)$ *of* f *is defined by:* $\mathrm{It}(f)(m,n) = f^m(n)$. *Notice that even if* f *is a primitive recursive function of one argument this function of two arguments is not* prima facie *primitive recursive. Show that it is primitive recursive nevertheless.*

   Take $\mathcal{I}$ *to be the inductively defined class of functions containing the successor function* $S(n) = n+1$, *the functions* `pair`, `fst`, `snd` *and closed under composition and iteration. Show that if* $a \in \mathbb{N}$ *and* $G(x,y)$ *is in* $\mathcal{I}$ *and* $H(x)$ *is defined by*
   $H(0) = a$
   $H(n+1) = G(H(n), n)$,
   then $H(x)$ *is in* $\mathcal{I}$. *[Hint: Consider* $\texttt{pair}(H(y), y)$.*]*

EXERCISE 44 *Show that all primitive recursive functions are total by induction on the rectype. The induction step for primitive recursion uses induction over* $\mathbb{N}$.

This means that functions like that which returns n when given $2n$ and fails on odd numbers is not primitive recursive. Nevertheless you will often hear people say—as I say to you now—that you would be extremely unlucky to encounter computable functions that are not primitive recursive unless you are a logician and go out of your way to look for trouble. The resolution of this apparent contradiction is that the function $\lambda n.(\texttt{if}\, n = 2k \,\texttt{then}\, k \,\texttt{else fail})$ is in some sense *coded* by the primitive recursive function which sends $2n+1$ to 0 (meaning `fail`) and sends $2n$ to $n+1$ (meaning n)—and this function *is* primitive recursive.

6.2 μ-recursion

Does the datatype of primitive recursive functions exhaust the class of (total) functions that reasonable people would consider computable? Let's see:

DEFINITION 35 *Ackermann function:*

$$A(0,y) := y+1;\ \ A(x+1,0) := A(x,1);\ \ A(x+1,y+1) := A(x,A(x+1,y))$$

DEFINITION 36 f **dominates** g *if for all sufficiently large* n, $f(n) > g(n)$.

EXERCISE 45 *For every primitive recursive function* $f(\vec{x}, n)$ *there is a constant* c_f *such that*

$$(\forall n \forall \vec{x})(f(\vec{x}, n) < A(c_f, max(n, \vec{x})))$$

(In slang, every primitive recursive function is in $O(Ackermann)$.*)*

(Hint: use induction on the rectype of primitive recursive functions)

EXERCISE 46 *For* **enthusiasts** *only!*[1] *When you are satisfied with your answer to exercise 45—and you should be!—try what follows:*

1. *Write out a definition of a constructor of* **double recursion** *so that you now have a rectype of doubly recursive functions. (Do not worry unduly about how comprehensive your definition is).*

2. *What would a ternary Ackermann function be? Prove that the ternary Ackermann function you have defined dominates all doubly recursive functions in the manner of your proof of exercise 45.*

COROLLARY 37 *The Ackermann function is therefore not primitive recursive.*

... but it is still total!

REMARK 38 *$A(n, m)$ is defined for all $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$*

Proof:
We need to recall that the lexicographic product $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ is a wellorder. This means that we can do wellfounded induction on it. Let $\langle x, y\rangle$ be minimal in the lexicographic order of $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ such that $A(x, y)$ is undefined. It doesn't take long to check that y and x must both be nonzero. But in these circumstances $A(x, y) := A(x - 1, A(x, y - 1))$. Now the pair $\langle x, y - 1\rangle$ is below $\langle x, y\rangle$ in the lexicographic order of $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ so $A(x, y - 1)$ is defined, so we can use the fact that $\langle x - 1, A(x, y - 1)\rangle$ is below $\langle x, y\rangle$ in the lexicographic order of $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ to infer that $A(x - 1, A(x, y - 1))$ must be defined (since $\langle x, y\rangle$ was minimal in the lexicographic order of $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ such that $A(y, x)$ is undefined!) So $A(x, y)$ (which is $A(x - 1, A(x, y - 1))$) is defined after all! Contradiction. ■

The Ackermann function involves recursion on two variables in a way that cannot be disentangled. The point of exercise 46 is that there is also treble recursion and so on. A function is **n-recursive** if it is declared by a recursion involving n entangled variables. Exercise 46 invites you to prove analogues for each n of the facts we have proved about the Ackermann function, namely: for every n there are functions that are n recursive but not $n - 1$-recursive, and one can prove their totality by a wellfounded induction over the lexicographic product $\mathbb{N}^n$. Is every total computable function n-recursive for some n? No it isn't, but I shall not give a proof. It turns out that the correct response to the news brought by the Ackermann function that not every total computable function is primitive recursive is not to pursue 2-recursive, 3-recursive and so on but rather to abandon altogether the idea that computable functions have to be total in order to be computable. For a sensible general theory we need

[1] Then why put it in!? Because it makes a point I shall need to allude to later: read it but don't do it.

to consider **partial** functions.[2] This is because we want unbounded search[3] to be allowed. The new gadget we need is μ-recursion, which corresponds to unbounded search. This is a sensible new constructor to reach for because any strategy for computing g will give rise to a strategy for computing g^{-1}: simply try g with successively increasing inputs starting at 0 and continue until you get the answer you want—if you ever do. The point is that if we have a deterministic procedure for getting values of g we will have a deterministic procedure for getting values of g^{-1}.

> **So we augment the constructors of the rectype of primitive recursive functions by allowing ourselves to declare f by $f(n, \vec{x}) := (\mu y)(g(y, \vec{x}) = n)$, once given g. Then $\mu y.\Phi$ is the least y such that Φ (if there is one) and is undefined otherwise.**

(Notice that the even with this new constructor the rectype of μ-recursive functions is still countably presented)

But there is a catch to this. The unbounded search constructor preserves computability as long as its argument is a total function, but the inverse function that it gives us is not guaranteed to be total itself! Think about inverting $\lambda n.2n$. The result is a function that divides even numbers by 2 and fails on odd numbers. No problem there. For the moment let f be the function that divides even numbers by two and fails on odd numbers. The problem arises if we try to invert f: how do we ever discover what $f^{-1}(3)$ is? It ought to be 6 of course, but if we approach it by computing $f(0)$, $f(1)$ etc., we get stuck because the endeavour to compute $f(1)$ launches us on a wild goose chase. We could guess that the way to compute $f^{-1}(3)$ is to try computing $f(6)$ but we don't want to even think about nondeterminism, because this severs our chain to the anchor of tangibility which was the motivation for thinking about computability in the first place.

The upshot is that we cannot rely on being able to iterate inversion, and we cannot just close the set of primitive recursive functions under the old constructors and this new one, and expect to get a sensible answer. As the $\lambda n.2n$ example shows, FLOOP might output a function that you cannot then FLOOP. Nor can we escape by doctoring the datatype declaration so that we are allowed to apply inversion only to functions satisfying conditions which—like totality—are ascertainable solely at run-time. That would not be sensible.[4]

---

[2] On page 109 we encountered a naturally occurring computable partial function that wasn't *really* partial because there was a computable total function that in some sense encoded the same information. When I write that we must embrace partial functions I mean we must embrace even those partial functions that cannot be coded as total function in the way division by 2 can.

[3] Gödel Escher Bach fans might be helped by a reminder that Hofstader calls unbounded search FLOOP (as opposed to BLOOP which is bounded search).

[4] It is true that one can obtain a declaration of the μ-recursive functions as a rectype by simply adding to the constructors for the primitive recursive functions the declaration:

> If $\phi(\vec{x}, y)$ is a total μ-recursive predicate then $f(\vec{x}) := (\mu y)(\phi(\vec{x}, y) = 0)$ is a

Fortunately it will turn out that any function that we could define by more than one inversion can always be defined by only one.[5] I am going to leave the *precise* definition of μ-recursive up in the air for the moment. We will discover what it is by attempting to prove the theorem that a function is μ-recursive iff it is computable by a Turing machine (or register machine or any of the other paradigmatic architectures).

At first blush it seems odd to formalise computability in such a way that a function can be computable but undefined, but this liberalisation is the key that unlocks computation theory. Perhaps on reflection it isn't so odd after all: all of us who have ever written any code at all know perfectly well that the everywhere undefined function is computable—since we have all inadvertently written code that computes it!

Specifically this enables us to connect syntactic concepts of computability—function declarations—to semantic concepts: computability by machines, to which we now turn.

6.3 Machines

A register machine has

> (i) finitely many registers $R_1 \dots R_n$ each of which holds a natural number; and
>
> (ii) A **program** which is a finite list of **instructions** each of which consists of a **label** and a **body**. Labels are natural numbers, and a body has one of the three forms:
>
> 1. $R^+ \to L$: add 1 to contents of register R and jump to intruction with label L.
> 2. $R^- \to L', L''$: if contents of R is nonzero, subtract one from it and jump to instruction with label L', o/w jump to instruction with label L''.
> 3. `HALT`!

The **output** of the register machine is the contents of register 1 (say!) when the machine executes a `HALT` command. Notice that we don't really specify the number of registers by stipulation but only indirectly by mentioning registers in the instructions in the program. If the program has only 10 lines it cannot mention more than 10 registers and so the machine can be taken to have only 10 registers.

μ-recursive function.

and some writers do this, but this is philosophically distasteful for the reasons given: it makes for a less abstract definition.

[5] Unfortunately this isn't proved by exhibiting an algorithm for eliminating extra inversions: it's less direct than that.

We say that a register machine $\mathfrak{M}$ **computes** a function f iff: for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $f(n)$ is defined iff whenever we run $\mathfrak{M}$ starting with n in register 1 it halts with $f(n)$ in register 1, and does not halt otherwise.

Very important that the register machines can be effectively enumerated. Deeply unimportant how we do this, though one can collect a few hints.[6]

Recall the discussion on page 35. The prime powers trick lets us code lists of numbers as numbers. If we do this the usual list-processing functions `head`, `tail` and `cons` will be primitive recursive. Although it's simultaneously very important that the register machines can be effectively enumerated and deeply unimportant how we do this, there is one fact about how we do it that we will need, and that is that the map from numbers to machines should be recursive in some sense. We can describe a machine completely in a specification language of some kind, because a machine is after all a finite object, and it will have a finite description, and we can have a standardised uniform way of way of presenting these descriptions. The specification language can be written in an alphabet with perhaps 50 characters (alphanumerics and punctuation), so if we identify a machine with its description in the language it can be thought of as a numeral to base 50. This numeral won't just be a *name* of the machine, but an actual *description* of it.

$\mathbb{N}$ is a rectype, and so is the set of machine descriptions in the specification language. The gnumbering function given is nice in the sense that it is a rectype homomorphism.

If a formula is a list of symbols we can define a Gödel enumeration of formulæ by list-recursion as shown in the following `ML` pseudocode. The gnumber of a formula is a number to base 256 (because ASCII codes are numbers below 256!)

```
gnumber h::[ ] = ASCII of h
  |      h:: t  = 256*gnumber(t) + gnumber(h);
```

From now on we are going to assume we have fixed an enumeration of register machines in this style. There is a convention of writing "$\phi_e(n) \downarrow = k$" to mean that the eth machine halts with input n and outputs k. "$\phi_e(n) \uparrow$" means that the eth machine does not halt with input n. In these circumstances we say $\phi_e(n)$ **diverges**.

[6] Indeed it is deeply important that it is unimportant, for this is another *invariance* point:

> "That's very important," the King said, turning to the jury. They were just beginning to write this down on their slates, when the White Rabbit interrupted: "*Un*important, your Majesty means, of course," he said in a very respectful tone, but frowning and making faces at him as he spoke.
>
> "*Un*important, of course, I meant," the King hastily said, and went on to himself in an undertone, "important–unimportant–unimportant–important–" as if he were trying which word sounded best.
>
> Some of the jury wrote it down "important," and some "unimportant". Alice could see this, as she was near enough to look over their slates; "but it doesn't matter a bit," she thought to herself.

6.3.1 The μ-recursive functions are precisely those computed by register machines

An essential gadget is

DEFINITION 39 Kleene's T function: *Input m and i and t, output a list of t states of the mth machine started with input i, one for each time $t' < t$. (The state of a register machine is the tuple of contents of the registers and the current instruction.)*

The output, $T(m, i, t)$, of Kleene's T-function is commonly called a **complete course of computation**. We will assume without proof that T is primitive recursive. The proof would be extremely laborious, but relies merely on checking that all the functions involved in encoding and decoding are primitive recursive. This is plausible because the machines have finite descriptions, and are deterministic. Not only are they deterministic but the answer to the question "what state will it go to next?" can be found by looking merely at the machine and its present state, and not by consulting the positions of the planets or anything else which—however determinate—isn't constrained to happen inside the machine.

This shows that

Theorem 40 *The function computed by the mth machine is μ-recursive.*

In other words: the machine with gnumber m computes the μ-recursive function: $\lambda i.$ the least k such that m started with i halts with output k.

Now for the converse.

Theorem 41 *Every μ-recursive function can be computed by a register machine.*

Proof:

Consider the rectype of functions built up from the initial functions (as in the declaration of primitive recursive functions) by means of composition, primitive recursion and μ-recursion. This class contains all sorts of functions that are undefined in nasty ways because it allows us to invert the results of inversions and the result of inverting a function might not be total—as we have seen. Nevertheless we can prove by induction on this datatype that for every declared function in it there is a register machine that computes it. That is, in the sense that whenever these declarations don't fall foul of common sense by attempting to invert functions that aren't total, the machine that we build does indeed compute the function.

The details of how to glue together register machines for computing f and g into one that computes $f \circ g$ will be omitted, as will the details of how to compose register machines to cope with the primitive recursion constructor, and how to front-end something onto a register machine which computes $f(x, y, \vec{z})$ to get something that computes $\mu x.(f(x, y, \vec{z}) = k)$.

■

This completes the proof of the completeness theorem for computable functions.

6.3.2 A Universal Register machine

Kleene's T function is primitive recursive so there is a machine that computes it. Any such machine can be tweaked into a **universal** or all-purpose machine: one that can simulate all others.

We need two auxilliary functions on core-dumps: `current_instruction`(d) and `register_0`(d), which return the current instruction and the contents of register 0. Also a function `last` which returns the last element of a list would be handy. Easy to check they are all primitive recursive. Once we've got those, we can build a machine which, on being given m and i, outputs:
`register_0`(`last`$(T(m,i,(\mu t)$(`current_instruction`(`last`$(T(m,i,t) =$ `HALT`))))))

which is what the mth machine does on being given i.

(Notice that there is no universal finite state machine!)

One of the intentions behind the invention of computatble functions was to capture the idea of a decidable set. One exploits it in some manner along the following lines. A set is decidable iff it is the range of a computable function. It turns out that that doesn't straightforwardly give us what we want. Suppose we want to know whether or not n is a member of a putatively decidable set, presented as f"$\mathbb{N}$, for some computable function f. If we set our machine that computes f to emit $f(1)$, $f(2)$ and so on, (or even run it in parallel with itself if we are not assuming that f is total) then if n is ideeed a value of f we will learn this sooner or later, but if it isn't, this process will never tell us. However this does at least give us a *verification procedure*: we can detect membership of f"$\mathbb{N}$ in these circumstances even though we are not promised an exclusion procedure. Thus the natural idea seems to be that of a *semi*-decidable set: one for which membership can be confirmed in finite time.

But is this the only way we can exploit computable functions to get a concept of semidecidable set? Being the range of a computable function seems a pretty good explication of the concept of a semideciable set, but then being the set of arguments on which a computabale function halts—$\{n : f(n)\downarrow\}$ seems pretty good too. After all, if $f(n)\downarrow$ then we will certainly learn this in finite time. Fortunately for us, all obvious attempts to capture the concept of semidecidable set using these idea give the same result.

Remark 42 *The following conditions on a set $X \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ are equivalent.*

(i) it is the range of a μ-recursive function;

(ii) it is the set of naturals on which a μ-recursive function is defined;

(iii) it is the range of a μ-recursive function that happens to be total.

Proof:

(i) $\rightarrow$ (iii).

The converse is obvious since (iii) is a special case of (i). The key idea here is that of finite but unbounded parallelism, an important idea which we will now explain.

Suppose X is the range of a computable function f, and $\mathcal{M}$ is a machine that computes f. The idea of autoparallelism is that at stage n we run $\mathcal{M}$ with input `fst` n for `snd` n steps. When we do this with a machine, the effect is that we keep trying the machine with all inputs, continually breaking off and revisiting old inputs—and continually starting computations on new, later inputs—so that every computation is given infinitely many chances to halt. Of course once a computation with input k has halted, we don't revisit it. Therefore at stage n, if `fst` n is an input that has already halted, we procede at once to stage $n+1$.

We run $\mathcal{M}$ in parallel with itself as just described and declare g to be the function that sends an input n to the nth thing output by M when run in parallel with itself. g is total, and clearly it outputs all and only the members of X. (I am ignoring the case where X is finite: check for yourselves that this is safe!)

(i) $\rightarrow$ (ii)

Given a machine $\mathcal{M}$ that outputs members of X we can build a machine $\mathcal{M}'$ that on being given a number n runs $\mathcal{M}$ in parallel with itself as above until it produces the output n: $\mathcal{M}'$ then outputs 0, say (it doesn't matter). $\mathcal{M}'$ is then a machine that halts on members of X and nothing else.

(ii) $\rightarrow$ (i)

Given a machine $\mathcal{M}$ that halts on members of X, we can build a machine that outputs members of X by simply trapping the output of $\mathcal{M}$ and outputting the input instead of the output.

■

Incurable optimists might hope that this autoparallelism might give us a cure to the problem discussed on page 111 in section 6.2. After all there is always the possibility of running g in parallel with itself. Will this help? Although that will turn up an input y to g s.t. $g(y, \vec{x}) = n$ if there is one there is no reason to suppose it will turn up the smallest. Indeed quite which one it turns up will depend on how we have implemented the autoparallel algorithm, so even which functions turn out to be computable will depend on how we implement the algorithm! This is clearly intolerable.

EXERCISE 47 *Suppose that ϕ is a partial function of two arguments.*
(i) Show that there is a partial computable function ψ of one argument such that for each m if there are x with $\phi(x, m) = 0$ then $\phi(\psi(m), m) = 0$. If there are no such x is your $\psi(m)$ defined?
(ii) Show that it is not always possible to take $\psi(m) = \mu x.(\phi(x, m) = 0)$.

See also exercise 3 in section 6.6.

EXERCISE 48 *Show that one can take the total computable function that emits members of our set to be one-to-one.*

DEFINITION 43 *A set satisfying the conditions in remark 42 is* **semidecidable** [7] *A set X is* **decidable** *if X and $\mathbb{N} \setminus X$ are both semidecidable.*

[7] The old terminology is 'recursively enumerable', which is gradually going out of fashion.

"Decidable" is better than "recursive"—the old terminology. "Recursive set" would suggest that there ought to be also "primitive recursive set"—you are one if you are the range of a primitive recursive function. But in fact

EXERCISE 49 *Every decidable set is the range of a primitive recursive function. (Hint: use autoparallelism and Kleene's T function.)*

Note the parallel between the idea of a *regular language* which is the set of strings accepted by a finite state machine, and the idea of a *semidecidable set* which is the set of natural numbers on which a Turing machine will halt.

If X is semidecidable it is $f``\mathbb{N}$ for some total computable f so whenever $n \in X$ there is $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and a finite computation verifying that $f(k) = n$ so that $n \in X$. This finite computation should be thought of as a *proof* or *certificate* in the sense of section 2.1.7, so a semidecidable set of naturals can be thought of as a subset of $\mathbb{N}$ that happens to be a rectype in its own right. Indeed we can take this further: by means of gnumbering every finitely presented rectype can be thought of as a semidecidable set.

We are now in a position to give a slightly more natural version of definition 18. An axiomatisable theory is one with a set of axioms whose gnumbers form a semidecidable set. (It is assumed that the theory only has finitely many rules of inference. Without that condition any theory at all could be axiomatisable as follows: take an empty set of axioms, and for each theorem have a nullary rule of inference whose conclusion is that theorem.)

1. Show that any theory that can be axiomatised with a set of axioms that is semidecidable also has a set of axioms that form a decidable set. (Beware of this question: its proof is very silly)

2. Since Propositional Logic is decidable, the set of falsifiable propositional formulæ over an alphabet is also semidecidable, so it is a rectype. Give a presentation. (I do not know of a particularly sweet answer to this)

It might be felt that the following definition of decidable sets is more natural: X is decidable iff there is a total computable function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \{0, 1\}$ such that $X = f^{-1}``\{1\}$.

EXERCISE 50 *Check that a set is decidable iff there is a total computable function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \{0, 1\}$ such that $X = f^{-1}``\{1\}$.*

The original definition looks more cumbersome and long-winded, but if one starts with the definition of decidable sets given in exercise 50, it is much harder to motivate the concept of semidecidable set and the connection between the two ideas is less clear.

I emphasised that concentrating on partial functions was the conceptual breakthrough: it was that that enabled us to prove the completeness theorem

That notation arises because any set of natural numbers can be enumerated (and *enumerable* or *denumerable* are old words for 'countable'), but not necessarily by a computable function. If the set is enumerated by a *recursive* function, it is *recursively* enumerable.

for computable partial functions. Quite how big a mess we would have got into if we'd stuck with total functions is shown by the diagonal argument:

Theorem 44 *The set of gnumbers of total computable functions is not semidecidable.*

Proof:

Suppose the set of gnumbers of machines that compute total functions were semidecidable. Then there would be a total computable function f whose values are precisely the gnumbers of machines that compute total functions. Indeed let f_n be the function computed by the machine whose gnumber is $f(n)$. Now consider the function $\lambda n.f_n(n) + 1$. This function is total computable, and should therefore be f_m for some m. But it can't be f_m, because its value for argument m is $f_m(m) + 1$ not $f_m(m)$. ■

This should not come as a surprise. Ask yourself: if I am given the gnumber of a machine, can I confirm in finite time that the function computed by that machine is total? At the very least, it is obvious that there is no *straightforward* way of confirming this in finite time. So one shouldn't be surprised that there is in fact no way at all of doing it—in finite time.

6.3.3 Undecidablity of the halting problem

Suppose we had a machine which, on being given a natural number n, decoded it (using the primitive recursive unpairing functions alluded to on page 108) into `fst` n and `snd` n (n_1 and n_2 for short), and then $\downarrow= 0$ if the n_1th machine halts when given input n_2 and $\downarrow= 1$ o/w.

We can tweak this machine (by using something to trap the output) to get something with the following behaviour: On being given n, it decodes it into n_1 and n_2 (`fst` and `snd` of n) and then $\downarrow= 1$ if the n_1th machine diverges on input n_2 (just as before) but diverges if n_1th machine halts when given input n_2.

Front-end onto *this* machine a machine that accepts an input x and outputs `pair`(x, x). We now have a machine with the following behaviour.

> On being given n, it tests to see whether or not the nth machine halts with input n. If it does, it goes into an infinite loop (diverges). If not, it halts with output 1.

This machine is the n_0th, say. What happens if we give it n_0 as input? Does it halt? Well, it halts iff the n_0th machine loops when given input n_0. But it *is* the n_0th machine itself!

Formally we can write $\phi_{n_0}(n_0)\downarrow$ iff (by definition of ϕ_{n_0}) $\phi_{n_0}(n_0)\uparrow$. Notice the similarity with the proof of Cantor's theorem (section 2.1.6)

What assumption can we discard to escape from this contradiction? Clearly we cannot discard the two steps that involve just trapping output and front-ending something innocent onto the hypothesised initial machine. The culprit can only be that hypothesised machine itself! So we have proved

Theorem 45 *The set of numbers* $\texttt{pair}(p,d)$ *such that* p *halts on* d *is not decidable.*

... though it is obviously semidecidable!

From now on we say "computable" instead of 'μ-recursive'. You may also hear people saying "general recursive" or "partial recursive" which mean the same thing. Confusingly you will also hear people talk about functions being *partial recursive* in contrast to being *total recursive*. A set is **decidable** if its **characteristic function**[8] is computable.

DEFINITION 46 *The characteristic function of* $A \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ *is*

$\lambda n.\ \texttt{if}\ x \in A\ \texttt{then}\ 1\ \texttt{else}\ 0.$

... written $\chi(A)$.

6.4 Rice's Theorem

Theorems 44 and 45 are manifestations of a general phenomenon, captured by Rice's theorem. (Though theorem 44 is actually slightly stronger than a special case of Rice's theorem).

Theorem 47 *("The S-m-n theorem")*
There is a computable total function S *such that*

$$\phi_e(a,b) = \phi_{S(e,b)}(a)$$

... *and so on for higher degrees (more parameters).*

This is a corollary of the equality between μ-recursiveness and and computability by register machines: one can easily tweak a machine for computing $\lambda ab.\phi_e(a,b)$ into a machine that, on being given a, outputs a description of a machine to compute $\lambda b.\phi_e(a,b)$.

In turn we get a corollary of this,

COROLLARY 48 The fixed point theorem.
Let $h : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ *be a total computable function. Then there is* n *such that* $\phi_n = \phi_{h(n)}$.

Proof: Consider the map

$$\texttt{pair}(e,x) \mapsto \phi_{h(S(e,e))}(x)$$

This is computable and is therefore computed by the ath machine, for some a. Set $n = S(a,a)$. Then

$$\phi_n(x) =^1 \phi_{S(a,a)}(x) =^2 \phi_a(a,x) =^3 \phi_{h(S(a,a))}(x) =^4 \phi_{h(n)}(x)$$

[8] In other traditions sometimes called **indicator functions**.

(1) holds because $n = S(a, a)$; (2) holds by definition of S; (3) holds by definition of a and (4) holds by definition of n.

Notice that we need h to be total computable.

There is a powerful corollary of this that is a sort of omnibus undecidablity theorem.

Theorem 49 *Rice's theorem*

Let A be a nonempty proper subset of the set of all recursive functions of one variable. Then $\{n : \phi_n \in A\}$ is not decidable.

Proof:

Suppose $\chi(A)$ is computable; we will deduce a contradiction.

Find naturals a and b so that $\phi_a \in A$ and $\phi_b \notin A$. (Not only are there such a and b but we can find them, because $\chi(A)$ is computable.) Since $\chi(A)$ is recursive the following function is also recursive:

$$g(n) := \texttt{ if } \phi_n \in A \texttt{ then } b \texttt{ else } a$$

("wrong way round"!) By corollary 48 there must now be a number n such that $\phi_n = \phi_{g(n)}$. Is ϕ_n in A?

If it is, then (i) $\phi_{g(n)} \in A$ (since $\phi_n = \phi_{g(n)}$) and (ii) $g(n) = b$ by construction of g. But if $\phi_n = \phi_{g(n)}$ then $\phi_{g(n)} \in A$ whence $g(g(n)) = b$ (by construction of g). Now $g(n) = b$ so $g(g(n)) = g(b) = a$. This contradiction shows that $\phi_n \notin A$.

Now try $\phi_n \notin A$. We have (i) $\phi_{g(n)} \notin A$ (since $\phi_n = \phi_{g(n)}$) and (ii) $g(n) = a$ by construction of g. But if $\phi_n = \phi_{g(n)}$ then $\phi_{g(n)} \notin A$ whence $g(g(n)) = a$ (by construction of g). Now $g(n) = a$ so $g(g(n)) = g(a) = b$. This gives a contradiction too, so we must drop our assumption that A was decidable.

■

This theorem is very deep and very important, but the moral it brings is very easy to grasp. It tells us that we can never find algorithms to answer questions about the *behaviour* of programs ("Does it halt on this input?"; "Does it always emit even numbers when it does halt?") on the basis of information purely about the *syntax* of programs ("Every variable occurs an even number of times"). In general, if you want to know anything about the behaviour of a program, you may be lucky and succeed in the short term and in a small number of cases, but in the long run you cannot do better than by just running it.

In particular it has the consequence that it is not decidable whether or not two programs compute the same function(-in-extension). This makes it particularly important to bear in mind that the theory of computable functions is in the first instance a study of function declarations (functions-in-intension) than function graphs.

6.5 Relative computability

Quite early on in the development of the theory of computable functions people noticed that the techniques developed to study computability generalise naturally to enable one to study *relative computability*, what is termed so evocatively

computation relative to an oracle. All one has to do is enhance the machine architecture by adding a state in which the machine consults an oracle, which will be a subset of $\mathbb{N}$, or a function $\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$. This leads one naturally to the study of equivalence classes of functions $\mathbb{N} \rightharpoonup \mathbb{N}$ under the relation of being-equally-computable.

6.6 Exercises

Set an exercise on Trakhtenbrot's theorem. This is a coding proof that won't work in prop calc. Interesting, because for most of these arguments propl calc is sufficient.

1. Are the following three functions computable?

   (To put it more fairly: for each of the following functions-in-intension are there computable functions-in-intension with the same extension?)

   (i) $\lambda x.$ if there is somewhere in the decimal expansion of π a string of exactly x 7's then 0 else 1;
   (ii) $\lambda x.$ if there is somewhere in the decimal expansion of π a string of at least x 7's then 0 else 1;
   (iii) $\lambda k.$ the least n such that all but finitely many natural numbers are the sum of at most n kth powers.

2. Recall from page 10 the idea of the graph of a function. Show that the graph of a total computable function $f : \mathbb{N}^n \to \mathbb{N}$ is a decidable subset of $\mathbb{N}^{n+1}$.
   Is the graph of a partial computable function decidable?

3. Suppose that f is a total computable function satisfying $\forall n. f(n) \leq f(n+1)$. Show that the range of f is a decidable set.
   [Hint: the range of f is either finite or infinite; consider these two cases separately. Be warned that your proof is not constructive!]

4. A **Box of tiles** is a set of square tiles, all of the same size. The tiles have an orientation (top and bottom, left and right) and the edges have colours. The idea is to use the tiles in the box to tile the plane, subject to rules about which colours can be placed adjacent to which, and each box comes with such a set of rules. (Naturally every set of rules includes all the obvious things like: a bottom edge can only go next to a top edge, and so on). So of course the box has infinitely many tiles in it. Nevertheless, the tiles can only be of finitely many kinds. (It's a bit like a scrabble set: only 27 letters but lots of tokens of each)

   With some boxes one can tile the plane. With some one can't. Sketch how to gnumber boxes and explain why the set of gnumbers of boxes that can't tile the plane is a semidecidable set.

5. Let $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ be a strictly order-preserving total computable function. Construct a semidecidable subset A of $\mathbb{N}$ such that (i) for all e, if the domain $\mathrm{Dom}(\phi_e)$ of the eth partial computable function is infinite, then $\mathrm{Dom}(\phi_e) \cap A \neq \emptyset$ (ii) there are at most e elements less than $f(e)$.

   Deduce that there is a semidecidable set B such that $\mathbb{N} \setminus B$ is infinite and contains no infinite semidecidable subset.

6. Is it possible to decide *given that* ϕ_e *is total* whether or not
   (i) $\forall n.\phi_e(n) = 0$?
   (ii) $\exists n.\phi_e(n) \leq \phi_e(n+1)$?
   (iii) $\exists n.\phi_e(n) \geq \phi_e(n+1)$?

7. Any natural substitution function S will have $S(e,n) > e$ and $S(e,n) > n$ for all e and n. Deduce that for any (partial) computable f there are infinitely many e with $\phi_e = f$.

8. Show that the following sets are not decidable.
   (i) $\{e \mid \phi_e$ everywhere undefined $\}$ (ii) $\{e \mid \phi_e$ is total $\}$
   (iii) $\{e \mid \forall i < e.\, (\phi_e(i)\downarrow)\}$ (iv) $\{e \mid \forall i.\, (\phi_e(i)\downarrow \implies i < e)\}$.

9. Is the following true or false? If $h : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ is total computable then there is an e such that ϕ_e is total and $\phi_e = \phi_{h(e)}$.

10. Suppose that $f, g : \mathbb{N}^2 \to \mathbb{N}$ are total computable. Show that there exist i, j with $\phi_i = \phi_{f(i,j)}$ and $\phi_j = \phi_{g(i,j)}$. [Hint: show first that there is a total computable h with $\phi_{h(i)} = \phi_{g(i,h(i))}$.] (Hard)

11. Show that $A \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ is semidecidable just when it is of the form $\{n \in \mathbb{N} \mid \exists m.R(n,m)\}$ for some recursive predicate R.

12. Which of the sets R and their complements $\neg R$ from question 8 are semidecidable?

13. By considering enumerations of the partial computable functions find a partial computable function that cannot be extended to a total computable function.

14. Show that for any operating system whatever there can be no program `IS-SAFE` which when given program p and data d says 'yes' if p applied to d does not corrupt the O/S and 'no' otherwise.

15. (For lambda hackers only) The Church numeral $\mathbf{n}$ is that lambda term representing the function which—when given a function f, returns the function that does f to its argument n times. Thus Church numeral 1 is the identity. Church numeral 0 is K of the identity. Find a lambda term for successor. How do we implement multiplication and addition?

16. (For lambda hackers only) Using the pairing and unpairing lambda terms you discovered earlier and your answer to question 2 show that any primitive recursive function can be represented by a lambda term acting on church numerals.

17. What might a decidable partition of $\mathbb{N}$ be? Show that there is a decidable partition of $\mathbb{N}^3$ s.t. any set monochromatic for it can be used to solve the halting problem.

Chapter 7

Ordinals

The word 'ordinal' has been used for years to denote a kind of number word: there are ordinals and cardinals. Cardinals are words like 'one', 'two', 'three'; ordinals are words like 'first', 'second', 'third'. Although some of the original nature of the difference has been lost in the process of having these words appropriated by mathematics, a significant and important part remains. Ordinal numbers allude to order, and to positions in a sequence. Happily, the best introduction to these ideas is by way of their historically first application.

For reasons we cannot go into here Cantor was interested in the complexity of closed sets in $\Re$. A closed set might be a **perfect** closed set (a union of closed intervals) or it might have some isolated points. If one removes the isolated points from a closed set one might get a perfect set. One might not. It might be that once one removes all the isolated points from a closed set, a point that hadn't been isolated before now becomes isolated. One measures the complexity of a closed set by the number of times one has to perform this operation of deleting isolated points to obtain a perfect closed set. The interesting feature is that even if one performs this deletion infinitely often one is not assured of obtaining a perfect closed set. It's not difficult to construct a closed set containing a point x which is the limit of a sequence $\{x_n\}$ where x_k becomes isolated at stage k. x itself then never gets deleted, but it becomes isolated after infinitely many stages. But all is not lost. After we have performed the deletion operation infinitely many times, we can look at what is left, and perform the deletion operation on that, and thereby continue the process transfinitely. One can hope that eventually a perfect closed set is reached.

Let us now stand back and ask ourselves what it was about this scenario that made it possible to apply this operation transfinitely. All that was needed was that there should be a monotone (increasing or decreasing, it doesn't matter) function from some poset into itself, which is continuous, so that we have a well-defined notion of what-happens-at-a-limit-stage.

Ordinals are now invoked as that-kind-of-number-that-counts-stages. This is turn naturally generates them as a rectype: for any stage there is a just-next stage, and for any increasing sequence of stages there is a supremum stage. The

class of stages thus forms a rectype whose engendering relation is a wellorder.

Since the set of stages of any construction indexed in this way is naturally wellordered by the engendering relation of the rectype of stages of the construction, one is led to consider the isomorphism types of wellorderings. This is another way of thinking of ordinals. These two ways are complementary, and both right. We should now cast our minds back to the two ways we have of thinking of natural numbers. We can think of them as sizes of finite sets, or we can think of them as the members of a certain inductively defined sets. These two ways of thinking about natural numbers correspond to the two ways of thinking of ordinals. Ordinals can be thought of as isomorphism classes of wellorderings, or they can be thought of as members of a rectype.

7.1 Ordinals as a rectype

Lower case Greek letters are used to range over ordinals. Its use in λ-calculus notwithstanding, the letter 'λ' is always liable to a variable ranging over *limit* ordinals in the way that in 'A'-level analysis 'x' and 'y' are ordinate and abcissa or input and output variables, control and state variables ...

We are going to derive ordinal arithmetic in a fairly relaxed and informal way from ordinals constructed as a rectype in a way suggested by the following `ML`-style pseudocode.

```
new_data_type ordinal = 0
                      | succ of ordinal
                      | sup of (chain-of ordinal)
```

The occurrence of the word "chain" in the second clause of course presupposes an ordering, so we must come clean on that, by defining $\leq_{On}$ recursively as follows:

Definition 50 *We start by noting that (as with* $\mathbb{N}$*)* `succ` *is understood to have no fixed points.*

$\alpha \leq_{On} \beta \to \beta \leq_{On} \gamma \to \alpha \leq_{On} \gamma$;
$\alpha \leq_{On} \alpha$;
$\alpha \leq_{On} \beta \leq_{On} \alpha \to \alpha = \beta$;
$0 \leq_{On} \alpha$;
$\alpha \leq_{On} \texttt{succ}\ \alpha$;
$\alpha \leq_{On} \beta \to \texttt{succ}\ \alpha \leq_{On} \texttt{succ}\ \beta$;
$\alpha \in X \to \alpha \leq_{On} \texttt{sup}\ X$;
$(\forall \alpha \in X)(\alpha \leq \beta) \to \texttt{sup}\ X \leq_{On} \beta$.

Naturally we will also want '$\alpha <_{On} \beta$' as short for '$\alpha \leq_{On} \beta \wedge \beta \not\leq_{On} \alpha$'.

The ordinals are very nearly a complete poset, but not quite. The presence off the `succ` operator prevents there being a top element, but every *bounded* chain has a least upper bound. The following exercise is really only for enthusiasts: it's a bit fiddly.

EXERCISE 51 *Show that $<_{On}$ is a wellordering.*

Hint: recycle the proof of Witt's theorem to show it is a total ordering, then use general considerations about rectypes to show it is wellfounded. After all $<_{On}$ is the engendering relation of a rectype and as such is bound to be wellfounded.

Declaring the ordinals like this is a kind of indian rope trick, but it does at least give us a picture of ordinals-as-things-that-count-stages.

Then we define $\alpha + \beta$ recursively by

DEFINITION 51 .

$\alpha + 0 := \alpha$;
$\alpha + \mathtt{succ}\ \beta := \mathtt{succ}\ (\alpha + \beta)$;
$\alpha + \mathtt{sup}\ X := \mathtt{sup}\ \{\alpha + \beta : \beta \in X\}$.

EXERCISE 52 *For all ordinals α and β, $\alpha \leq_{On} \beta$ iff $(\exists\gamma)(\alpha + \gamma = \beta)$*

Now we can procede to define multiplication ...

DEFINITION 52 .

$\alpha \times 0 := 0$;
$\alpha \times \mathtt{succ}\ \beta := (\alpha \times \beta) + \alpha$;
$\alpha \times \mathtt{sup}\ X := \mathtt{sup}\ \{\alpha \times \beta : \beta \in X\}$;

... and exponentiation

DEFINITION 53 .

$\alpha^{0} := \mathtt{succ}\ 0$;
$\alpha^{(\mathtt{succ}\ \beta)} := (\alpha^{\beta}) \times \alpha$;
$\alpha^{(\mathtt{sup}\ X)} := \mathtt{sup}\ \{\alpha^{\beta} : \beta \in X\}$.

Given these definitions it is clear that addition on the right, multiplication on the right and exponentiation on the right, namely the functions $\lambda\alpha.\beta + \alpha$, $\lambda\alpha.\beta \times \alpha$ and $\lambda\alpha.\beta^{\alpha}$ are—for each ordinal β—*continuous* in the sense in which the ordinals are (very nearly) a chain-complete poset.

EXERCISE 53 *Look again at exercise 3.3.2.1.5 which shows that these operations are noncommutative.*

Give examples to show that addition and multiplication on the left are not commutative.

Give an example to show that $\lambda\alpha.\alpha^2$ is not continuous.

Which of the following are true for all α, β and γ?

1. $(\alpha \times \beta)^{\gamma} = \alpha^{\gamma} \times \beta^{\gamma}$;
2. $\gamma^{(\alpha \times \beta)} = \gamma^{\alpha} \times \gamma^{\beta}$;
3. $(\alpha + \beta) \times \gamma = \alpha \times \gamma + \beta \times \gamma$;
4. $\gamma \times (\alpha + \beta) = \gamma \times \alpha + \gamma \times \beta$.

Prove the true assertions and give counterexamples to the false assertions.

We will need later a notion of ordinal **subtraction**. $\alpha - \beta$ is the length of a wellordering obtained from a wellordering of length α by chopping off an initial segment of length β.

EXERCISE 54 *Give a recursive definition of ordinal subtraction, and prove that your definition obeys:* $\beta + (\alpha - \beta) = \alpha$.

We have already invoked a concept of continuity of functions from On (or $(On\ timesOn)$ to On. For the following definition we need to hark back to the idea of the order topology: a set of ordinals is closed iff it contains all its limit points.

DEFINITION 54 *A* **clubset** *is a* **CL***osed and* **U***n***B***ounded set. Alternatively: the range of a total continuous function. (Sometimes called a* **normal** *function).*

Thus a normal function is strictly increasing and continuous. It's obvious that every normal function has a fixed point. If f is normal, then $\sup\{f^n\alpha : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$ is the least fixed point for f above α. In fact:

LEMMA 55 *The function enumerating the set of fixed points of a normal function is also normal.*

Proof: See your answer to exercise 3.1.3 14.

DEFINITION 56 *If* $c_1 \subseteq c_2$ *are two chains in a poset with the same sup we say* c_1 *is* **cofinal** *in* c_2.

Although we will only use this definition in connection with sequences of ordinals, it makes sense in a much more general context: f and g do not have to be wellordered sequences for definition 56 to make sense.

DEFINITION 57 *The cofinality of* α*, written '*$cf(\alpha)$*' is the least ordinal that is the length of a cofinal subsequence of something of length* α.

Thus $cf(\omega) = \omega$, and the cofinality of any successor ordinal is 1.
Notice that the relation 'f is cofinal in g' is *transitive*.

DEFINITION 58 *An ordinal* α *is* **regular** *if* $\alpha = cf(\alpha)$. *Otherwise it is* **singular**.

Clearly cf is idempotent ($cf(cf(\alpha)) = cf(\alpha)$) because of transitivity, so all cofinalities are regular.

I mentioned earlier the important triviality that every normal function has a fixed point. This is true because we can always obtain a fixed point by iterating ω times. This gives us fixed points of cofinality ω, which are typically singular. The assertion that normal functions have *regular* fixed points is a strong ("large cardinal") axiom.

EXERCISE 55 *Prove that ω_1 (the first uncountable ordinal) is regular. You may use the axiom of countable choice.*

(Without AC the only (infinite) ordinal we can prove to be regular is ω, though finding models of ZF where all infinite ordinals are singular is very difficult indeed. Come to think of it, you may well wonder how can you can be sure that there are any uncountable ordinals in the first place—let alone *regular* uncountable ordinals. This is a consequence of a deeply mysterious theorem called **Hartogs' theorem** which will be theorem 100, and states that for every set x there is a wellorderable set y which cannot be injected into x.)

The fact that ω_1 is regular means that we cannot reach it by any countable iteration of a continuous function from On into itself: Think of any operation that takes countable ordinals to countable ordinals iterate it ω times and take the sup, the result is never ω_1—because the way it is generated ensures that it is of cofinality ω!

7.1.1 Cantor's Normal Form Theorem

To prove Cantor's normal form theorem we will need to make frequent use of the following important triviality.

REMARK 59 *If $f : On \to On$ is normal, then for every $\alpha \in On$ there is a maximal $\beta \in On$ such that $f(\beta) \leq \alpha$.*

Proof: Consider the set of β such that $f(\beta) \leq \alpha$, and let β_0 be its sup. By continuity of f, $f(\beta_0) \leq \alpha$ and is clearly maximal with this property. ■

This enables us to prove a normal form theorem for ordinal notations.

If $\alpha < \beta$ then there is a largest γ such that $\alpha^\gamma \leq \beta$ by remark 59. Call this ordinal γ_0. Then $\alpha^{\gamma_0} \leq \beta$. If $\alpha^{\gamma_0} = \beta$ we stop there.

Now consider the case where $\alpha^{\gamma_0} < \beta$. By remark 59 there is a maximal θ such that $\alpha^{\gamma_0} \cdot \theta \leq \beta$. Call it θ_0. If $\alpha^{\gamma_0} \cdot \theta_0 = \beta$ we stop there, so suppose $\alpha^{\gamma_0} \cdot \theta_0 < \beta$. Now $\beta = \alpha^{\gamma_0} \cdot \theta_0 + \delta_0$ for some δ_0. (remember dfn of $<_{On}$).

What we have proved is that, given ordinals $\alpha < \beta$, we can express β as $\alpha^{\gamma_0} \cdot \theta_0 + \delta_0$ with γ_0 and θ_0 maximal. If $\delta_0 < \alpha$ we stop. However if $\delta_0 > \alpha$ we continue, by repeating the above process with α and δ_0.

What happens if we do this? We then have $\delta = \alpha^{\gamma_1} \cdot \theta_1 + \delta_1$, which is to say

$$\beta = \alpha^{\gamma_0} \cdot \theta_0 + \alpha^{\gamma_1} \cdot \theta_1 + \delta_1$$

One thing we can be sure of is that $\gamma_0 > \gamma_1$. This follows from the maximality of θ_0. Therefore, when we repeat the process to obtain:

$$\beta = \alpha^{\gamma_0} \cdot \theta_0 + \alpha^{\gamma_1} \cdot \theta_1 + \alpha^{\gamma_2} \cdot \theta_2 + \ldots \alpha^{\gamma_n} \cdot \theta_n + \ldots$$

we know that the expression can only be finitely long, because the sequence of ordinals $\{\gamma_0 > \gamma_1 > \gamma_2 > \gamma_n \ldots\}$ is a descending sequence of ordinals and must be finite, because $<_{On}$ is wellfounded.

So we have proved this:

Theorem 60 *For all β, and all $\alpha < \beta$, there are $\gamma_0 > \ldots > \gamma_n$ and $\theta_0 \ldots \theta_n$ such that*

$$\beta = \alpha^{\gamma_0} \cdot \theta_0 + \alpha^{\gamma_1} \cdot \theta_1 + \alpha^{\gamma_2} \cdot \theta_2 + \ldots \alpha^{\gamma_n} \cdot \theta_n + \ldots$$

■

If $\alpha = \omega$ all the θ_n are finite. (If any of them were bigger than ω, then the corresponding γ_n would not have been maximal.) This means that we can actually take each θ_n to be 1, by allowing finitely many repeats.

Quite how useful this fact is when dealing with an arbitrary ordinal β will depend on β. After all, if $\beta = \omega^\beta$ then all Cantor's normal form theorem will tell us if we run the algorithm with ω and β is that this is, indeed, the case. Ordinals β s.t. $\beta = \omega^\beta$ are around in plenty. They are called *ϵ-numbers*. They are moderately important because if β is an ϵ-number then the ordinals below β are closed under exponentiation. The smallest ϵ-number is called 'ϵ_0'. For the moment what concerns us about ϵ_0 is that if we look at the proof of Cantor's Normal Form theorem in the case where β is an ordinal below ϵ_0 and $\alpha = \omega$ the result is something sensible. This is because, ϵ_0 being the *least* fixed point of $\lambda\alpha.\omega^\alpha$, if we apply the technique of remark 59 to some $\alpha < \epsilon_0$ the output of this process must be an expression containing ordinals below α.

The following example of a wellordering of length ϵ_0 might help.

The consider those functions obtained by adding to the ring of polynomials in one variable with coefficients in $\mathbb{N}$ the extra operation giving things like x^{x^2+3} from $x^2 + 3$. Order these functions $\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ by domination (see definition 36.) The result is a wellordering of length ϵ_0.

7.2 Ordinals from Wellorderings

Chat about implementation of ordered pairs. Quote Alice again: important that we can do it, deeply unimportant how we do it. Just to nail things down, we will take ordered pairs to be Wiener-Kuratowski.

We will let capitalised variables ('X', 'X'', 'Y' ...) range over sets. Lower case variables ('x', 'y'', 'y' ...) likewise. We will have these two styles—common in set theory—so that we can write '$x \in X$' as usual.

DEFINITION 61 *Given two binary structures $\langle A, R\rangle$ and $\langle B, S\rangle$ we say $\langle B, S\rangle$ is an* **end-extension of** *$\langle A, R\rangle$ if $A \subseteq B$ and $R \subseteq S$ and whenever $y \in A$ and xSy then $x \in A$ too.*

(You will already have discovered this concept in your answer to exercise 2 page 53, and in your answer to exercise 3 page 48.)

For the moment we will be primarily interested in the case where $\langle A, R\rangle$ and $\langle B, S\rangle$ are partial orders—indeed wellorders, and in those circumstances the picture is easy to paint in slogan form: the new members all come after the old members. We will later also be interested in the case where both R and S are $\in$ and in this case the slogan is "New sets—yes; new members of old sets—no!".

In general the concept of end-extension isn't very useful except in connection with models of a theory of a rectype.

HIATUS

The result of concatenating two wellordering is a wellordering. [*HOLE This is disjoint union is ordinal addition*]. We have already met lexicographic orders in definition **??**. We now need to show that if $\langle A, \leq_A \rangle$ and $\langle B, \leq_B \rangle$ are both wellorderings then so is $A \times B$ with the lexicographic ordering. (We saw this in exercise 4.) This is ordinal multiplication. We also have to show that if we have a wellordered family of disjoint wellorderings, then the result of concatenating them all is also a wellordering. (Strictly, if we are going to do this, then we didn't need the same result for addition of two ordinals, but only for S—but never mind)

PROPOSITION 62 *The result of concatenating a wellordered family of disjoint wellorderings is another wellordering.*

Proof. Suppose we are given a family $\langle \mathcal{A}_i : i \in I \rangle$ of structures, where each $\mathcal{A}_i$ is a wellordering, and the index set is wellordered by $\leq_I$. We are also going to suppose that if $i \neq j \in I$ then A_i and A_j are disjoint. We now wellorder the union of all the A_i (written "$A = \bigcup_{i \in I} A_i$") by saying that x precedes y if the A_i that it belongs to is $\leq_I$-earlier than the A_j that y belongs to, or—if they belong to the same A_i—we rule that x precedes y if $x \leq_{A_i} y$. Now we want to be sure that this relation—which we shall write "$\leq_A$"—wellorders A. It is certainly a total order. It remains to be shown that it is wellfounded. Suppose it isn't, and X is a subset of A with no least member in the sense of $\leq_A$. Consider the set of i such that X contains members of A_i. This is a subset of I and so must have an $\leq_I$-least element, i_0, say. Now consider $X \cap A_{i_0}$. [*HOLE a picture would be a great help*]. Now since X has no $\leq_A$-least member we are not about to get a subset of it that does have a $\leq_A$-least member by chopping stuff off the end (though we might have a chance if we were to chop stuff off the beginning) so $X \cap A_{i_0}$ has no $\leq_A$-least element either. But, by virtue of the way we defined it, the restriction of $\leq_A$ to A_{i_0} is just $\leq_{A_{i_0}}$ which is known to be a wellordering, so $X \cap A_{i_0}$ does have a $\leq_A$-minimal member after all, and this must be the minimal member of X that we were after.

■

PROPOSITION 63 *Given two wellorderings $\mathcal{A} = \langle A, \leq_A \rangle$ and $\mathcal{B} = \langle B, \leq_B \rangle$ there is a unique isomorphism between one and an initial segment of the other.*

Proof:

We define the isomorphism by recursion. The idea is that we pair off the $\leq_A$-first member of A with the $\leq_B$ first member of B and thereafter we pair the $\leq_A$-first thing in A (that has not already been used) with the $\leq_B$-first thing in B (that has not already been used). There always *is* a first thing that has not already been used since $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ are wellorderings, so every subset has a first member.

This is usually formalised as a recursion over the ordinals: we define by recursion on On a function that, on being given an ordinal, returns a partial map from an initial segment of $\mathcal{A}$ to an initial segment of $\mathcal{B}$.

However, I prefer to do this directly by constructing over $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ themselves. We consider the class of *partial isomorphisms* between $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$. These are what you might expect: isomorphisms between an initial segment of $\mathcal{A}$ and an initial segment of $\mathcal{B}$. We will also need the concept of *two partial isomorphisms agreeing on their intersection*. We then prove by induction on $\mathcal{A}$ that, for all $a \in A$, if i and j are partial isomorphisms $A \to B$ which are defined at a (i.e., $i(a)$ and $j(a)$ are both defined) then i and j agree on a: i.e., $i(a) = j(a)$. For suppose not. Let a be the $\leq_A$-least element of A such that there are partial isomorphisms i, j from $A \to B$ s.t. $i(a) \neq j(a)$. This must mean that $\mathcal{B}$ has two elements $i(a)$ and $j(a)$ that are equally plausible as mates for a. But this cannot be, since $\mathcal{B}$ is a wellordering and so one of $i(a)$ and $j(a)$ must come earlier than the other and be the only fit mate for a. This means that we can sensibly introduce a notation $a_{\mathcal{B}}$ for the element of $\mathcal{B}$ that a must be paired with. We can do the same for $\mathcal{B}$, so that to $b \in \mathcal{B}$ there should correspond a $b_{\mathcal{A}}$. Notice that there is no reason to suppose that an arbitrary element of $\mathcal{A}$ is in the range of any partial isomorphism: $\mathcal{A}$ might be much longer than $\mathcal{B}$ or *vice versa*. This concentrates our minds on the two functions $\lambda a \in \mathcal{A}.a_{\mathcal{B}}$ and $\lambda b \in \mathcal{B}.b_{\mathcal{A}}$. One or other might be partial instead of total (if $\mathcal{A}$ is longer than $\mathcal{B}$ then $\lambda a \in \mathcal{A}.a_{\mathcal{B}}$ will be partial) but they cannot both be partial. (If they are, they can both be extended).

COROLLARY 64 *No wellordering is the same length as any of its proper initial segments.*

Proof: Apply proposition 63 to the situation where $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ are the same wellordering. It tells us that there is a unique isomorphism between $\mathcal{A}$ and some initial segment of $\mathcal{A}$. If there is only one isomophism there is only one initial segment, and since $\mathcal{A} \simeq \mathcal{A}$ that initial segment must be $\mathcal{A}$ itself.

■

DEFINITION 65 *We define the class of all wellorderings as the intersection of all classes of total strict orderings closed under unions of chains (where the order relation is end-extension) and additions of one extra element on the end.*

Of course it is more usual (and, mostly, more useful) to say that a relation R is a wellordering if it is a wellfounded strict total order as we did earlier, on page 53. By induction on the datatype everything in it is a wellordering. The converse is a bit harder!

EXERCISE 56 *Prove the equivalence of these two definitions of wellordering.*

Either of these two definitions can justify a principle of induction over wellorderings. This principle takes two forms, one arising from each definition. Since the datatype of wellorderings is a rectype we deduce an induction principle

for it in an obvious way. On the other hand there is a principle of wellfounded induction that we can prove for each individual wellordering, namely

> If $\mathfrak{X} = \langle X, <_X \rangle$ is a wellordering, and P a property such that $(\forall x \in X)(\forall y)(y <_X x \to P(y)) \to P(x))$, then $(\forall x \in X)(P(x))$.

Given $\mathfrak{X} = \langle X, <_X \rangle$ and $\mathfrak{Y} = \langle Y, <_Y \rangle$, both wellorderings, we construct the following recursively defined set.

DEFINITION 66 .

1. *$\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}}$ is to be the $\subseteq$-smallest bijection pairing the $<_X$-first member of X with the $<_Y$-first member of Y) and closed under the following operation: if $X' \subseteq X$ and X' is mapped 1-1 onto $Y' \subseteq Y$ by $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}}$ then $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}}$ also pairs $x_{X'}$ with $y_{Y'}$ where $x_{X'}$ is the $<_X$-first element of $X \setminus X'$ and $y_{Y'}$ is the $<_Y$-first member of $Y \setminus Y'$.*
2. *If $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}}$ is defined on the whole of X we write $\mathfrak{X}\underline{\hookrightarrow}\mathfrak{Y}$.*
3. *If $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}}$ is defined on the whole of X but is not onto Y we write $\mathfrak{X} \hookrightarrow \mathfrak{Y}$.*

Theorem 67 *Given any two wellorderings, there is a canonical map from one to an initial segment of the other.*

Proof:
It is an immediate consequence of this definition that anything in X that $<_X$-precedes anything in the domain of $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}}$ is also in the domain of $\mathfrak{X}$, and Y similarly. The only way in which this construction can fail to eat up all of X and Y is if at some stage the X' we are considering, or the Y' we are considering, turn out to be empty. If this happens, we have an isomorphism from one to an initial segment of the other. If it never happens, then $\langle X, <_X \rangle$ and $\langle Y, <_Y \rangle$ are isomorphic. ■

DEFINITION 68 *A structure is rigid if it has no nontrivial automorphisms.*

Theorem 69 *All wellorderings are rigid.*

Proof:
Suppose $\mathfrak{X}$ is not rigid and let x be the $<_X$-minimal member of X that is moved by an automorphism. So for some automorphism π we have $x < \pi(x)$. But then $\pi^{-1}(x) < x$, since π is an automorphism, and then x is not minimal. ■

COROLLARY 70 *Any isomorphism between two wellorderings $\mathfrak{X}$ and $\mathfrak{Y}$ is unique*

Proof:
If we had two distinct isomorphisms f and g between $\mathfrak{X}$ and $\mathfrak{Y}$ then $f \circ g^{-1}$ would be a nontrivial automorphism of $\mathfrak{Y}$. ■

DEFINITION 71 *We say* $\langle X, <_X\rangle$ **canonically injects into** $\langle Y, <_Y\rangle$ *if the canonical bijection* $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}}$ *uses up all of* $\langle X, <_X\rangle$ *and we write* $\langle X, <_X\rangle \underline{\hookrightarrow} \langle Y, <_Y\rangle$.

Thus clearly $\langle X, <_X\rangle$ **canonically injects into** $\langle Y, <_Y\rangle$ iff $\langle X, <_X\rangle \underline{\hookrightarrow} \langle Y, <_Y\rangle$.

PROPOSITION 72 $\underline{\hookrightarrow}$ *is transitive*

Proof: Compose the maps. ■

DEFINITION 73 .

We write '$\mathfrak{X} \simeq \mathfrak{Y}$*' for either of the following:*

1. *The canonical bijection* $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}}$ *is total and onto.*
2. $\mathfrak{X} \underline{\hookrightarrow} \mathfrak{Y} \wedge \mathfrak{Y} \underline{\hookrightarrow} \mathfrak{X}$.

We say of two wellorderings thus related that they are **of the same length**.

We had better show that these two clauses are equivalent.

$1 \to 2$. The first conjunct is immediate. The second comes from the fact that the inverse of a canonical bijection that is iso is also a canonical bijection.

$2 \to 1$. The composition of two canonical bijections is another canonical bijection. So $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}} \circ \underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{Y}\to\mathfrak{X}}$ is $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{X}}$. But this is onto X, so $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}}$ must have been onto Y. This is 1.

It is true that in this development we have not taken isomorphism as a primitive of this language, because it is convenient to approach it via the uniqueness theorem, corollary 70, but let us for the moment imagine we had taken it as primitive. We can then write $\mathfrak{X} \underline{\hookrightarrow} \mathfrak{Y}$ if $(\exists \mathfrak{X}')(\exists \mathfrak{Y}')(\mathfrak{X}' \simeq \mathfrak{X} \wedge \mathfrak{Y}' \simeq \mathfrak{Y} \wedge \mathfrak{X}' \subseteq_e \mathfrak{Y}')$. This relation is a preorder, and we can extract an equivalence relation from it as usual, and that equivalence relation is—the relation $\simeq$ we first thought of. This is the same state of affairs we found with cardinal arithmetic.

We end up where we started because of the Schröder-Bernstein theorem (as it is known in the cardinal case). The analogous statement for the ordinal version of $\hookrightarrow$ is much more trivial and has just been proved in the discussion following definition 73.

LEMMA 74 $\simeq$ *is an equivalence relation.*

Proof:

(i) $\simeq$ is reflexive because of the identity map.

If $\mathfrak{X} = \langle X, <_X\rangle$ we prove by induction on $<_X$ that $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{X}}$ is the identity. This is because the identity relation restricted to X is one of the family of bijections of which $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{X}}$ is defined to be the least.

(ii) $\simeq$ is transitive. (compose the maps)

(iii) $\simeq$ is symmetrical. (take the inverse)

■

The emergence of this isomorphism relation enables us to say what ordinal arithmetic is. **(First order) Ordinal arithmetic is the study of those relations between wellorderings for which $\simeq$ is a congruence relation.**

LEMMA 75 *No two distinct initial segments of a wellordering are the same length.*

Proof: We will prove the following assertion by $<_X$ induction on 'x':

$$(\forall y)((\langle\{z \in X : z <_X y\}, <_X\rangle \simeq \langle\{z \in X : z <_X x\}, <_X\rangle) \longleftrightarrow x = y)$$

Pick x in X $<_X$-minimal so that there is y in X such that $x \neq y$ but $\langle\{z \in X : z <_X y\}, <_X\rangle \simeq \langle\{z \in X : z <_X x\}, <_X\rangle$. Then pick y minimal so that $x \neq y$ but $\langle\{z \in X : z <_X y\}, <_X\rangle \simeq \langle\{z \in X : z <_X x\}, <_X\rangle$. By hypothesis, x and y are distinct, so one must be $<_X$ the other. Suppose it is x, without loss of generality. But then the initial segment bounded by x is isomorphic to two distinct initial segments of $\mathfrak{X}$ contradicting corollary 70.

LEMMA 76 $\hookrightarrow$ *is wellfounded.*

Proof:

Suppose A is a nonempty set of wellorderings such that no member of it injects into all the others. Let $\mathfrak{X} = \langle X, <_X\rangle$ be an arbitrary member of A. Since A has no element that injects into all others, there are at least some $\mathfrak{Y} = \langle Y, <_Y\rangle$ such that when we construct the canonical injection $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{Y}\to\mathfrak{X}}$ from $\mathfrak{Y}$ to $\mathfrak{X}$, there are bits of X that are not in the range of the canonical bijection. Let X' be the collection of elements x of X such that, for some $\langle Y, <_Y\rangle$, x is not in the range of the canonical injection $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{Y}\to\mathfrak{X}}$.

We will show that X' has no least member under $<_X$. Suppose it does, and x is the $<_X$-least element of X'. Then, for some $\mathfrak{Y} \in A$, x is the first thing not in the range of $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{Y}\to\mathfrak{X}}$. But then $\mathfrak{Y}$ injects into every wellordering in A, contradicting the assumption that there is no such $\mathfrak{Y}$.

■

More graphically (because of the connexity of $\hookrightarrow$ (theorem 67) every nonempty set X of wellorderings has a member that canonically injects into all members of X.

Now let us demonstrate a few elementary facts about wellorderings.

REMARK 77 *If there is an order-preserving embedding $\pi : X \to Y$ then $\langle X, <_X\rangle$ canonically injects into $\langle Y, <_Y\rangle$.*

Proof: We know that $(\forall x \in X)((\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}})(x) \leq \pi(x))$ because $(\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}})(x)$ is the *least* thing in Y not in the range of $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}}$ restricted to $\{w \in X : w <_X x\}$, whereas all we know about $\pi(x)$ is that it is one of the things in Y not in the range of $\underline{\hookrightarrow}_{\mathfrak{X}\to\mathfrak{Y}}$ restricted to $\{w \in X : w <_X x\}$. ■

Remark 77 actually characterises wellorderings in the sense that

EXERCISE 57 *A linear ordering $\mathfrak{X}$ is a wellordering iff every linear order that can be embedded in $\mathfrak{X}$ is isomorphic to an initial segment of $\mathfrak{X}$.*

We saw a definition of ordinal exponentiation earlier. There is an alternative characterisation of ordinal exponentiation that is natural and connected to topics that will arise later. Let $\langle A, \leq_A \rangle$ and $\langle B, \leq_B \rangle$ be wellorderings of length α and β respectively. Partially order the set of functions **with finite support**[1] from B to A by the **colex** ordering: $f < g$ iff at the **last** argument where they differ the value of f is less than the value of g.

EXERCISE 58 *Check that this is indeed a wellordering of the functions $B \to A$ with finite support and is of length α^β.*

Give an example to show that if we had ordered these functions by first difference instead of last the result wouldn't always be a wellorder.

7.2.1 Cardinals pertaining to ordinals

DEFINITION 78 *An* **initial** *ordinal is one such that the domain of any wellordering of that length is larger than the domain of any wellordering of any shorter length.*

Here of course by 'larger' we mean that there is an injection going one way but no injection (not just no order-preserving injection) going the other way.

Assuming AC we can generalise exercise 55 to show that for every ordinal α the $\alpha + 1$th initial ordinal is regular. (This is standard set theory but we won't need it).

Although this definition relies on the conception of ordinals as isomorphism types of wellorderings this won't cause much difficulty for the reader as the only initial ordinals we need to think about are—apart from the finite initial ordinals!—ω and ω_1. the first uncountable ordinal. (In the Von Neumann implementation of ordinal and cardinal arithmetic in *ZF*C initial ordinals implement cardinals.) Ordinals below ω are typically identified with natural numbers. The set of countable ordinals is sometimes called the **second number class**. This expression is Cantor's. (The *first* number class is of course $\mathbb{N}$!)

Assuming **full** AC (as is common in the study of wellfounded sets) every cardinal corresponds to a unique initial ordinal. The $\alpha + 1$st (infinite) initial ordinal is ω_α ($\alpha+1$st because we start counting at '0' so $\aleph_0$ is the first aleph. We **always** omit the subscript '0' in 'ω_0'!) and the corresponding cardinal number is $\aleph_\alpha$.

This notation makes sense even without AC. A cardinal of a wellorderable set is called an $\aleph$ and the collection of alephs is naturally wellordered. The αth aleph is notated '$\aleph_\alpha$'. Remember that 0 is the least element of $\mathbb{N}$, so the first aleph is $\aleph_0$!

[*HOLE Usual dire warning about the difference between ω^ω and ${\aleph_0}^{\aleph_0}$.*]

Next we show

Theorem 79 *Cofinalities are initial ordinals.*

[1] this means "on all but finitely many arguments the function takes value 0".

Proof: Fix $\langle X, \leq_X \rangle$ a wellordering of length ζ, with ζ regular. Suppose further that κ is the initial ordinal corresponding to ζ and $\kappa < \zeta$. We will obtain a contradiction. We enumerate X (in a different order) as a κ-sequence: $\langle X, \leq_\kappa \rangle$. Delete from X any element which is $\leq_X$ something which is $\leq_\kappa$ of it. What is left is a subset of X cofinal in X in the sense of either ordering and which is of length κ at most, contradicting regularity of ζ ■

So every regular ordinal is initial. So every countable ordinal $> \omega$ is singular. So it has smaller cofinality. This cofinality cannot be a smaller countable ordinal $> \omega$ because cofinality is idempotent. So

REMARK 80 *Every countable limit ordinal has cofinality ω.*

The successor ordinals of course have cofinality one!

■

7.2.2 Time for some exercises

These need to be divided up

1. Look at your answer to exercise 5, p. 28. What is the rank of the well-founded relation you discovered?
2. Use Cantor Normal forms to show that every ordinal can be expressed as a sum of powers of 2.
3. The class of wellorderings is closed under substructure and cartesian product.
4. The end-extension relation between wellfounded binary structures is well-founded.
5. The transitive closure of a wellfounded relation is wellfounded.
6. Complete the proof of the recursion theorem: theorem 3.
7. Look again at exercise 3 from chapter 3. You should now be able to do the following proof, which is slightly more standard. Turn G upside-down. It has a wellfounded part (which is the part on which you can define a rank function in the manner of theorem **??** below). Use the recursion theorem to define a map from the wellfounded part of G to $\{\mathtt{I}, \mathtt{II}\}$. Use the fact that all infinite plays are won by player `II` to show that one of the two players has a winning strategy.

7.3 Rank

We first encountered ordinals in the way Cantor did, as the kind of number appropriate for counting the stages of processes of transfinite length. But not

all transfinite processes have stages that are linearly ordered by the prerequsite relation. It isn't hard to imagine that there could be processes whose prerequiste relation was something like that in the Hasse diagram of figure 7.1, where actions taken at stages further up the page rely on the successful completion of actions taken lower down the page on the same line. If the processes (the bottom points of the Hasse diagram) are all started simultaneously and run in parallel then at stage ω we will be able to do the task located at point x.



Figure 7.1: A relation of rank ω

Suppose we have defined a function f by recursion on the relation whose Hasse diagram is in figure 7.1. How long does it take us to compute $f(x)$? Well,

the recursion tells us to call f on all the immediate predecessors of x. These predecessors are nicely presented in such a way that computing the nth lets us in for a nest of subroutine calls of length n. Thus (assuming as we will that we can call simultaneously as many copies of this program as we like) after infinitely many steps we will have evaluated all of them and in one more step we will have computed $f(x)$. We would like to have some more information about what sort of infinity this is. Now look at the following tree

Suppose we have defined a function f by recursion on the relation whose Hasse diagram is in figure 7.2. How long does it take to compute $f(y)$? Clearly one step longer than it took us to compute $f(x)$, in the sense that we compute $f(y)$ *after* (one stage after) we compute $f(x)$. So the kind of infinite number we are dealing with is one that gets larger when you add 1! Notice that infinite cardinal numbers do not have this property (though finite ones do: exercise **??** tells us that $(\forall n \in \mathbb{N})(n \neq S(n))$ since if we add an extra element to $\mathbb{N}$ we obtain a set the same size as $\mathbb{N}$. This makes it clear that we are dealing with a different sort of number altogether. It also introduces us to the notion of the *rank* of a wellfounded relation.

What we are after is a parameter (" nastiness") associated with points x in the domain of R that tells us how hard it is to compute $f(x)$. Clearly for these purposes all R-minimal elements are equivalent, and have nastiness 0. The nastiness of any element is at least as big as the nastinesses of its R-ancestors. Of course the complexity of the computation of $G(x, \emptyset)$ might well depend on x but we are interested only in the contribution to the complexity made by R. Thereafter two points x and x' have the same nastiness as long as their R-ancestors are equally nasty. The thinking behind this is that since we are also assuming unbounded parallelism the *number* of R-ancestors of x has no effect on the nastiness of x: the only thing about them that matters is how nasty they are.

This function we have just defined is called *rank*, usually written with a 'ρ'.

DEFINITION 81 *If R is a wellfounded relation we define ρ by recursion on R: $\rho(x) = sup\{(\rho(y)) + 1 : R(y, x)\})$.*

An illustration is in order. Consider $\mathbb{N}$, with the usual wellfounded relation $<_{\mathbb{N}}$ on it. What is ρ of 0? It is the sup of $\{(\rho(y)) + 1 : y < 0\}$. This set is empty, and the sup of the empty set is 0. (0 is the smallest thing in $\mathbb{N} \geq$ everything in the empty set.) $\rho(1)$ is now $\{(\rho(y)) + 1 : y < 1\}$. There is only one thing below 1, namely 0, and $\rho(0) + 1$ is 1. So, $\rho(n) = n$ (by induction!) This is a trivial example, but it is only an illustration.

In fact we have two natural ways to think of a rank function. We can either (as we have just done) define a rank function for each wellfounded structure, so that it is a function that accepts elements of that structure and returns ordinals. The other thing we can do is associate with each structure the smallest ordinal that is not the rank (in the first sense) of any element of the structure. This we can think of as *the rank of the structure.*

EXERCISE 59 *Show that if $\langle X, R\rangle$ is a wellfounded structure then the rank of any point y in X is the same as the rank of $\langle {}^*R^{-1}\text{“}\{y\}, R\restriction {}^*R^{-1}\text{“}\{y\}\rangle$.*

We are not going to make any use of ranks here, beyond pointing out that we have for any wellfounded relation R a function from $dom(R)$ to the ordinals. What this means is that just as $\mathbb{N}$ has a privileged position among inductively defined sets (any induction over an inductively defined set with first-order generating function can be thought of as an induction over $\mathbb{N}$) so $\langle On, \leq_{On}\rangle$ has a corresponding special position among wellfounded relations: any induction over wellfounded relations can be thought of as an induction on rank. Thus instead of doing induction over some wellfounded relation R to prove that everything in $dom(R)$ is ψ (where the induction hypothesis is "all R-predecessors of x are ψ" and we conclude "x is ψ"), we prove by induction on rank that everything in $dom(R)$ is ψ (where the induction hypothesis is "everything of rank $< \alpha$ is ψ" and we conclude "everything of rank α is ψ").

Theorem 82 *If $\mathfrak{M}$ is a rectype with carrier set M and with constructors of finite arity, then $\langle M, R\rangle$ where R is the engendering relation of $\mathfrak{M}$ is of rank precisely ω.*

Proof:
This is because any element of an inductively defined structure, no matter how many founders or generating functions there are, is obtained by some finite number of applications of those functions to the founders. That is to say, we prove by structural induction on the structure that all its elements have finite rank. Indeed we define the rank by a recursion.

■

We cannot say much about the ranks of the engendering relations on rectypes that do not have finite character.

We first encountered ordinals here as values of a parameter measuring lengths of computations with infinite parallelism (" nastiness"). This is not the only way in which people other than Set theorists can naturally bump into them. Consider a computer system for storing sensitive information like people's credit information, or criminal records, and suchlike. It is clearly of interest to the subjects of these files to know who is retrieving this information (and when and why), and there do exist systems in which each file on an individual has a pointer to another file which contains a list of the the userids of people accessing the head file, and dates of those accesses. One can even imagine people wishing to know who has accessed *this* information, and maybe even a few steps further. A well-designed system would be able to allocate space for new and later members of this sequence of files as new reads by users made this necessary. These files naturally invite numerical subscripts. The system controllers might wish to know how many files had been generated by these reads, and know how rapidly new files were being generated, or what statistical relations existed between the number of reads at each level. This information would have to be stored in a file too, and the obvious subscript to give this file is ω. (It wouln't be sensible

to label it 'n', for n finite (even if large) because there is always in principle the possibility that we might generate n levels of data files.) Then we start all over again, with a file of userids and dates of people who have accessed the ωth file. Thus we can imagine a system where *even though there are only finitely many nonempty files* some of those files naturally have transfinite ordinals as subscripts.

Under any homomorphism of binary structures the image of a bad (no minimal elements) subset is also bad, so a homomorphic image of an illfounded sructure is also illfounded. This shows:

REMARK 83 *A binary structure is wellfounded iff it admits a homomorphism onto a wellordering.*

Do not worry about getting a formal proof of this until after we have understood the axiom scheme of replacement.[2]

EXERCISE 60 *Verify that the functions $+$ and $\times$ defined by the recursions above correctly measure the lengths of the wellorderings given by concatenation and cartesian product as above.*

There is even a synthetic version of ordinal exponentiation, though it is far from obvious. If we have wellorderings $\langle A, \leq_A \rangle$ and $\langle B, \leq_B \rangle$ of length α and β respectively then we can form a wellordering of length α^β as follows. Let the first element of $\langle B, \leq_B \rangle$ be 0_B. Then consider the set of maps f from A to B with the property that $f(a) = 0_B$ for all but finitely many $a \in A$. Then order this lexicographically.

EXERCISE 61 *Prove that this wellordering is of length α^β*

It would be nice to have natural examples of wellorderings of lengths other than ω. $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ ordered lexicographically is of length ω^2. And, in general, $\mathbb{N}^n$ ordered lexicographically is of length ω^n. We can wellorder the set of all finite lists of natural numbers to a longer length than this by a variant of the lexicographic ordering, but the definition is forgettable because of complications to do with deciding how to compare lists of different length. In some ways a simpler way to present these ordinals is through wellorderings of polynomials by dominance. (see definition **??**). Consider quadratics: $\lambda x.(ax^2 + bx + c)$ and order them by dominance. It is fairly clear that $\lambda x.(ax^2+bx+c)$ is dominated by $\lambda x.(a'x^2+b'x+c')$ iff $\langle a, b, c \rangle$ comes below $\langle a', b', c' \rangle$ in the lexicographic order of $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$. So the set of quadratics, ordered by dominance, is of length ω^3. In

[2] It's just as well this theorem is true. If it weren't then the lecturer's linearisation problem might have unsolvable instances. As it is, once one has arranged things so that the *prerequisite* relation on material for a course is wellfounded, one can wellorder what one wants to write. (The prerequisite relation might be a partial order, but we have to refine it to a total order because time is totally ordered.) If this weren't true, wellfoundedness of the prequisite relation would not be a sufficient condition for explainability! The fact that it is a *neccessary* condition for explainability bears a bit of reflection. Just think—all those areas of knowledge that will never be known because the prerequisite relation restricted to them is not wellfounded ... !

fact this holds for polynomials of higher degree as well, so the set of polynomials of degree n, ordered by dominance, are of length ω^{n+1}. Finally the set of all polynomials (ordered by dominance) will be of order $\omega + \omega^2 + \omega^3 \ldots + \omega^n \ldots$ What is this ordinal? Well, $\omega^n + \omega^{n+1}$ is the same as ω^{n+1}, so it is simply the sup of all these ordinals, which, by definition, is ω^ω. Of course we could have got straight the definition of the wellordering of finite sequences of natural numbers for another presentation of ω^ω but this advantage of this version is that it can be easily upgraded. Consider now not the set of polynomials with coefficients in $\mathbb{N}$ but the much larger class of functions obtained by allowing exponentiation as well, so we can have expressions like

$$e^{e^x+x^3+x} + e^{x^{50}} + x^{200} + 137.x^3$$

and consider what happens if we try to order *these* by dominance.



Figure 7.2: A relation of rank $\omega + 1$

Chapter 8

Set Theory

The semantical and Logical paradoxes. Sets as properties-in-extension. Well-founded sets. Zermelo and Zermelo-Fränkel. Limitation of size, collection and replacement. Rank and the Von Neumann hierarchy. Hartogs' theorem and the existence of rectypes. The reflection principle. Independence of the axioms: foundation, power set, replacement.

when do we implement ordered pairs?

8.1 Prologue

Set theory is the first-order theory of equality and one extensional binary relation, and its importance in twentieth century mathematics arises from the fact that any mathematical language can be interpreted in it, with varying felicitousness. Indeed that is the chief reason why many mathematicians feel they have to know at least some set theory. Many people (including a lot of set theorists) feel that the importance of Set Theory's status as the posessor of a universal language for mathematics has been exaggerated, and set theory should be regarded a a branch of mathematics like any other—except more fun.

An extensional relation ("Two things related to the same things are the same thing") on a set X can be thought of as an injective map from X into $\mathcal{P}(X)$ (notation!). The word 'extensional' has a long and relevant history which I went over on page 10.

Sets are the simplest extensions.

The fact that everything can be expressed in Set Theory causes it to be the natural site for the manifestation of foundational problems, and it is in a course like this that you will encounter them. That doesn't mean that (*pace* the American Mathematical Society's classification scheme which has things like "Logic and foundations") foundational problems are problems of set theory, merely that set theorists worry about them more than other people do.

8.2 The paradoxes

It's because of the paradoxes that we need an axiomatic approach.

Ramsey's distinction between the *semantical* and the *logical* paradoxes is roughly that between those that can and those that can't be easily formalised.

Naïve set theory is the axiom of extensionality—the assumption that $\in$ is extensional—and the axiom scheme of naïve comprehension.

$$(\forall \vec{x})(\exists y)(\forall z)(z \in y \longleftrightarrow \Phi)$$

with 'y' not free in Φ. (Why does this last clause matter? because o/w we could take Φ to be '$z \notin y$'!)

The most famous is Russell's paradox, but there is also Berry's paradox, Grelling's paradox, Mirimanoff's paradox and the Burali-Forti paradox. Let's start with the semantic paradoxes.

Berry

Berry's paradox is the paradox of the smallest integer not definable in at most 19 syllables.

Grelling and the Barber

Grelling's paradox is the paradox concerning the word "heterological". A word is *autological* if it is true of itself ("short", "english") and *heterological* if it isn't ("long", "german"). We get a paradox if we ask whether or not 'heterological' is heterological. The status of "autological" seems obscure too. This is a semantic paradox not a logical paradox, in Ramsey's terms. This becomes clear if you think about the word 'italicised', which makes it clear that we have to consider use-mention and type-token distinctions carefully.

The paradox of the Barber is, like Grelling's paradox, another presentation of Russell's paradox. In a certain village lives a barber who shaves all those men (and only those men) who do not shave themselves. The usual answer is that of course (!) there is no such village. Another answer could be that the barber is a woman. Perhaps the best answer is that the barber lives outside the village.

Cantor's paradox

Cantor's paradox arises from Cantor's theorem from section 2.1.6, so we'd better have another look at that first.

Set theory seems to be a counterexample to the distinction between first-order and higher-order. The reason why set theory appears to violate this distinction is that according to set theory, everything is a set! To clarify this we have to distinguish between arbitrary subsets of the structure we have in mind, and those subsets that are coded in the structure in some way. In the case of a model of set theory, there is an obvious way in which subsets are coded: the model has elements, and a relation $\in$. A subset X of the model M is coded

by x_0 iff for all y in M, y is in X iff $y \in x_0$. Cantor's theorem tells us that however we cook up the $\in$-relation of M, there are always subsets which remain uncoded.

Cantor's paradox is now the assertion that, because $\mathcal{P}(V) = V$ but there is no surjection $X \to \mathcal{P}(X)$, there is no surjection $V \to V$, though of course there obviously is! This leads us straight to

Russell's paradox

because it was by examining the proof of Cantor's theorem in the case where the cardinal number being considered is $|V|$ that Russell discovered the paradox that bears his name. Try it yourself: the obvious surjection $V \to V$ is $\lambda x.x$, and that way the C of the proof of theorem 6 turns out to be $\{x : x \notin x\}$.

EXERCISE 62 *Show that the collection* $\{x : \neg\exists y(x \in y \in x)\}$ *cannot be a set.*

Show further that For each n *there is a paradox about* $\{x : x \notin^n x\}$. *(Russell's paradox is the case* $n = 1$ *and the paradox just mentioned is* $n = 2$*).*

These all seem to be the same. There is a '∞' version, known as Mirimanoff's paradox. This concerns the collection of all wellfounded sets.

I shall print it in small letters because it's a bit *recherché*.

Mirimanoff's Paradox

The usual way to present this paradox uses the "wrong" definition of wellfoundedness from page 27: R is wellfounded if there is no sequence $\langle x_n : n \in \mathbb{N}\rangle$ of elements of the domain of R so that $\forall n\ R(x_{n+1}, x_n)$. We say that a *set* x is wellfounded if there is no sequence $\langle x_n : n \in \mathbb{N}\rangle$ $\forall n\ x_{n+1} \in x_n$ with $x_1 = x$. We obtain a paradox by asking whether the collection of wellfounded sets is itself wellfounded.

A more arresting way of presenting Mirimanoff's paradox is due to Bill Zwicker. Consider the collection of all games in which all plays are of finite length. (A game need not have a finite bound on the lengths of its plays to belong to this set). *Hypergame* is the following game. Player `I` picks a game of finite length, which `I` and `II` then procede to play, `II` starting. A paradox arises if we ask whether or not Hypergame is a game of finite length.

The Liar Paradox

The last of the paradoxes is of course also the first: "I am lying". Prior has an interesting non-paradoxical version:

EXERCISE 63 "Everything I say is false". *Why is it not paradoxical: what does it prove? For discussion of this see Prior op. cit.*

Yablo's paradox

makes a point about illfoundedness of subformula relation. see the article on page `http://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~tf/`

Notice the similarities with the proof of the unsolvability of the halting problem. My *Doktorvater* used to say that Euclid's proof of the infinitude of the set of primes was a diagonal argument.

8.3 Axioms for Set theory with the axiom of foundation

This should really be subtitled *Safe Sets*.

The paradoxes in naïve set theory are intolerable, and if we are to use set theory we will have to explicitly axiomatise it to get a system (or systems) which we can use without fear of contradiction.

The most widely touted solution to the problem—and the only one we will have time for in this book—is to pretend that there are no sets except well-founded sets. What is a wellfounded set? The best answer declares the well-founded sets as a rectype:

DEFINITION 84 *The empty set is a wellfounded set; every collection of well-founded sets is a wellfounded set. Nothing else is a wellfounded set.*

This gives us a formal-looking definition of WF, namely

DEFINITION 85 $WF := \bigcap\{Y : \mathcal{P}(Y) \subseteq Y\}$

It has to be admitted that this definition ought to be vacuous: Cantor's theorem tells us that $\{Y : \mathcal{P}(Y) \subseteq Y\}$ is empty. The problem lies in the arity of the constructor: set-of is not of finite arity, nor countable, nor of bounded arity at all. However at this stage we are merely trying to find out what assumptions we have to make in order to do the things we want to do, and this discussion will be carried out in naïve set theory. We need to wade through this stage in order to reach the axioms! We discover what axioms we need by noting what we do. At any rate this is obviously the correct definition of wellfounded set.

There are two basic facts which we will need frequently, and we had better have right at the outset a proof that they follow from this definition.

LEMMA 86 *If every member of x is wellfounded, so is x.*

Proof: Suppose every member of x belongs to all X such that $\mathcal{P}(X) \subseteq X$. Then $x \subseteq X$ for all X such that $\mathcal{P}(X) \subseteq X$. Then $x \in \mathcal{P}(X)$ for all such X, whence $x \in X$ for all such X and x is wellfounded as desired. ■

LEMMA 87 *Every member of a wellfounded set is wellfounded.*

If x is wellfounded, and X is an arbitrary set satisfying $(\forall y)(y \subseteq X \to y \in X)$ then obviously $x \in X$. It will suffice to show that $x \subseteq X$ as well.

Suppose $x \not\subseteq X$. We will show that $\mathcal{P}(X) \setminus \{x\} \subseteq (X \setminus \{x\})$, whence $x \in (X \setminus \{x\})$ (since x is wellfounded). This is impossible.

Suppose $y \subseteq (X \setminus \{x\})$. Then $y \subseteq X$ and $y \in X$. To deduce $y \in (X \setminus \{x\})$ it will suffice to show $y \neq x$, which would follow from $x \not\subseteq (X \setminus \{x\})$. But we have assumed that $x \not\subseteq X$ so *a fortiori* $x \not\subseteq (X \setminus \{x\})$. ■

COROLLARY 88 *Every subset of a wellfounded set is wellfounded*

The collection of wellfounded sets is the intersection of all Y such that $\mathcal{P}(Y) \subseteq Y$. This means that if we have a property ϕ such that every collection of things that are ϕ is a set that is itself ϕ, then everything in the collection of wellfounded sets is ϕ. That is to say, the following is a good rule of inference:

$$\frac{(\forall y)(y \in x \ \to \psi(y)) \to \psi(x)}{(\forall x \in WF)(\psi(x))}$$

Now if every set is wellfounded (so $WF = V$) this simplifies to

$$\frac{(\forall y)(y \in x \ \to \psi(y)) \to \psi(x)}{(\forall x)(\phi(x))}$$

This is $\in$-induction.

We can also prove by $\in$-induction that every set is a member of WF. This is pretty easy: take $\psi(x)$ to be "x is wellfounded."

This shows:

Theorem 89 *$\in$-induction iff $WF = V$.*

The collection of wellfounded sets is usually called the **cumulative hierarchy**.

8.4 Zermelo set theory

Set theory with the axiom of foundation is the study of the recursive datatype WF. It is a powerful, interesting and important theory—or family of theories. You may or may not believe that set membership is a wellfounded relation, but even if you don't, the rectype WF is an object worthy of study.

But most mathematicians accept ZF not because the rectype of wellfounded sets is a worthy object of study, but simply because set theory with the axiom of foundation is really a quick fix to the paradoxes to free us to get on with the other major application of set theory: the Universal Language. Let us try to axiomatise the theory of wellfounded sets. That is, for which ϕ do we have $WF \models \phi$?

- By lemma 86 we know that any set of wellfounded sets is wellfounded, we know that the wellfounded sets are a model for the axiom of **pairing**, for example. This is $(\forall x)(\forall y)(\exists z)(\forall w)(w \in z \longleftrightarrow (w \in x \vee w \in y))$

- By lemma 87 we know that every member of a wellfounded set is wellfounded, so if x is wellfounded, so is every member of it, and so is every member of $\bigcup x$. But a set is wellfounded as long as all its members are, so the sumset of a wellfounded set is wellfounded. This gives us the axiom of **sumset**. This is $(\forall x)(\exists y)(\forall z)(z \in y \longleftrightarrow (\exists w)(z \in w \wedge w \in x))$

- If every member of a wellfounded set is wellfounded, and every set of wellfounded sets is wellfounded, then any subset of a wellfounded set is wellfounded. This justifies **aussonderung** also known as **separation**. This axiom scheme is $(\forall x)(\forall \vec{w})(\exists y)(\forall z)(z \in y \longleftrightarrow (z \in x \wedge \phi(z, \vec{w}))$

- In addition the set of subsets of a wellfounded set is a set of wellfounded sets and is therefore a wellfounded set itself by lemma 86. This justifies the axiom of **power set**, which is $(\forall x)(\exists y)(\forall z)(z \in y \longleftrightarrow z \subseteq x)$

- Infinity? Well, if you keep on doing the construction then after infinite time you will have built infinitely many wellfounded sets, and at all points thereafter the set of all of the things you have constructed so far will be an infinite wellfounded set.

  Finally the reader should check that WF really is a model for extensionality. It's not hard but it needs to be done.

These are the axioms of **Zermelo Set Theory**. The only one I haven't given explicitly is the axiom of infinity. This has various formulations, but for technical reasons which will be explained later it is usually given in the form: $(\exists x)(\emptyset \in x \wedge (\forall y \in x)(y \cup \{y\} \in x))$.

What we have proved really, by means of lemmas 86 and 87, is that the class of wellfounded sets is closed under certain operations. All the axioms except empty set and infinity say that the universe is closed under some operation or other. You might think that this is the same as the wellfounded sets being a model for an axiom saying that the operation is always defined. You'd be wrong. Notice the special status of the power set axiom in this respect. By "downward skolemheim" (exercise 37) every theory with an infinite model has a countable model. Any theory that says there is an infinite set and that every set has a power set inevitably also says that there are uncountable sets. But it must have countable models! What happens is that the "uncountable" sets are only uncountable from the point of view of the model but not from the point of view of the rest of the universe (which is what thinks that the model is countable). A structure $\mathfrak{M}$ can be a model of the axiom of power set if for every x in M (the carrier set) there is y in M that contains all subsets of x *that happen to be in* M. This is a much weaker condition than containing the power set of x, and the y in question might well be countable.

The trouble with Zermelo is that if we try to write out a formal proof of the recursion theorem—and all the proofs so far have been pretty informal—we find that we need the axiom of transitive containment, and this is not an axiom of Zermelo.

DEFINITION 90 *A set x is* **transitive** *if $\bigcup x \subseteq x$ or (equivalently) $x \subseteq \mathcal{P}(x)$.*

Transitive containment is the axiom that says that every set has a transitive superset.

One complication is that the definition we gave of "x is wellfounded" really makes sense only in naïve set theory, or at least in Set theories where we cannot prove Cantor's theorem. This is because $\mathcal{P}(X) \subseteq X$ contradicts Cantor's theorem and therefore we would find that there are no such X and that accordingly every set is vacuously wellfounded. For example we will see later that we can add consistently to ZF (strictly: ZF without the axiom of foundation) the assertion that there is an $x = \{x\}$, and yet still everything would be wellfounded according to our old definition. This obliges us to find other characterisations of wellfounded sets that are not in danger of collapse into triviality in this way. There are three candidate definitions for wellfoundedness in the context of the axioms we have so far, and we consider the justification of $\in$-induction for each of these three concepts of wellfounded set. They all involve the concept of what set theorists call the **transitive closure** of a set, $TC(x)$. This is the collection of all those things related to x by the transitive closure of $\in$. (Now you understand why I prefer "ancestral" to "transitive closure"—it avoids overloading this expression.)

They are

1. "All descending $\in$-chains from x are finite" (every sequence $\{x_0, x_1, x_2 \dots\}$ where $x_0 = x$ and for all i, $x_{i+1} \in x_i$, is finite.)

2. Every subset of $TC(x)$ has an $\in$-minimal element.

3. x is nice: this idea is a special case of the R-regularity from theorem 2 when R is $\in$. A set x is **regular** iff

$$(\forall y)(x \in y \to (\exists w \in y)(w \cap y = \emptyset))$$

Let's try to justify $\in$-induction for each of these in turn. In each case we will assume $(\forall y \in x)(\phi(y)) \to \phi(x)$ and let x be an arbitrary set which is wellfounded in the sense-in-hand and $\neg\phi(x)$.

1. All descending $\in$-chains are finite

   Notice that every set that isn't ϕ has a member that isn't ϕ so we can pick an *infinite* descending $\in$-chain starting at x. To do this properly we need DC. which readers will remember says that if R is a relation such that $(\forall x \in Dom(R))(\exists y)(R(x, y))$ then there is an infinite R-chain.) To use this axiom we seem to need to take R to be the $\in$-relation restricted to all the sets that are in x, or in something in x, or in something that is in something ... etc. That is to say, we seem to need $TC(\{x\})$ to be a set.

2. Every subset of $TC(x)$ has an $\in$-minimal element

(Notice that this does not—on the face of it at least—commit us to having $TC(x)$ as a set).

In this case we know that $\neg\phi(x)$ but every subset of $TC(x)$ has an $\in$-minimal element. We wish to deduce a contradiction. The obvious subset of $TC(x)$ to consider is $\{y \in TC(x) : \neg\phi(y)\}$ which has no $\in$-minimal element. The only way to get the existence of this set from our axioms seems to be to assume the existence of $TC(x)$ and use separation.

3. Regular sets

   Consider $\{z \in TC(\{x\}) : \neg\phi(z)\}$. x is a member of it, so it must be disjoint from one of its members. Suppose it is disjoint from a member w. Since $\neg\phi(w)$, w must have members that are also $\neg\phi$, and all thse members will be in $TC(\{x\})$. We know too that none of them are $\neg\phi$ because they are in w which is disjoint from $\{z \in TC(\{x\}) : \neg\phi(z)\}$. So $\phi(w)$ too. Contradiction.

   Again we seem to have had no choice but to use an axiom giving us the existence of transitive closures.

8.5 *ZF* from Zermelo: replacement, collection and limitation of size

All these three ways of getting a notion that behave like wellfoundedness but doesn't commit us to absurd things like sets being supersets of their own power sets involve the axiom of transitive closure. (All we need is transitive containment, because with comprehension we can get transitive closures)

The rectype WF does not have finite character, and although that is not *obviously* a *prima facie* problem, it is a problem in this case, beause there is a theorem waiting in the wings ready to give us trouble should we ever wish to pretend that the creation of WF through sufficiently many stages of iteration ever gets completed. Cantor's theorem tells us that no set can be equal to its power set, and a completed WF would certainly be a set equal to its own power set. So if we believe Cantor's theorem, we are never going to trust the *whole* of WF, but only some fragment of it. What can we say about the fragment that we trust? What operations is it closed under, for example?

We can ask this question in general, about any rectype lacking finite character, and whose completion might be problematic. How much do we trust? One thing is clear: the part that we trust is certainly going to be downward-closed under the engendering relation: if there are some things from which x is built that we do not trust, then we will need to hear some special pleading before we trust x.

In the case of WF this tells us that if we think that a set exists we must also think that all its members exist, and so on. In short, we must think that everything in its transitive closure exists. Does this mean that if we trust x we should also trust $TC(x)$? The answer to that depends on how cautious

we want to be. Are there any other considerations that make trusting $TC(x)$ for trustworthy x sound like a sensible thing to do? The 'limitation of size' principle says that **anything the same size as a set is a set**, or alternatively, **anything that isn't too big is a set**. If we think of this as a way of avoiding the paradoxes this is completely barmy: whether or not a set is paradoxical seems to have much more to do with how kinky its definition is than to do with how big it is. In addition, unless we assume the axiom of foundation *ab initio* it is perfectly clear that not everything the same size as a wellfounded set is wellfounded. If $x = \{x\}$ this x is the same size as any other singleton, but it isn't wellfounded. However the idea that *WF* is a model for replacement is not obviously barmy. Here is the axiom scheme of replacement:

If $(\forall x)(\exists! y)(\phi(x, y))$ then $(\forall X)(\exists Y)(\forall z)(z \in Y \longleftrightarrow (\exists w \in X)\phi(w, z))$

(ϕ represents a function, and replacement says "the image of a set in a function is a set").

Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is Zermelo set theory with this new axiom scheme added.

Notice how this gives us the existence of transitive closures. Fix a set X, and consider the recursively defined function f that sends 0 to X, and sends $n+1$ to $\bigcup(f(n))$. This is defined on everything in $\mathbb{N}$. By replacement its range is a set. We then use the axiom of sumset to get the sumset of the range, which is of course $TC(X)$.

This does look a bit dodgy: what exactly is the ϕ in the instance of replacement we are using here? It is to an explanation of this that we now turn.

Bootstrapping the recursion theorem in ZF

Our troubles with transitive containment are not *completely* over once we adopt the axiom scheme of replacement. In order to prove the recursion theorem for $\in$ along any of the lines above we need to know that transitive closures exist. Now the obvious way to exploit replacement to obtain the transitive closure of x is to apply $\lambda n. \bigcup^n x$ to $\mathbb{N}$ to form the set $\{x, \bigcup x \ldots \bigcup^n x \ldots\}$ and take the union. This uses the recursion theorem, so we must find a way of getting the transitive closure from the other axioms without using the recursion theorem.

Clearly we aren't going to be able to just magic $\{x, \bigcup x \ldots \bigcup^n x \ldots\}$ into existence as the intersection of all sets containing A and closed under $\bigcup$, since we haven't got an axiom giving us a set containing x and closed under $\bigcup$. And how are we going to define the obvious bijection between $\{x, \bigcup x \ldots \bigcup^n x \ldots\}$ and $\mathbb{N}$? This looks like an inductively defined set again and we are back where we started.

The simplest way to deal with this is the concept of a partial map satisfying the recursion wherever it can, usually in the slang called an **attempt**. (We first encountered this idea in the proof of theorem 3.) We prove by induction on the naturals that for all n there is a function defined on the naturals up to n which satisfies the recursion *and that this function—or at least the restriction of any such function to the naturals below n—is unique*. The ϕ we want is the formula that says x and n are related iff every attempt defined at n sends n to x.

Notice that the collection of (graphs of) attempts partially ordered by set inclusion forms a chain-complete poset.

8.5.1 The cumulative hierarchy again

Now we have replacement we have transitive closures of sets and can prove the recursion theorem formally. We can now define the Von Neumann hierarchy as the range of a function defined on the ordinals by means of the recursion theorem. Define

$$V_0 := \emptyset; \quad V_{\alpha+1} := \mathcal{P}(V_\alpha); \quad V_\lambda := \bigcup_{\beta<\lambda} V_\beta.$$

WF is a wellfounded structure and has a rank function by theorem **??**. Then we prove a connection between these two: by induction the rank of a set is the least α s.t. it is in V_α.

We can now come clean on what the Axiom of Infinity really means: every rectype of finite character is a set. To be precise, every rectype with finitely many founders and finitely many operations all of finite arity is a set. (And a countable set at that: recall section 2.1.6). This is for the following reason. In a set theory with an axiom scheme of separation, to show that a certain inductively defined collection is a set, it is sufficient to find even *one* set that is closed under the requisite operations. The hard part is to prove that there is even one such set. In the case of $\mathbb{N}$, we actually needed a special axiom just to give us this, and this is of course the axiom of infinity. We can then construct any other rectype of finite character by means of replacement. How do we do this exactly? Well, we can illustrate by showing that the rectype with founders Tweedledum and Tweedledee and two binary constructors F and G is a set. We do it by coding. Code Tweedledum as 0 and Tweedledee as 1. Values of F will be coded by even numbers and values of G by odd numbers. $code(F(x,y))$ will be—say— $2^{code(x)} \times 3^{code(y)}$ and $code(G(x,y))$ will be $5^{code(x)} \times 7^{code(y)}$. We can define this map *code* by a formula of the language of set theory by the recursion theorem.. $code^{-1}$ is a partial map defined on $\mathbb{N}$. Then by replacement the range is a set.

8.5.2 Mostowski

LEMMA 91 *(Mostowski's collapse lemma)*

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1. *If $\langle X, R\rangle$ is a wellfounded extensional structure then there is a* **unique** *transitive set Y and a unique isomorphism between $\langle X, R\rangle$ and $\langle Y, \in\rangle$.*

2. *If $\langle X, R\rangle$ is a wellfounded structure then there is a transitive set Y and a homomorphism $f{:}\langle X, R\rangle \to \langle Y, \in\rangle$.*

Proof: We use the recursion theorem. Set $\pi(x) := \{\pi(y) : yRx\}$. The desired Y is simply the range of π. Y is transitive because nothing ever gets put into

Y unless all its members have been put in first. If R is extensional then no two things in X have the same set of R-predecessors and so no two things ever get sent to the same thing by π.

The philosophically motivated reader may have been worried by the cheerful and casual way in which we adopted the axiom scheme of replacement. It is true that it implies the existence of transitive closures, and thereby gives us a proof of the recursion theorem, but its philosophical motivation is weak. On the other hand it does also imply lemma 91, and although it won't have become apparent yet, lemma 91 is indispensible. The fact that the axiom scheme of replacement implies it is a very powerful point in its favour. *By their deeds ye shall know them* and in the end one has to judge an axiom by its consequences. This ought to sound to the reader like an instance of the fallacy of affirming the consequent, but this is actually quite legitimate: pointing out that a candidate axiom gives a single reason for believing lots of things that we have disparate reasons for wishing to believe is a very good way of arguing for an axiom. It's an example of Occam's razor. I was attracted to Buddhism because it seemed to give a single reason for being atheist, vegetarian and pacifist, all of which I was anyway.

8.6 Implementing the rest of Mathematics

[*HOLE Universal Language blah.*]

8.6.1 Scott's trick

The obvious way to implement ordinals is to take them to be isomorphism classes of wellorderings. Obvious it may be, but sadly it doesn't work as long as we have separation. Consider the ordinal number 1. This would be the set of all wellorderings of length 1. A wellordering is the ordered pair of a set X and a relation $R \subset X \times X$ which wellorders X. The only wellordering of a singleton is the empty relation, so the ordinal 1 would be the set of all ordered pairs $\langle \{x\}, \emptyset \rangle$, which is to say the set of all sets of the form $\{\{\{x\}\}, \{\{x\}, \emptyset\}\}$. so $\bigcup 1$ would be the set of all sets of the form $\{\{x\}\}$ or $\{\{x\}, \emptyset\}$, and so on, so that $\bigcup^3 1$ would be the universe.

This problem is quite general in ZF: no mathematical object that one naturally thinks of as an isomorphism class can ever be a set. However, as long as one has the axiom of foundation one exploit do the following trick, due to Dana Scott.

For each wellordering, there will be a first stage in the cumulative hierarchy at which a wellordering of that length appears. So we take the ordinal of that wellordering to be the set of wellorderings isomorphic to it that appear at that stage in the cumulative hierarchy. This is a set by separation, and will do very well. And, naturally, the same idea will work for any other mathematical object arising naturally as an isomorphism class.

Although this is a useful general idea—and we will use it—it is not actually the ideal way to implement ordinals in ZF. The implementation of ordinals that is universally used in ZF (so universally used that many set theorists think that they *are* ordinals) is due to Von Neumann.

Von Neumann ordinals

[*HOLE "The time has now come for us to show that Von Neumann ordinals are a faithful implementation of ordinals. Quine calls them* **counter sets**, *not ordinals." I like the idea of a faithful representation. Should we re-use it?*]

We must cast our minds back to the characterisation of ordinal arithmetic as *that part of set theory for which isomorphism of wellorderings is a congruence relation*. The naïve thing is to take ordinals to be the equivalence classes. Sadly, as we have just seen, that doesn't work. We can use Scott's trick, and implement ordinals so that the ordinal of a wellodering $\langle X, < \rangle$ is the set of all wellorderings of minimal rank isomorphic to $\langle X, < \rangle$. However, we can do something nicer. We know by Mostowski that every wellordering is isomorphic to a transitive set wellordered by $\in$, so each equivalence class will contain a unique wellordering $\langle X, \in \rangle$, and we can take these representatives to be ordinals. Having done this we then notice that all these wellorderings have the same wellordering relation, and differ only in their carrier sets, so that no two ordinals have the same carrier set. Thus to distinguish ordinals it is sufficient to examine their carrier sets and we can throw away the wellordering relation. Thus we can take ordinals to be transitive sets wellordered by $\in$. This is the **Von Neumann** implementation of ordinals.

The other way we can arrive at the Von Neumann implementation is to think of ordinals as a rectype. Take 0 to be the empty set; take $\texttt{succ}(\alpha)$ to be $\alpha \cup \{\alpha\}$ and `sup` to be $\bigcup$.

Once we have done this we can see how to implement $\mathbb{N}$, and how we use the axiom of infinity to achieve it. The definition of $\mathbb{N}$ as $\bigcap\{Y : 0 \in Y \wedge S\text{“}Y \subseteq Y\}$ is not legitimate, since there is no reason to suppose that $\{Y : 0 \in Y \wedge S\text{“}Y \subseteq Y\}$ is a set. however, if there is even one X such that $0 \in X \wedge S\text{“}X \subseteq X$ then $\bigcap\{Y \subseteq X : 0 \in Y \wedge S\text{“}Y \subseteq Y\}$ exists and is equal to $\bigcap\{Y : 0 \in Y \wedge S\text{“}Y \subseteq Y\}$. In this context notice that the customary formulation of the axiom of infinity has been cooked up to say precisely that there is an X such that $0 \in X \wedge S\text{“}X \subseteq X$, where '0' and '$S$' have the meanings they must have in the Von Neumann implementation.

8.6.2 Collection

The **Axiom scheme of collection** states:

$(\forall x \in X)(\exists y)(\psi(x, y)) \rightarrow (\exists Y)(\forall x \in X)(\exists y \in Y)(\psi(x, y))$

Weaker versions of collection (e.g., for ψ with only one unrestricted quantifier) are often used in fragments of *ZF*C engineered for studying particular phenomena.

Theorem 92 *WF* $\models$ *Collection and Replacement are equivalent.*

Proof:

Collection $\rightarrow$ replacement is easy. To show that replacement implies collection assume replacement and the antecedent of collection, and derive the conclusion. Thus

$$(\forall x \in X)(\exists y)(\psi(x,y))$$

Let $\phi(x,y)$ say that y is the set of all z such that $\psi(x,z)$ and z is of minimal rank. (Scott's trick again already!) Clearly ϕ is single-valued so we can invoke replacement. The Y we want as witness to the "$\exists Y$" in collection is the sumset of the Y given us by replacement.

■

Quantifier pushing and squashing

Counting quantifiers is an important pastime in computational complexity. This is because a quantifier is an injunction to search the entire universe. If by any chance there are quantifiers that do *not* correspond to such injunctions then we should be able to treat them differently (from a syntactic point of view).

What the arithmetic of $\mathbb{N}$ has in common with set theory-with-the-axiom-of-foundation is that they are both studies of rectypes: $\mathbb{N}$ and *WF*. Thus a restricted quantifier $(\forall y \in x)$ is not an instruction to search the entire universe, but only that part of it that we have already constructed, or have already been given[1]. In the arithmetic of $\mathbb{N}$ we have the notion of a primitive recursive function. As we saw in chapter 6, the set of primitive recursive functions is closed under bounded search. The feature common to all these cases is that the relation we are using to restrict the quantifier is the engendering relation.

This makes it sound as if the availability of a notion of restricted quantifier depends on our subject matter being organised into a rectype, and this seems to be true: there is clearly no good notion of restricted quantifier for real or rational arithmetic.

We will say that a formula containing only restricted quantifiers is Δ_0. A Σ_{n+1} (resp. Π_{n+1}) formula is (a formula that is equivalent to) the result of binding with existential (resp. universal) quantifiers a Π_n (resp. Σ_n) formula (or Δ_0 if $n = 0$). A formula is Δ_n iff it is equivalent to both a Π_n formula and a Σ_n formula.

(So if a set x has some Σ_1 property in a universe M, it has it in any end-extension of M. (we say Σ_1 properties "generalise upwards"). Dually Π_1 sentences generalise downwards. Δ_0 are **absolute** (for all transitive structures).)

There is a family of results known collectively as the **hierarchy theorem**, to the effect that these sets of formulæ are all distinct. The axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis are Π_2 but not Σ_2. Large parts of the hierarchy theorem are easier to prove if we assume foundation: indeed without foundation

[1] Notice that the 'y' and the 'x' must be distinct variables: the outermost quantifier in '$(\forall x \in x)(\ldots)$' is not restricted!

some parts fail altogether. For example if there is a universal set then every formula is both Π_2 and Σ_2.

DEFINITION 93 *$\ulcorner\phi^x\urcorner$ is the result of replacing every quantifier $\exists y$ or $\forall y$ in ϕ by $(\exists y \in x)$ and $(\forall y \in x)$.*

Notice that ϕ^x is always Δ_0 even if ϕ isn't. (Brief reality check: when there is a universal set any formula ψ is equivalent to both $(\exists x)(\forall y)(y \in x \wedge \psi^x)$ and to $\forall x \exists y(y \notin x \vee \psi^x)$ so the hierarchy theorem fails. In these circumstances the restricted quantifiers are not behaving like no-quantifiers-at-all in the way they are supposed to in a rectype. This is exactly what you'd expect if the universe is a set because then there are sets (specifically the universe, which is a member of itself) which do not belong to the rectype that is the cumulative hierarchy).

How might we expect the difference between bounded and unbounded quantifiers significance to manifest itself logically? Well, the prenex normal form theorem says that every formula of predicate calculus is equivalent to one with all its quantifiers at the beginning, so that every atomic subformula is within the scope of every quantifier. The appropriate manifestation in this context would be a theorem that every formula is equivalent to one with all its *unrestricted* quantifiers pulled out to the front, and every restricted quantifier (and every atomic subformula) within the scope of every unrestricted quantifier, in an exact analogue of exercise 42. And the axiom scheme of collection seems almost to have been sent from heaven precisely to prove this theorem, as we shall now see.

Theorem 94 *Given a theory T, which proves collection, for every expression ϕ of the language of set theory, there is an expression ϕ' s.t. $T \vdash \phi \longleftrightarrow \phi'$ and every restricted quantifier and every atomic formula occurs within the scope of all the unrestricted quantifiers.*

Proof:

It is simple to check that $(\forall x)(\forall y \in z)\phi$ is the same as $(\forall y \in z)(\forall x)\phi$ (and similarly $\exists$) so the only hard work involved in the proof is in showing that

$$(\forall y \in z)(\exists x)\phi$$

is equivalent to something that has its existential quantifier out at the front. But by collection we infer

$$(\exists X)(\forall y \in z)(\exists x \in X)\phi$$

and the implication in the other direction is easy. The remaining case is where we have an unrestricted $\forall$ within the scope of a restricted $\exists$. But this case is subsumed under the one we have just dealt with, since it is its negation. After all, if $p \longleftrightarrow q$ then $\neg p \longleftrightarrow \neg q$. ■

I wrote at the beginning of section 7.2 about **end-extensions**. To each notion of limited quantifier there corresponds a notion of end-extension, and

vice versa. As we saw there, in Set theory the appropriate notion of end-extension is "New sets: yes; new members of old sets: no!". In general, whatever the binary relation involved, an end-extension is one that preserves formulæ without unlimited quantifiers: end-extensions are elementary (see definition 26) for sentences containing no unbounded quantifiers.

(All this is really to justify restricting our attention to transitive models when seeking models of bits of ZF. Our desire to restrict attention to transitive models also explains why Mostowski collapse is so useful)

So the argument for replacement is that it enables us to prove the hierarchy theorem for the theory of wellfounded sets, which ought to be provable, and which we don't seem to be able to prove otherwise.

8.6.3 Reflection

If Φ is an expression and $\mathfrak{M}$ a structure (with domain M), and $\mathcal{I}$ is a map from the predicate and function letters of the language of Φ that sends an n-place predicate to a subset of M^n (and function letters similarly) then $\Phi^{\mathfrak{M}}$ (the *interpretation of* Φ *in* $\mathfrak{M}$) is the formula we get from Φ by applying the following rules recursively to Φ:

if ψ is an atomic formula $R(x_1 \dots x_n)$ then $\psi^{\mathfrak{M}}$ is $\langle x_1 \dots x_n \rangle \in I(R)$

$(\psi \wedge \theta)^{\mathfrak{M}}$ is $(\psi^{\mathfrak{M}}) \wedge (\theta^{\mathfrak{M}})$. ($\rightarrow$, $\vee$ similarly)

$(\exists x \psi)^{\mathfrak{M}}$ is $\exists x (x \in M \ \wedge (\psi^{\mathfrak{M}}))$

$(\forall x \psi)^{\mathfrak{M}}$ is $\forall x (x \in M \ \rightarrow (\psi^{\mathfrak{M}}))$.

Subject to some small print (concerning cases where the language of $\mathfrak{M}$ is not the same as the language of which Φ is part) $\Phi^{\mathfrak{M}}$ is supposed to be the same as $\mathfrak{M} \models \Phi$. If $\Phi^{\mathfrak{M}}$ is true, we say that $\mathfrak{M}$ *is a model of* Φ.

If $\phi \longleftrightarrow (\phi^{V_\gamma})$ we say γ **reflects** ϕ. The scheme of reflection has various expressions. For example

$$\phi \rightarrow (\forall x)(\exists y)(x \in y \wedge \phi^y)$$

or

$$\phi \rightarrow (\forall \alpha)(\exists \beta \geq \alpha)(\phi^{V_\beta})$$

I shall prove something apparently slightly stronger than this.

Theorem 95 *For every* ϕ *ZF proves* $\phi \longleftrightarrow (\exists$ *a closed unbounded class of* $\alpha)\phi^{V_\alpha}$

Proof:

By induction on quantifiers and connectives. It's certainly true for ϕ a Δ_0 formula. Assume $\forall \vec{x} \exists \vec{y} \phi$. Then, in particular, for any old ordinal α, $(\forall \vec{x} \in V_\alpha)(\exists \vec{y})\phi$. Now by collection we infer $(\exists B)(\forall \vec{x} \in V_\alpha)(\exists \vec{y} \in B)\phi$ and we can take this B to be a V_β getting $(\exists \beta)(\forall \vec{x} \in V_\alpha)(\exists \vec{y} \in V_\beta)\phi$ so we have proved

$(\forall\alpha)(\exists\beta)(\forall\vec{x}\in V_\alpha)(\exists\vec{y}\in V_\beta)\phi$. That is to say, we have proved that the function $\lambda\alpha.(\text{least }\beta)(\forall\vec{x}\in V_\alpha)(\exists\vec{y}\in V_\beta)\phi)$ is total.

By induction hypothesis there is a closed unbounded class of ordinals that reflect ϕ. Let X be such a class of ordinals and consider the function $\lambda\alpha.(\text{least }\beta\in X)(\forall\vec{x}\in V_\alpha)(\exists\vec{y}\in V_\beta)\phi)$. Since $\beta\in X$ this becomes $\lambda\alpha.(\text{least }\beta\in X)(\forall\vec{x}\in V_\alpha)(\exists\vec{y}\in V_\beta)\phi^{V_\beta})$. This function (or rather its restriction to X) is a continuous function from X into itself and will have a closed unbounded class of fixed points (by exercise 3 section 3.1.3 page 48). A closed unbounded subclass of a closed unbounded class is itself closed and unbounded. The ordinals in this class reflect $\forall\vec{x}\exists\vec{y}\phi$. ■

Reflection is a kind of omnibus existence theorem for recursive datatypes, since it tells us that if the universe is closed under a bundle of operations then there is a set (indeed lots of sets) closed under those same operations.

We needed the function $\lambda\alpha.(\text{least }\beta\in X)(\forall\vec{x}\in V_\alpha)(\exists\vec{y}\in V_\beta)\phi^{V_\beta})$ to be continuous so we could be sure that it had a closed unbounded class of fixed points. It is continuous because of the finitary nature of ϕ. If we were trying to prove reflection for an infinitary language (of the kind where we can bind infinitely many variable simultaneously) then the function wouldn't be continuous. Thinking about what one can retrieve in this situation gets one into the kind of mental habits that prepare one for large cardinal axioms. As they say on TV: *do not attempt this at home.*

COROLLARY 96 *ZF not finitely axiomatisable.*

Proof: In fact we can show something slightly stronger than this: ZF proves the consistency of any of its finitely axiomatisable subsystems. If ϕ is the conjunction of all the axioms of a finite fragment of ZF we have ZF $\vdash\phi$ so for some β, $V_\beta\models\phi$. ■

Zermelo isn't finitely axiomatisable either, but of course this proof won't work. Indeed no satisfactory proof has ever been published and the only proof known to me is very fiddly.

It is sometimes convenient to accord a kind of shadowy existence to collections that aren't sets, particularly if there are obvious intensions of which they would be the extensions—like the collection of all singletons, or all things which are equal to themselves (the intensions are pretty straightforward after all!). We call these things **classes** or (since some people want to call all collections "classes"—so that sets are a kind of class) *proper classes.*

If we allow classes we can reformulate *ZF* as follows. Add to the language of set theory a suite of upper-case Roman variables to range over classes as well as sets. Lower-case variables will continue to range solely over sets as before. Since classes are sets that are not members of anything we can express "X is a set" in this language is '$(\exists Y)(X\in Y)$' and we do not need a new predicate letter to capture sethood.

Next we add an axiom scheme of class existence: for any expression $\phi(x,\vec{y})$ whatever, we have a class of all x such that $\phi(x,\vec{y})$.

We rewrite all the axioms of *ZF* except replacement and separation by restricting all quantifiers to range over sets not classes. We can now reduce these two scheme to single axioms that say "the image of a set in a class is a set" and "the intersection of a set and a class is a set". Does this make for a finite set of axioms? This depends on whether the axiom scheme of class existence can be deduced from finitely many instances of itself. The version of this scheme asserted in the last paragraph cannot be reduced to finitely many instances. This system is commonly known as Morse-Kelley set theory.[2] However if we restrict it so that for ϕ to appear in a class existence axiom it must not have any bound class variables then it can be reduced to finitely many axioms, and this system is usally known as 'GB' (Gödel-Bernays). GB is exactly as strong as *ZF*, in the sense that for some sensible proof systems at least there is an algorithm which transforms GB-proofs of assertions-about-sets into *ZF*-proofs of those same assertions. Indeed, for a suitable gnumbering of proofs, the function involved is primitive recursive.

Morse-Kelley is actually stronger than GB, and although the details are hard, it is not hard to see why this might be true. Morse-kelley proves the existence of more sets, and therefore makes it possible to prove more things by induction.

EXERCISE 64 *Von Neumann had an axiom which makes sense in the context of Set-Theory-with-classes.*

A class is a set iff it is not the same size as V

Prove that Von Neumann's axiom is equivalent to replacement plus choice.

Finally some important trivialities:

Replacement gives bigger sets

Using replacement we can prove the existence of the set $\{\mathbb{N}, \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N}), \mathcal{P}^2(\mathbb{N}) \dots\}$ and then its sumset, which is of course bigger than $\mathcal{P}^n(\mathbb{N})$ for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$. What is perhaps slightly more surprising is that replacement enables us to prove novel results, not provable in Zermelo. about small sets whose existence even Zermelo set theory can prove. Thus there are theorems of Analysis provable in ZF that are not provable in Zermelo.

[*HOLE Give a few examples: Borel determinacy, Friedman's finite form of Kruskal's theorem?*]

8.7 Some elementary cardinal arithmetic

PROPOSITION 97 *If x can be wellordered, $|x|^2 = |x|$*

[2] It was actually first spelled out by Wang and Mostowski.

Proof:

Here is an obvious strategy. It doesn't work, but the idea is a good one, and will lead us to one that does. Notice that the equivalence relation $|\alpha| = |\beta|$ is a congruence relation for all the operations of ordinal arithmetic. Use this to prove by induction on α that $(\forall\alpha)(|\alpha| = |\alpha^2|)$. The induction step at successor ordinals seems fine: if $|\alpha| = |\alpha^2|$ then $|(\alpha+1)^2| = |\alpha^2+\alpha+1|$ (at least if $\alpha > \omega$ so that $1+\alpha = \alpha$.) Then $|\alpha^2+\alpha+1| = |\alpha+\alpha+1|$ and clearly (again, as long as $\alpha > \omega$) $|\alpha+\alpha+1| = |\alpha+1|$. However $\lambda\alpha.\alpha^2$ is not continuous and so the argument breaks down at limit ordinals. But this is retrievable.

Consider the following (origami proof) ordering. Order $\{\beta : \beta < \alpha\} \times \{\beta : \beta < \alpha\}$ as follows. Order pairs in the graph of $>$ lexicographically, so that if $\beta > \gamma$ and $\beta' > \gamma$ then put $\langle\beta,\gamma\rangle$ earlier than $\langle\beta',\gamma'\rangle$ iff $\beta < \beta'$ or $\beta = \beta' \wedge \gamma < \gamma'$. (That is what the vertical lines in the bottom right half of figure 8.1 are doing).

Order pairs in the graph of $\leq$ in the colex ordering, so that if $\beta \leq \gamma$ and $\beta' \leq \gamma$ then put $\langle\beta,\gamma\rangle$ earlier than $\langle\beta',\gamma'\rangle$ iff $\gamma < \gamma'$ or $\gamma = \gamma' \wedge \beta < \beta'$. (That is what the horizontal lines in the top left half of figure 8.1 are doing). At this point we have two disjoint sets, both wellordered, and the operation of flipping ordered pairs is an isomorphism between them.

Then place every pair next to its flip. (That is to say, fold top left corner down onto bottom right corner).

This is almost a wellordering, but we have $\langle\beta,\gamma\rangle$ and $\langle\gamma,\beta\rangle$ sitting on top of each other, so it is not antisymmetric. Ordain that in each case the first of these two pairs shall be the one that is in the graph of $<$. If we interleave two wellorderings of length λ for λ limit, we clearly get a wellordering of length λ as a result. If we interleave two wellorderings of length $\lambda+n$, we get a wellordering of length $\lambda+2n$.

Let us say that this wellordering of $\{\beta : \beta < \alpha\} \times \{\beta : \beta < \alpha\}$ is of length $f(\alpha)$. f is a *continuous* function $f : On \to On$ such that $f(\alpha+1) = f(\alpha) + \alpha \cdot 2 + 1$. [*HOLE must prove it's cts!!*] This will have the property that $|f(\alpha)| = |\alpha^2|$. Because f is continuous we will be able to prove by induction on α that $(\forall\alpha)(|\alpha| = |f(\alpha)|)$. But—because we know that $|f(\alpha)| = |\alpha^2|$—the proof is now complete.

■

LEMMA 98 *Bernstein's lemma.*

In figure 8.2 we see a representation of a set of size $|x \times y|$ split into two pieces of size a and b. Consider the U-shaped area labelled 'b', and its projection onto the horizontal axis. Does it cover the whole of the horizontal axis? If it does, then $b \geq^* y$. If it doesn't then there is a line parallel to the other axis lying entirely within the complement of b, namely a, whence $x \leq a$. So we have proved

$$(x \times y = a + b) \to (b \geq^* y \vee x \leq y)$$

DEFINITION 99 .



Figure 8.1: $|\alpha^2| = |\alpha|$

1. *An* **aleph** *is a cardinal of a wellordered set.* $\aleph(\alpha)$ *is the least aleph* $\not\leq \alpha$.
2. *We write '*$|A| \leq^* |B|$*' when there is a surjection of* B *onto* A *(or* A *is empty).*
3. $\aleph^*(\alpha)$ *is the least aleph that is not* $\leq^* \alpha$.
4. *If* κ *is an aleph then* κ^+ *is the next aleph, which is of course the same as* $\aleph(\kappa)$.

There is no notation for the first ordinal that is not the length of a wellordering of any set of size $\leq \alpha$. If we want '$\aleph(\alpha)$' to denote this object we really do have to exploit the nasty hacky identification of cardinals with initial ordinals.

We'd better show that $\aleph(\alpha)$ is always defined! The collection of alephs is naturally wellordered, since to each aleph there corresponds an initial ordinal, so there is no problem about leastness. Existence needs to be checked. We do that next.

Theorem 100 *Hartogs' theorem.* $\aleph(\alpha)$ *is always defined. In fact (Sierpinksi)* $\aleph(\alpha) < 2^{2^{\alpha^2}}$.

Let A be a set of size α. Every wellordering of any subset of A is an element of $\mathcal{P}(A \times A)$. Therefore the set of all wellorderings of subsets of A is a subset



Figure 8.2: Bernstein's lemma

of $\mathcal{P}(A \times A)$. Therefore the quotient, the set of all isomorphism classes of wellorderings of subsets of A is a quotient of $\mathcal{P}(A \times A)$ and accordingly injects into $\mathcal{P}^2(A \times A)$. This structure is naturally wellordered to the length of the sup of the lengths of the wellorderings represented in it, namely the smallest ordinal not the length of any wellordering of A. ■

Notice that the axioms of ZF are such that if we ever succeed in proving the existence of set with a given property then by keeping track of the axioms we have used we can usually read off an upper bound for the size of the set whose existence we have proved. This is what has just happened here.

EXERCISE 65 *By coding a wellordering as the set of its initial segments show how to prove the following variant of Hartogs'.*

$$\aleph(\alpha) < 2^{2^{2^\alpha}}$$

Recalling the definition of the the cardinal-valued function $\aleph^*(\alpha)$ from definition 99, find some upper bounds and some $\leq^*$-upper bounds for $\aleph(\alpha)$ and

$\aleph^*(\alpha)$.

One immediate and standard application of Hartogs' is the fact that Comparability of cardinals implies AC. (Think about α and $\aleph(\alpha)$. Another is that GCH implies AC. GCH is the Generalised Continuum Hypothesis—the assertion that for **all** cardinals α (not just $\aleph_0$) there are no cardinals strictly between α and 2^α. One proves this by thinking about $\alpha + \aleph(\alpha)$ which by Hartogs' must be bigger than α but smaller than $2^{2^{2^\alpha}}$.

EXERCISE 66 *Not provable without AC that every infinite set has a countable subset, but every infinite subset of $\Re$ has a countable partition.*

COROLLARY 101 *If $\alpha = \alpha^2$ for all cardinals α then* AC.

Proof: Assume $(\alpha = \alpha^2)$ for all cardinals α. Now let α be a cardinal that is not an aleph. Then we have

$$(\forall\alpha)(\alpha + \aleph(\alpha))^2 = (\alpha + \aleph(\alpha)).$$

Expand the left hand side to get

$$\alpha^2 + 2 \cdot \alpha \cdot (\aleph(\alpha)) + (\aleph(\alpha))^2$$

which can be simplified progessively to

$$\alpha + 2 \cdot \alpha \cdot (\aleph(\alpha)) + \aleph(\alpha)$$

(using $(\forall$ cardinals $\alpha)(\alpha = \alpha^2)$) and then (since if $\alpha = \alpha^2$ then certainly $\alpha = 2\cdot\alpha$)

$$\alpha + \alpha \cdot (\aleph(\alpha)) + \aleph(\alpha)$$

which eventually becomes

$$\alpha \cdot (\aleph(\alpha))$$

Then

$$\alpha \cdot (\aleph(\alpha)) = \alpha + \aleph(\alpha)$$

and we can use Bernstein's lemma to infer $\alpha \leq^* \aleph(\alpha) \vee \aleph(\alpha) \leq \alpha$. The second disjunct cannot happen (by definition of $\aleph(\alpha)$) and the first implies that α is an aleph.

■

COROLLARY 102 *AC is equivalent to the assertion that $\alpha = \alpha^2$ for all infinite cardinals.*

In fact AC follows even from the apparently much weaker assertion that squaring of cardinals is merely injective. But that is beyond the scope of this book.

Let us now return to Bernstein's lemma. A simple induction on $\mathbb{N}$ shows us that if $\{A_i : i < n\}$ and $\{B_i : i < n\}$ are families of sets with a map from the union of the Bs onto the product of the As then something happens. We can even get a result on infinite sums and products. But we will need AC.

Theorem 103 *The Jordan-König theorem* (AC)*:*
If $\{A_i : i \in I\}$ *and* $\{B_i : i \in I\}$ *are families of sets such that* $(\forall i \in I)(|A_i| \not\geq^* |B_i|)$ *then*

$$|\bigcup_{i\in I} A_i| \not\geq^* |\prod_{i\in I} B_i|$$

Proof:
Suppose not, and that $f : \bigcup_{i\in I} A_i \to \prod_{i\in I} B_i$. We show that f is not onto. For each $i \in I$ let $f_i : A_i \to B_i$ be $\lambda x_{A_i}.(f(x)(i))$. f_i cannot be onto by hypothesis so pick (remember we are using AC) n_i to be a member of $B_i \setminus f_i$"A_i. Now we find that the function $\lambda i.n_i$ is not in the range of f, for otherwise if $f(a) = \lambda i.n_i$ where $a \in A_i$ say, then $f_i(a) = (\lambda x.(f(x))(i))(a) = (f(a))(i) = (\lambda i.n_i)(i) = n_i$ contradicting choice of n_i.

■

The Jordan-König theorem is equivalent to AC, because it implies that the product of nonempty sets is nonempty.

COROLLARY 104 $2^{\aleph_0} \neq \aleph_\omega$.

Proof: Take the A_i to be of size $\aleph_i$, for $i \in \mathbb{N}$ and the B_i to be all of size $2^{\aleph_0}$, and note that $(2^{\aleph_0})^{\aleph_0} = 2^{\aleph_0}$.

EXERCISE 67 *Prove that* $\alpha < \alpha^{cf(\alpha)}$.

Writing '$\alpha < \alpha^{cf(\alpha)}$' like this is a bit slovenly. Clearly α and $\alpha^{cf(\alpha)}$ are to be cardinals, so the exponent, $cf(\alpha)$ has to be a cardinal too. But it is *ordinals* that have cofinalities, not cardinals, and cofinalities are ordinals not cardinals! Thus this notation exploits the tacit identification of the cardinal α with the initial ordinal corresponding to it, and the similar identification of the ordinal $cf(\alpha)$ with the corresponding aleph. Slovenly it may be, but it is universally practiced.

8.8 Independence Proofs

Although clearly some instances of the axiom schemes of separation and replacement can be derived from others, it is standard that the remaining axioms of ZF are independent from each other. For any other axiom A we can show that $ZF \setminus A \not\vdash A$. And for replacement we can show that $ZF\setminus$ replacement does not imply all instances of replacement, though it does prove some. For some of these axioms ZF actually proves the consistency of $ZF \setminus A$ in the sense that ZF proves the existence of a *set* that is a model of $ZF \setminus A$.

A device which turns up in many of these independence proofs is the idea of the set of things that are hereditarily ϕ, where ϕ is a one-place predicate. The intuition is that x is hereditarily ϕ if everything in $TC(x)$ is ϕ. Let us have a formal definition.

DEFINITION 105 . $\mathcal{P}_\kappa(x) := \{y \subseteq x : |y| < \kappa\}$; $H_\kappa := \bigcap\{y : \mathcal{P}_\kappa(y) \subseteq y\}$

$$\mathcal{P}_\phi(x) =: \{y \subseteq x : \phi(y)\}; \quad H_\phi =: \bigcap\{y : \mathcal{P}_\phi(y) \subseteq y\}$$

A word is in order on the definition and the notation involved. The use of the set-forming bracket inside the '$\bigcap$' is naughty: in general there is no reason to suppose that the collection of all y such that $\mathcal{P}_\phi(y) \subseteq y$ is a set. However its intersection will be a set—as long as it's nonempty! And if there is even one x such that $\mathcal{P}_\phi(x) \subseteq x$ then $\{y \subseteq x : \mathcal{P}_\phi(y) \subseteq y\}$ will have the same intersection as $\{y : \mathcal{P}_\phi(y) \subseteq y\}$ and so no harm is done. But this depends on there being such an x. If there is, we are in the same situation we were with the implementation of $\mathbb{N}$. If not, then the collection H_ϕ will be a proper class and we have to define it as the collection of those x with the property that everything in $TC(x)$ is of size $< \kappa$. If H_ϕ is a set then the two definitions are of course equivalent, but if it isn't, it is only the definition in terms of TC that works. The definition in terms of TC is the standard one, but I find that my definition is more helpful to people who are used to thinking in terms of inductive definitions. After all, H_ϕ is a rectype. It has an empty set of founders and one (infinitary!) constructor that says that a subset of H_ϕ that is itself ϕ is also in H_ϕ.

EXERCISE 68 .

1. *Show that if κ is regular and we have AC then we can take H_κ to be the set of x s.t. $|TC(x)| < \kappa$.*
2. *Show that the collection of hereditarily wellordered sets isn't a set.*

REMARK 106 *If $\phi(x) \to \phi(f\text{“}x)$ for all x and f then H_ϕ is a model for replacement.*

Proof:

For H_ϕ to be a model of replacement it is sufficient that if $x \in H_\phi$ and $f : H_\phi \to H_\phi$ is defined by a formula *with parameters from H_ϕ only, all of whose quantifiers are restricted to H_ϕ* then $f\text{“}x$ is also in H_ϕ. But this condition is met because by assumption a surjective image of a set that is ϕ is also ϕ: indeed, we didn't even need the italicised condition. ■

8.8.1 Replacement

The only independence proof that we will give which doesn't use an H_ϕ is the independence of the axiom scheme of replacement. Let's get it out of the way now.

$V_{\omega+\omega}$ is a model for all the axioms except replacement. It contains wellorderings of length ω but cannot contain $\{V_{\omega+n} : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$ because we can use the axiom of sumset (and $V_{\omega+\omega}$ is clearly a model for the axiom of sumset!) to get $V_{\omega+\omega}$.

Readers are encouraged to check the details for themselves to gain familiarity with the techniques involved.

8.8.2 Power set

The set we need to prove the independence of power set is $H_{\aleph_1}$, but much of what we need to say about $H_{\aleph_1}$ generalises to other H_κ so we will give a slightly more general treatment.

Although it is not obvious, H_κ is always a set according to *ZF*. The proof does not need (much) AC, but the axiom of foundation is essential.[3]

Theorem 107 *If κ is an aleph, $|H_{\kappa^+}| \leq 2^\kappa$.*

Proof:

Let X be a set of size 2^κ.

Assume enough AC to be sure that $|X| = |\mathcal{P}_{\kappa^+}(X)|$ because κ^+ is well-behaved. We need a bit of choice to do this because $\kappa^2 = \kappa$ is not enough. For example there are $2^{\aleph_0}$ ω-sequences of reals, since there are $(2^{\aleph_0})^{\aleph_0} = 2^{\aleph_0 \cdot \aleph_0} = 2^{\aleph_0}$ but that doesn't tell us there are precisely $2^{\aleph_0}$ countable sets of reals. There are clearly $\geq 2^{\aleph_0}$ countable sets of reals, and the argument we have just sketched shows that there are $\leq^* 2^{\aleph_0}$ countable sets of reals. To infer that there are precisely $2^{\aleph_0}$ countable sets of reals from the fact that there are $2^{\aleph_0}$ ω-sequences of reals we would need to be able to pick, for each countable set of reals, a wellordering of it to length ω.

Let us fix an injection $\pi : \mathcal{P}_{\kappa^+}(X) \hookrightarrow X$. We construct an injection $h : H_{\kappa^+} \hookrightarrow X$ by recursion thus: $h(x) := \pi(h``x)$. By considering a member of H_{κ^+} of minimal rank not in the range of h we show easily that h is total. It is injective because π is one-one. The range of h is a set by comprehension, and so its domain (which is H_{κ^+}) is also a set, by replacement. ■

Remark 108 $|H_{\aleph_1}| = 2^{\aleph_0}$

Proof: We have just seen $|H_{\aleph_1}| \leq 2^{\aleph_0}$. The other direction follows immediately from the fact that $V_{\omega+1}$ is a subset of $H_{\aleph_1}$ of size $2^{\aleph_0}$. ■

There is another way of proving that $H_{\aleph_1}$ is a set. Recall that $\lambda x.\mathcal{P}_{\aleph_1}(x)$ is not ω-continuous. If you think about this for a while you will realise that this function is α-continuous as long as the cofinality of α is not a countable ordinal. The most obvious such ordinal is ω_1. (Look back at remark 80). So all we have to do is iterate this function ω_1 times and we will reach a fixed point. $H_{\aleph_1}$ will be a subset of this fixed point and will be a set by comprehension.

$H_{\aleph_1}$ gives us a model of $ZF\backslash$ power set. The axiom of infinity will hold because there are genuinely infinite sets in $H_{\aleph_1}$. If X is such a set then there will be a bijection from X onto a proper subset of itself, and this bijection (at least if our ordered pairs are Wiener-Kuratowski) will be a hereditarily countable set. And we have been assuming the axiom of choice so the union of countable

[3] We will see soon that if we do not assume the axiom of foundation we can easily construct models containing as many Quine atoms (sets $x = \{x\}$) as we want. Since these objects are clearly hereditarily of size less than κ^+ there is no point in asking about the size or sethood of $H_{\aleph_1}$ unless we assume some form of foundation.

many elements of $H_{\aleph_1}$ is also an element of $H_{\aleph_1}$, so it is a model of the axiom of sumset.

Everything in $H_{\aleph_1}$ is countable and therefore wellordered, and under most implementation of pairing functions, the wellorderings will be in $H_{\aleph_1}$ too, so $H_{\aleph_1}$ is a model of AC, even if AC was not true in the model in which we start.

8.8.3 Independence of the axiom of infinity

$H_{\aleph_0}$ provides a model for all the axioms of ZF except infinity and thereby proves the independence of the axiom of infinity. (We constructed a copy of $H_{\aleph_0}$ on page 35).

That status of AC in $H_{\aleph_0}$ is like its status in $H_{\aleph_1}$. Everything in $H_{\aleph_0}$ is finite and therefore wellordered, and under most implementation of pairing functions, the wellorderings will be in $H_{\aleph_0}$ too, so $H_{\aleph_0}$ is a model of AC, even if AC was not true in the model in which we start. This is in contrast to the situation obtaining with the countermodels to sumset and foundation: the truth-value of AC in those models is the same as its truth-value in the model we start.

8.8.4 Sumset

$\mathfrak{i}$ numbers are defined by setting $\mathfrak{i}_\alpha := |V_\alpha|$, or recursively by $\mathfrak{i}_0 := \aleph_0; \mathfrak{i}_{\alpha+1} := 2^{\mathfrak{i}_\alpha}$, taking sups at limits. Let us for the moment say that a set of size less that $\mathfrak{i}_\omega$ is **small**.

Then $H_{\mathfrak{i}_\omega}$, the collection of hereditarily small sets, proves the independence of the axiom of sumset. This is because there are wellorderings of length $\omega + \omega$ inside $V_{\omega+n}$ for n small, so by replacement $\{V_\alpha : \alpha < \omega + \omega\}$ is a set. Indeed it is a hereditarily small set. But $\bigcup\{V_\alpha : \alpha < \omega + \omega\}$ is not hereditarily small, being of size $\mathfrak{i}_\omega$.

EXERCISE 69 *Establish that the collection of hereditarily small sets is a set.*

8.8.5 Foundation

For the independence of the axiom of foundation and the axiom of choice we need a Rieger-Bernays models for independence of foundation.

If $\langle V, R\rangle$ is a structure for the language of set theory, and π is any permutation of V, then we say $x\ R_\pi\ y$ iff $x\ R\ \pi(y)$. $\langle V, R_\pi\rangle$ is a *permutation model* of $\langle V, R\rangle$. We call it V^π. Alternatively we could define Φ^π as the result of replacing every atomic wff $x \in y$ in Φ by $x \in \pi(y)$. We do not rewrite equations in this operation: $=$ is a logical constant not a predicate letter. The result of our definitions is that $\langle V, R\rangle \models \Phi^\pi$ iff $\langle V, R_\pi\rangle \models \Phi$. Although it is possible to give a more general treatment we will keep things simple by using only permutations whose graphs are sets.

A wff ϕ is stratified iff we can find a *stratification* for it, namely a map f from its variables (after relettering where appropriate) to $\mathbb{N}$ such that if the

atomic wff '$x = y$' occurs in ϕ then $f(\text{`}x\text{'}) = f(\text{`}y\text{'})$, and if '$x \in y$' occurs in ϕ then $f(\text{`}y\text{'}) = f(\text{`}x\text{'}) + 1$.

To discuss these topics properly we will also need the notation $j =_{\rm df} \lambda f \lambda x.(f\text{``}x)$. The map j is a group homomorphism: $j(\pi\sigma) = (j\pi)(j\sigma)$.

We shall start with a lemma and a definition, both due to Henson [1973]. The definition arises from the need to tidy up Φ^τ. A given occurrence of a variable 'x' which occurs in 'Φ^τ' may be prefixed by 'τ' or not, depending on whether or not that particular occurrence of 'x' is after an '$\in$'. This is messy. If there were a family of rewriting rules around that we could use to replace $x \in \tau(y)$ by $\sigma(x) \in \gamma(y)$ for various other σ and γ then we might be able to rewrite our atomic subformulæ to such an extent that for each variable, all its occurences have the same prefix.

Why bother? Because once a formula has been coerced into this form, every time we find a quantifier Qy in it, we know that all occurrences of y within its scope have the same prefix. As long as that prefix denotes a permutation then we can simply remove the prefixes! This is because $(Qx)(\ldots\sigma(x)\ldots)$ is the same as $(Qx)(\ldots x\ldots)$. If we can do this for all variables, then τ has disappeared completely from our calculations and we have an invariance result. When can we do this?

Henson's insight was as follows. Suppose we have a stratification for Φ and permutations τ_n (for all n used in the stratification) related somehow to τ, so that, for each n,

$$x \in \tau(y) \iff \tau_n(x) \in \tau_{n+1}(y).$$

then by replacing ' $x \in \tau(y)$ ' by ' $\tau_n(x) \in \tau_{n+1}(y)$ ' whenever 'x' has been assigned the subscript n, every occurrence of 'x' in ' Φ^τ ' will have the same prefix. Next we will want to know that τ_n is a permutation, so that in any wff in which 'x' occurs bound—$(\forall x)(\ldots\tau_n(x)\ldots)$—it can be relettered $(\forall x)(\ldots x\ldots)$ so that 'τ' has been eliminated from the bound variables. It is not hard to check that the definition we need to make this work is as follows

DEFINITION 109 $\tau_0 =$ identity, $\tau_{n+1} = (j^n\tau)\tau_n$.

This definition is satisfactory as long as $j^n(\tau)$ is always a permutation of V whenever τ is, for each n. But if the graph of τ is a set we need have no worries on that score. This gives us immediately a proof of the following result.

LEMMA 110 ***Henson* [1973]**. *Let Φ be stratified with free variables 'x_1', ... , 'x_n', where 'x_i' has been assigned an integer k_i in some stratification. Let τ be a setlike permutation and V any model of NF. Then*

$$(\forall\vec{x})V \models (\Phi(\vec{x})^\tau \longleftrightarrow \Phi(\tau_{k_1}(x_1)\ldots\tau_{k_n}(x_n))).$$

In the case where Φ is closed and stratified, we infer that if τ is a permutation whose graph is a set then

$$V \models \Phi \longleftrightarrow \Phi^\tau.$$

.

REMARK 111 *(Scott [1962]).*

If $\langle V, \in\rangle \models ZF$ and τ^{-1} is a permutation of V whose graph is a set then $\langle V, \in_\tau\rangle \models ZF$.

Proof: The stratified axioms are no problem. The only unstratified axiom scheme is replacement. It is easy enough to check for any ϕ that if $\forall x \exists! y \phi$ then $\forall x \exists! y \phi^\tau$, so that for any set X the image of X in ϕ^τ is also a set. Call it Y. But then $\tau^{-1}(Y)$ is the image-of-X-under-ϕ (in the sense of V^τ). ■

We now take π to be the transposition $(\emptyset, \{\emptyset\})$. In $\mathfrak{M}^\pi$ the old empty set has become a Quine atom: an object identical to its own singleton: $x \in_\pi \emptyset \longleftrightarrow x \in \pi(\emptyset) = \{\emptyset\}$. So $x \in_\pi \emptyset \longleftrightarrow x = \emptyset$. So $\mathfrak{M}^\pi$ is a model for all the axioms of ZF except foundation.

8.8.6 Choice

We start with a model of ZF + foundation, and use Rieger-Bernays model methods to obtain a permutation model with a countable set A of Quine atoms. The permutation we use to achieve this is the product of all transpositions $(n, \{n\})$ for $n \in \mathbb{N}^+$. A will be a **basis** for the illfounded sets in the sense that any class X lacking an $\in$-minimal element contains a member of A. The standard way of adjoining countably many Quine atoms ensures this, though I won't prove it. Since the elements of A are Quine atoms every permutation of A is an $\in$-automorphism of A, and since they form a basis we can extend any permutation σ of A to a unique $\in$-automorphism of V in the obvious way: set $\sigma(x) =: \sigma``x$. Notice that the collection of sets that this definition does not reach has no $\in$-minimal member if nonempty, and so it must contain a Quine atom. But σ by hypothesis is defined on Quine atoms. We will write '(a, b)' also for the unique automorphism to which the transposition extends.

Every set x gives rise to an equivalence relation on atoms. Say $a \sim_x b$ if (a, b) fixes x. We say x is of (or has) **finite support** if $\sim_x$ has a cofinite equivalence class. (It can have only one, if any). The union of the (finitely many) remaining (finite) equivalence classes is the **support** of x. Does that mean that x is of finite support iff the transitive closure $TC(x)$ contains finitely many atoms? Well, if $TC(x)$ contains only finitely many atoms then x is of finite support (x clearly can't tell apart the cofinitely many atoms not in $TC(x)$) but the converse is not true: x can be of finite support if $TC(x)$ contains cofinitely many atoms. (Though that isn't a sufficient condition for x to be of finite support!!)[4]

It would be nice if the class of sets of finite support gave us a model of something sensible, but extensionality fails: $\mathcal{P}(A)$ and the set $\{X \subseteq A : X$ is of finite support$\}$ are both of finite support and have the same members with finite support. We have to consider the class of elements hereditarily of finite support. Let's call it HF. This time we do get a model of ZF.

Let f be a definable function. Notice that if (a, b) fixes every argument to f, it must also fix its value, by single-valuedness of f. This has the immediate

[4] A counterexample: wellorder cofinitely many atoms. The graph of the wellorder has cofinitely many atoms in its transitive closure, but they are all inequivalent.

consequence that HF is closed under all definable operations: sets that are of finite support are of finite support in virtue of a cofinite set of atoms that they cannot discriminate. So if $x_1 \ldots x_n$ are all of finite support, then $f(x_1 \ldots x_n)$ is in HF in virtue of the intersection of the cofinite sets of atoms associated with $x_1 \ldots x_n$, and the intersection of finitely many cofinite sets is cofinite. This takes care of all the axioms of ZF except infinity. Since every wellfounded set is fixed under all automorphisms, HF will contain all wellfounded sets so since there was an infinite wellfounded set in the model we started with HF will contain that infinite set and will model infinity. Finally HF satisfies replacement because of remark 106.

We now have a very simple independence proof of AC from ZF. Consider the set of (unordered) pairs of atoms. This set is in HF. But clearly no selection function for it can be. Suppose f is a selection function. It picks a (say) from $\{a, b\}$. Then f is not fixed by (a, b). Clearly the equivalence classes of $\sim_f$ are going to be singletons, and $\sim_f$ is going to be of infinite index and f is not of finite support.

So the axiom of choice for countable sets of pairs fails. Since this axiom is about the weakest version of AC known to man, this is pretty good. The slight drawback is that we have had to drop foundation to achieve it. On the other hand the failure of foundation is not terribly grave: the only illfounded sets are those with a Quine atom in their transitive closures, so there are no sets that are gratuitously illfounded: there is a basis of countably many Quine atoms.

8.9 The axiom of Choice

Why do people believe the axiom of choice anyway? The things that make the axiom of choice look so plausible (the countable collection of pairs of socks in Russell's Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy p.126) are very misleading. One is tempted to say "It's obvious that the union of countably many pairs is countable, and if we need the axiom of choice to prove it then the axiom of choice we'd better have". The point is not that this is a fallacy of affirming the consequent: there is nothing wrong with arguing for an axiom on the grounds that it has a lot of obviously true consequences that do not appear to follow from the other axioms we have settled on. We saw this in connection with lemma 91 and the axiom scheme of replacement. The problem here is that the consequences of the axiom of choice are *not* obviously true, but can be easily confused with things that are. Any subset of the plane or of $\Re^3$ that is a union of countably many pairs is indeed countable, but that is not the same as saying that any union of countably many pairs is countable. If the socks from countably many pairs of socks are dispersed through $\Re^3$ then the interior of every sock must contain a rational number, and there will be a least rational number inside each sock, and this can be used to count the socks. So this is a proof that there are countably many socks in countably many pairs of socks:[5] it is not a proof

[5]Or, more correctly, we can prove the following without any use of AC at all: if A is a family of disjoint subsets of $\Re$, each with nonempty interior, and A has a countably infinite

of the axiom of choice for countably many pairs.

Another—common and important—example of a spuriously plausible assertion is the claim that a union of countably many countable sets is countable. The most illuminating discussion of this is one I learned from Conway (oral tradition). Conway distinguishes between a **counted set**, which is a structure consisting of a set with a bijection onto $\mathbb{N}$, and a countable set, which is a naked set that just happens to be the same size as $\mathbb{N}$. As Conway says (elliptically but memorably): a counted union of counted sets is counted; a countable union of counted sets is countable, but a counted union of countable sets, and *a fortiori* a countable union of countable sets could—on the face of it—be anything under the sun. The fact that is obvious is not 'a countable union of countable sets is countable' but the quite distinct 'a counted union of counted sets is counted'.

Put like this, it sounds as if failures of the axiom of choice happen only when we have imperfect information about sets. If we were God we would be able to wellorder the universe and we would be able to see that a union of countably many countable sets is countable. What else could it possibly be? The counterexample we have contrived seems indeed contrived, and to happen only because we cannot tell Quine atoms apart. But God can, so God knows that AC is true. In philosophical terminology, people who believe that mathematical objects are real are **realists**. It certainly seems to be the case that realists also tend to believe the axiom of choice. They believe it for substantially the same reasons that God knows that AC is true. If mathematical objects are real then questions about their sizes must have real answers. The only possible answer to the question about the number of socks seems to be $\aleph_0$, and if the only way to infer that is to assume AC then realists have a good reason to believe AC.

8.9.1 AC and constructive reasoning

The idea that independence of AC is connected with incomplete information should remind us of constructive reasoning: when we reason constructively we deliberately refrain from exploiting certain kinds of information. This would lead us to expect that AC should sit ill with constructive reasoning. This turns out to be the case: the axiom of choice implies the law of excluded middle. Indeed the law of excluded middle follows if there is even one nontrivial well-founded relation.

8.9.2 The consistency of the axiom of choice?

The idea that if we have perfect information about sets we can wellorder them gives rise to an idea for a consistency proof for the axiom of choice. Recall the rectype WF: its sole constructor adds at each stage *arbitrary* sets of what has been constructed at earlier stages. If we modify the construction so that at each stage we add only those sets-of-what-has-been-constructed-so-far about which we have a great deal of information then with luck we will end up with

partition into pairs, then A is countable.

a model in which every set has a description of some sort, and in which we can distinguish socks *ad lib.* and in which the axiom of choice is true. This strategy can be made to work, but there is no space for all the details here.

Exercises

1. Define E on $\mathbb{N}$ by: $n\ E\ m$ iff the n^{th} bit in the binary expansion of m is 1 (Remember to start counting at the 0th bit!!) Do you recognise this structure?

2. If you got that easily consider the following more complicated version: $n\ E_{\mathcal{O}}\ m$ iff either m is even and the n^{th} bit in the binary expansion of $m/2$ is 1 or m is odd and the n^{th} bit in the binary expansion of $(m-1)/2$ is 0. You have almost certainly never seen this structure before: what can you say about it?

3. An *antimorphism* is a permutation π of V so that $\forall x\ y\ x \in y \iff \pi(x) \notin \pi(y)$. Prove (*without* using the axiom of foundation) that no model of ZF has an antimorphism.

   (i) Find an antimorphism of the second structure in exercise 2.

   (ii) Is it unique? (hint: Consider the dual of the preceding structure, i.e., the natural numbers with the relation $n\ E_{\mathcal{O}^*}\ m$ iff either m is even and the n^{th} bit in the binary expansion of $m/2$ is 0 or m is odd and the n^{th} bit in the binary expansion of $(m-1)/2$ is 1. Prove that this is isomorphic to the naturals with $E_{\mathcal{O}}$)

4. Let X be a transitive set. If R is an equivalence relation on X and Y, Z are subsets of X we can define $R'(Y,Z)$ iff $(\forall y \in Y)(\exists z \in Z)(R(y,z)) \wedge (\forall z \in Z)(\exists y \in Y)(R(y,z))$. Check that the restriction of R' to X is also an equivalence relation on X.

   Show that this operation on equivalence relations has a fixed point. For any fixed point, one can take a quotient. Show how to define a membership relation on the quotient in a natural way, and that the result is a model of extensionality as well.

   This construction is of particular interest if X is a V_α and the fixed point is the greatest fixed point. What can you say about the quotient in this case?

5. Use AC to show that every chain-complete poset is a CPO.

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